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SUMMARY  
 
This thesis analyzes the technical definition of the crime of persecution for the 
purpose of prosecutions at the International Criminal Court.  The provisions on the 
crime of persecution are found in Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome 
Statute and Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  Lack of clarity is a difficulty 
with these provisions.  The writer analyzes the provisions by pooling together primary 
and secondary sources and drawing on the customary international law that has 
emerged from the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals established between 1945 
and 2003.  
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1907 
18 October, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land. 
 
1919 
28 June, Treaty of Versailles (Treaty of Peace between Allied and Associated Powers 
and Germany) 
 
1945 
26 July, Potsdam Declaration  
 
1948 
10 December, Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
9 December, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
 
1954 
28 July, International Law Commission 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind 
 
1963 
20 November, United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
1965 
21 December, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
1967 
7 November, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
 
1966 
16 December, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
16 December, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
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1973 
30 November, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid 
 
1976 
18 July, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid 
 
1978 
27 November, Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice 
 
1979 
18 December, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
 
1981 
25 November, Declaration on the Eliminations of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief  
 
1991 
19 July, International Law Commission 1991 Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind 
 
1992 
18 December, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
 
1996 
6 May-26 July, International Law Commission 1996 Draft Code of Offences Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind 
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STYLISTIC GUIDELINES 
 
The writer advises that the reader bear in mind the following stylistic guidelines when 
reading this thesis:   
• The symbols * + # which appear in the text and footnotes of this thesis are 
used to differentiate the writer’s own footnotes from those that appear in the 
Elements of Crimes drafted by the Preparatory Commission.  
• The word “Judgment” is deliberately capitalized in this thesis to comply with 
the way in which the ad hoc Tribunals use the word.  
• There are different spellings used for the word “Judgment”.  In the majority of 
instances: 
- The ICTY uses “Judgment”;  
- The ICTR uses “Judgement”;   
- The ICC and the Panels of Judges use both spellings. 
• The writer uses the phrase “international judicial bodies” to collectively 
describe the combination of Panels of Judges, Extraordinary Chambers, 
Special Courts, and Special Tribunals etc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
I. THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS  
 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (hereafter referred 
to as ICC) recognizes persecution as a crime against humanity.  Article 7 defines 
‘crimes against humanity’ as: “any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.”  The statutory provision identifies 11 enumerated acts 
which can amount to crimes against humanity.  Pursuant to Article 7(1)(h) these 
include: “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph (Article 7) or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”  In addition, Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute defines persecution as: “the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”    
 
This is the first time the crime of persecution has been defined in an international 
instrument.  The difficulty with the definition is that it is not clear.  The drafters 
appear to have left some unanswered questions which the writer will attempt to 
address in this thesis.  For example, how does one determine the severity of 
deprivation?  By what means could deprivation be carried out – physical, mental, or 
emotional?  What are fundamental rights?  On what other grounds than those 
stipulated in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute can the crime of persecution be 
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committed?  What does the phrase ‘by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity’ mean?  What factors determine or distinguish a group or collectivity?1   
 
In addition to the Rome Statute provisions pertaining to persecution, there are also the 
Elements of the crime of persecution.  Delegates who attended the 1998 Rome Statute 
deliberations, commonly referred to as the Rome Conference, were in agreement that 
it was necessary for a Preparatory Commission to draft the Elements of Crimes for the 
crimes recognized by Rome Statute: genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.2  There are 6 Elements that constitute the crime of persecution; these are 
stipulated in Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  They are:  
 
Element 1 The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons 
of fundamental rights.   
  
Element 2 The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or 
collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.   
  
Element 3 Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender…, or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under 
international law.   
  
Element 4 The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, 
Paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+   
  
Element 5 The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
  
Element 6 The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
  
                                                 
1 See questions raised by Cherif M. Bassiouni in Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in 
International Criminal Law (2nd ed) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 330. 
 
2 Knut Dörmann, with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War 
Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 1-2, 8. 
 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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The aim of this thesis is to analyze of the technical definitions of persecution found in 
these two significant international instruments, that is, the Rome Statute and the 
Elements of Crimes.  
 
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘persecution’ differs from the technical meaning 
established in the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes.  For example, Cherif M. 
Bassiouni, referring to definitions found in dictionaries from around the world, 
compiled the following definition of the terms ‘persecute’ or ‘persecution’:    
State action or policy leading to the infliction upon an individual of harassment, torment, 
oppression, or discriminatory measures, designed to or likely to produce physical or mental 
suffering or economic harm, because of the victim’s beliefs, views, or membership in a given 
identifiable group (religious, social, ethnic, linguistic etc.), or simply because the perpetrator 
sought to single out a given category of victims for reasons peculiar to the perpetrator. 3 
 
Also, in discussions held at the International Law Commission (hereafter referred to 
as ILC) for the 1991 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind (hereafter referred to as Draft Codes), the observation was made that the 
non-legal dictionary term ‘to persecute’ is: “to annoy with persistent or urgent 
approaches, to pester.”4   
 
There is no doubt that the term persecution in the context of crimes against humanity 
carries a different meaning.  Of particular concern here, is the simple fact that crimes 
                                                 
3 Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd ed) (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 327. Bassiouni relied on: Arabic, Danish, Dutch, English, French, 
German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, 
Spanish, Swedish, and Turkish sources.  This definition of crimes of persecution was discussed in great 
detail in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997 
paragraph 695.  The Tribunal commended Bassiouni’s attempts to fill what the Tribunal referred to as 
definitional vacuum.   
 
4 See, discussion in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 
January 2000, paragraph 569.  
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against humanity are offences of extreme gravity; they are not in any way trivial 
crimes.5  The crime of persecution is a serious offence, the punishment of which “on 
account of its distinctive features, has been found to justify a more severe penalty.”6  
Therefore, the argument could be made, and rightly so, that in the context of a 
criminal trial it would be inapplicable to adopt a simple definition for the crime of 
persecution such as the non-legal definition discussed at the ILC.7   
 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ROME STATUTE, THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
Article 21(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute establishes the applicable law to be used by 
the ICC:  
1. The Court shall apply:  
(a)   In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;  
(b)   In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict;  
(c)   Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards (emphasis added). 
                                                 
5 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 
569.  
 
6 Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, ICTY Trial Judgment, 28 October 2003, paragraph 
91, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 785; 
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 2001, paragraph 113; 
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, ICTY Sentencing Judgment, 27 February 2003, 
paragraph 27. 
 
7 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 
569.  
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A. THE ROME STATUTE AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES  
 
Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute discusses the general relationship between the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes.  According to this provision the purpose of the 
Elements is “to assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, 
and 8.”  In addition, Article 9(3) of the Rome Statute states that “the Elements of 
Crimes and the amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.”    
 
Paragraph 1 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes stipulates that 
“pursuant to article 9, the following Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute, including article 21 and 
the general principles set out in Part 3, are applicable to the Elements of Crimes.” 
 
The argument could be made, that as long as the Elements of Crimes do not contradict 
the Rome Statute, the two international instruments carry equal significance at the 
ICC.  Article 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute stipulates that “the Court shall apply: in the 
first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence” 
(emphasis added).  However, the provisions articulated in Article 9(1) and Article 
9(3) of the Rome Statute indicate that the Rome Statute is the primary instrument, and 
the Elements of Crimes assist in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 
8 only as long as the Elements are consistent with the Statute.  
 
The table below indicates that the provisions for the crime of persecution in Article 7 
of the Rome Statute and Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes are substantially 
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the same although there are some differences, discussed further in the thesis.  For 
example, Element 1 of the Elements of the crime of persecution, compared to Article 
7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute, does not expressly state that the deprivation of the 
fundamental rights should be intentional.  A requirement for intention is inferred from 
the Rome Statute provisions.  Another difference is that Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes, in contrast with Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute, uses 
the term ‘targeting’.   
 
Comparison of the Rome Statute (1998) and Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 
Elements of Crimes (2000) relating to the crime of persecution 
 
 
ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE (1998) 
 
ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES (2000) 
 
 
Chapeau to Article 7 
 
Elements 5 & 6 
 
…acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack. 
(5)  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
(6)  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
 
Article 7(1)(h) 
 
Elements 3 & 4 
 
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in 
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
(3)  Such targeting was based on political racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law. 
 
(4)  The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred 
to in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.+ 
 
Article 7(2)(g) 
 
 
Elements 1 & 2 
“Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.  
(1)  The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ 
one or more persons of fundamental rights. 
 
(2)  The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the 
identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the groups or 
collectivity as such. 
 
                                                 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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It may be noted that the discussion in this thesis will be organized around the 
Elements because these are set out in a systematic fashion.   
 
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Pursuant to Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC shall apply “principles and 
rules of international law.”  It may be noted that the delegates at the Rome Conference 
referred to case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as ICTY) to assist in drafting the provisions of the 
Rome Statute.   
 
Customary international law on persecution can be derived from the various 
international instruments that have prohibited crimes of persecution and judgments 
relating to these instruments.  A significant number of Tribunals and Special Courts 
have been established since the Second World War.  Created between 1993 and 2003, 
they include: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter referred to as 
ICTR), the ICTY, Panels of Judges with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal 
Offences Established within the East Timor District Courts (hereafter referred to as 
Panels of Judges), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter referred to as SCSL), 
Extraordinary Chambers within the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (hereafter referred to as 
ECCC), and the Iraqi Special Tribunal for the Prosecution of Crimes Against 
Humanity (hereafter referred to as IST).  Prior to 1993, there were only two ad hoc 
Tribunals.  These were created between 1945 and 1946: the International Military 
 29 
Tribunal (hereafter referred to as IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (hereafter referred to as IMTFE). 
 
Customary international law emerging from the ad hoc Tribunals would be relevant to 
the ICC as it may be applicable to some problems of interpretation in the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes.  As will be seen throughout this thesis, many of 
the terms used in the Rome Statute and the Elements of the crime of persecution are 
quite similar, and in some instances identical, to those used by the ad hoc Tribunals.  
For example, the provisions pertaining to the crime of persecution established in East 
Timor Regulation 2000/15 are identical to the Rome Statute provisions.  Therefore, 
the East Timor case Joni Marques et al8 was the first case to ‘test’ the Rome Statute 
definition of persecution.   
 
III. WHAT IS THE WRITER’S INTEREST IN THIS TOPIC? 
 
The writer’s interest in this topic stemmed from a series of discussions held with 
academic advisers concerning the writer’s frustration with the issue of widespread 
violations of human rights perpetrated by State sponsored insurgents.  The Rome 
Statute provisions and the Elements of the crime of persecution provided an 
appropriate framework within which to discuss these issues.  Upon closer examination 
of the statutory provisions pertaining to the crime of persecution the writer discovered 
that although a serious crime, persecution remains a somewhat peculiar, vague crime 
which has attracted little attention in international criminal law.  The crime of 
                                                 
8 Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001, hereafter 
referred to as the Los Palos case. 
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persecution was first prohibited in the Nuremberg Charter of 1945; it was prohibited 
in four subsequent international instruments, 9  but persecution was only defined 
approximately fifty years later in the Rome Statute of 1998.  Furthermore, analysis of 
the world’s major criminal justice systems indicates that the crime of persecution is 
not known10 in domestic criminal law.   
 
There are two distinctive features of the crime of persecution that captured this 
writer’s attention.  The first feature is the role that the crime plays at the ICC in 
comparison with its role at the majority of the ad hoc Tribunals.  The second feature 
is the scope of the discriminatory grounds required for the crime.   
 
Regarding the role of persecution at the ICC, crimes of persecution, pursuant to the 
Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, have a nexus requirement which appears to 
narrow the application of this crime.   According to the second limb of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Rome Statute, it must be shown that the persecution was committed “in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph (Article 7) or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court”11 (emphasis added).  Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes contains similar wording which parallels that found in Article 
7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.   
 
                                                 
9 See, Control Council Law No. 10, Tokyo Charter, ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute.  
 
10 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 694.  
See also discussion in Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 
(2nd ed) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 327.  
 
11 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, see also Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes. 
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Historical analysis of statutory international instruments indicates that a nexus 
requirement for crimes of persecution has come and gone several times in the period 
from 1945 to 2003.  It could be argued that, under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute 
and Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, the crime of persecution 
at the ICC is an ancillary crime as a result of the nexus requisite.  In contrast, it would 
appear that the crime of persecution, pursuant to the ad hoc Tribunals is a separate 
and distinct crime in its own right. 
 
Crimes of persecution have a nexus requirement pursuant to both the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters.  It is therefore interesting to note comments made by Cherif M. 
Bassiouni on these Charters which could be applied at the ICC.  Bassiouni, having 
analyzed the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and the Control Council Law No. 10 
(hereafter referred to as CCL 10), suggests that these provisions deal with persecution 
in two distinct ways.  According to Bassiouni, the first method treats persecution as “a 
prerequisite legal element.”  Presumably he is referring here to a requirement for a 
connection with another crime.  The second method treats persecution as though it 
were a specific crime in its own right.  Bassiouni describes the second approach as 
problematic.  He argues that not only is persecution not a crime in any of the world’s 
major criminal systems, but also proposes it is not “an international crime per se 
unless it is the basis for the commission of other crimes” (emphasis appears in the 
text).  Therefore, Bassiouni is of the view that there should be an identifiable “nexus 
between the discriminatory policy and existing international crime.”12   
 
                                                 
12 Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd ed) (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 327. 
 
 32 
Regarding the discriminatory grounds required for the crime, pursuant to the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes, these include: “political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law.”13  These discriminatory grounds are a distinct 
feature that set persecution apart from other crimes against humanity.14   
 
The argument could be made that when any crime against humanity is committed on 
discriminatory grounds, the statutory provision for crimes of persecution create an 
aggravated form of the original underlying crime.  Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth 
argue that “persecution can be an aggravated form of an enumerated inhumane act, if 
the act is committed with discriminatory intent.”15   
 
In addition, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al held, “acts that are not 
inherently criminal may nonetheless become criminal and persecutorial if committed 
with discriminatory intent.”16  When the Chamber made this statement they referred 
to jurisprudence from the Second World War where such acts as: “denying bank 
accounts, educational or employment opportunities, or choice of spouse to Jews on 
the basis of their religion,” amounted to persecution.17   Similarly, in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Simić et al, the Trial Chamber upheld the view that “persecutory act(s) 
or omission(s) may encompass physical and mental harm, infringements upon 
                                                 
13 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, see also Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes. 
 
14 This is with exception to the provisions stipulated in the ICTR Statute and ECCC Special Law which 
stipulate a requirement of discrimination for all crimes against humanity.  
 
15 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72.  
 
16 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 2 November 2001, paragraph 186. 
 
17 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 2 November 2001, paragraph 186. 
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individual freedom, as well as acts which appear less serious, such as those targeting 
property, provided that the victimized persons were specially selected or 
discriminated on political, racial, or religious grounds”18 (emphasis added).  
 
IV. AIMS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
A. WRITING STYLE AND STRUCTURE ADOPTED IN THIS THESIS 
 
The writer pooled together and summarized primary and secondary sources of 
information pertaining to crimes of persecution.  The writer largely adopts a 
descriptive method to provide the reader with an overview of all the relevant 
information available regarding the Rome Statute negotiation process at the Rome 
Conference as well as the deliberations over the Elements of Crimes at the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court.  In addition, the writer 
also cites customary international law pertaining to the crime of persecution which 
has emerged from the ad hoc Tribunals established between 1945 and 2003.   
 
The writer has chosen to structure the chapters in this thesis based on Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes, rather than the Rome Statute simply because the 6 
Elements of the crime of persecution are set out in a systematic fashion.    
 
A simple way to understand the structure of the Elements is that the Elements can be 
said to deal with two distinct aspects of a crime.  The first aspect is the actus reus of 
                                                 
18 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 50 
upheld the views expressed in the Blaškić Judgment.  See, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, 
ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 233. 
 
 34 
the crime, that is, the prerequisites which when added together constitute the conduct 
in question that is prohibited.  The second aspect is the mens rea, that is, the mental 
element, be it intent and/or knowledge, required for the crime.19  Elements 1 – 5 of 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes deal with the actus reus of the crime of 
persecution.  Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes deals with an 
aspect of the mens rea required for the crime of persecution.  However, Element 6 
does not deal with all aspects of mens rea.  
 
A more detailed, and somewhat complicated, way to understand the structure of the 
Elements of Crimes is found in the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes.  
Paragraph 7 of the Introduction states that the Elements are listed according to 
principles such as the conduct, consequences, and circumstances associated with a 
particular crime.  This is followed by the mental element and finally contextual 
circumstances are listed at the end.20  However, analysis of the 6 Elements of the 
crime of persecution found in Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes shows that 
they do not seem to adhere to the structure proposed by the Preparatory Commission 
in paragraph 7 of the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes.  For example, according 
to the proposed structure, since Elements 5 and 6 deal with the contextual 
circumstances in which the crime of persecution is perpetrated, Element 4 should deal 
with the mental element required for the crime of persecution.  Clearly, however, 
                                                 
19 Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, “General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of 
Crimes” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 13-14.   
 
20 Paragraph 7 of the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes states: 
The elements of crimes are generally structured in accordance with the following principles:  
- As the elements of crimes focus on conduct, consequences and circumstances associated with each 
crime, they are generally listed in that order; 
- When required a particular mental element is listed after the affected conduct, consequence or 
circumstance; 
- Contextual circumstances are listed last. 
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Element 4 does not establish the mental element required for persecution.  Hence, the 
writer has disregarded the structure proposed in paragraph 7 of the Introduction to the 
Elements of Crimes and simply structured the thesis in the manner indicated below.  
 
B. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAPTERS IN THIS THESIS 
 
In the following chapter, Chapter 2, the writer will trace the historical development of 
the term ‘persecution’.  In order to understand how the crime of persecution 
developed, one should be made aware of how persecution emerged as a crime against 
humanity.  Thus, Chapter 2 provides an analysis of preliminary historic references to 
the concept of crimes against humanity.  The writer also analyses the provisions on 
crimes of persecution established in: the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, CCL 10, the 
ICTY, and the ICTR.  In discussing the historical development of crimes of 
persecution, the writer will also analyze cases that helped shape customary 
international law in the aftermath of the Nuremberg era, these include: Barbie and 
Eichmann, heard before French and Israeli Courts, respectively.   
 
In Chapter 2, the writer will also analyze documents submitted by the ILC following a 
series of mandates by the UN General Assembly, commencing as early as the 1950’s, 
to draft an international instrument with the view to establishing a permanent 
International Criminal Court.  Thus, the writer discusses Draft Codes which were 
relied upon by delegates when the Rome Statute for the ICC was negotiated at the 
Rome Conference of 1998.  In particular, the writer analyses the 1954, 1991 and 1996 
Draft Codes.   The writer will also briefly discuss international instruments, created 
since 1998, which contain provisions on crimes of persecution.  These include: 
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Regulation 2000/15, ECCC Special Law, SCSL Statute, UN/Cambodia Agreement, 
and the IST Statute. 
 
In Chapter 3, the writer will analyze Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes which addresses the kinds of deprivations that amount to acts of persecution 
under the Rome Statute.  Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes 
states: “the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more 
persons of fundamental rights.”  In analyzing Element 1, the writer considers a 
number of issues, such as: who could be said to perpetrate crimes of persecution?  
What is ‘severe deprivation’?  What are fundamental rights?  
 
In Chapter 4, the writer discusses Elements 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes, which concern the manner of deprivations required for acts of 
persecution under the Rome Statute.  
 
Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the perpetrator 
targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity.”  
One of the characteristics that makes persecution so unique and sets it apart from 
other crimes against humanity is the discriminatory basis on which the crime is 
committed.  The writer considers issues such as: what acts are considered ‘targeting’?  
Why are the persons targeted by reason of their identity?  What differentiates a group 
or collectivity? 
 
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “such targeting was 
based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”  
The writer will analyze each of these impermissible grounds and discuss their 
significance.   
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the conduct was 
committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the 
Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+”  The writer will investigate 
this nexus requirement in greater detail and discuss how it affects the crime of 
persecution pursuant to the Rome Statute.   
 
The final part of Chapter 4 examines Element 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes which states: “the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”  Crimes against humanity are 
distinct from ordinary crimes because they are committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack.  The writer will discuss the terms ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’, as 
well as evaluate the definition provided in the Rome Statute for the phrase ‘attack 
directed against any civilian population’.   
 
In Chapter 5, the writer examines the mens rea required for crimes of persecution.  
The writer discusses Article 30 of the Rome Statute which defines the terms ‘intent’ 
and ‘knowledge’.  In addition, the writer will also discuss the provisions of the 
                                                 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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Elements of Crimes resulting from the Article 30 requirements.  The chapter will also 
identify what effects Article 30 of the Rome Statute and the related provisions of the 
Elements of Crimes have on the crime of persecution, as well as compare the mens 
rea requirements established by the ad hoc Tribunals.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, will conclude the thesis by summarizing the arguments 
and provide concluding remarks on the law pertaining to crimes of persecution.  
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2. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO THE CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY OF PERSECUTION 
 
The previous chapter briefly outlined what the crime of persecution is and what role it 
plays in International Criminal Law.  In this chapter, the writer will discuss in greater 
detail the progressive development of the crime against humanity of persecution.  In 
order to illustrate this, the writer will trace the historic development of international 
provisions pertaining to crimes against humanity spanning from as early as 1868 to 
international instruments created as recently as 2003.    
 
To understand how the crime of persecution developed, one needs to be aware of how 
persecution originated as a crime against humanity.  Crimes against humanity are 
amongst the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.  The 
phrase ‘crimes against humanity’ has come to acquire particular legal and moral 
significance.21   A crime against humanity, simply described is, “a crime against 
‘humaneness’ that offends certain general principles of law which becomes the 
concern of the international community.  It has repercussions beyond international 
frontiers or exceeds in magnitude or savagery any limits tolerated by modern 
civilization.”22 
                                                 
21 David Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity” (Winter, 2004) 29 Yale Journal of 
International Law 85 at 86. 
 
22 Egon Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity” (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178 at 
195-7. Also discussed in Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
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I. PRELIMINARY HISTORIC REFERENCES TO THE CONCEPT OF 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE CRIME OF 
PERSECUTION 
 
The concept of crimes against humanity, criticized by Darryl Robinson for its lack of 
order, has developed under customary international law in a manner best described as 
haphazard.23   Crimes against humanity, as they are known today, emerged from 
expressions like ‘the laws of humanity’ which can be traced back as early as the 
1860’s.24  
 
For example, the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 was proclaimed to limit the use 
of explosive or incendiary projectiles which were described as: “contrary to the laws 
of humanity.”25  This spirit of safeguarding humanity was reflected by the enthusiasm 
of the Parties’ to the Declaration who were eager to reconcile the laws of humanity 
with those of war.  This was evidenced by the Parties’ agreement to draft even more 
instruments in the future which would maintain these principles.26  
 
Again, we see reference to the concept of laws of humanity at the First Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899.  The Conference adopted the Martens Clause which was later 
                                                 
23 Darryl Robinson, “Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43 at 44.  
 
24 Darryl Robinson, “Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43 at 44.  
 
25 Declaration renouncing the use, in time of war, of projectiles under 400 grammes weight, reprinted 
in: A. Roberts and R. Guelff (eds), Documents on the Laws of War 30, 31 (2nd ed. 1989). 
 
26 Declaration renouncing the use, in time of war, of projectiles under 400 grammes weight, reprinted 
in: A. Roberts and R Guelff (eds), Documents on the Laws of War 30, 31 (2nd ed, 1989). 
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included as part of the preamble to the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907.   It referred to 
“the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from 
the dictates of the public conscience.”27 
 
In later years, the Joint Declaration of France, Great Britain, and Russia, issued on 28 
May 1915, denounced the massacre of Armenians in Turkey by the Ottoman Empire.   
The Declaration described the massacres as crimes against humanity and 
civilization.28  The Declaration called for the highest levels of accountability with 
clear indications that the Turkish Government and its agents would be held 
responsible for their actions.29  This was the first time that not only did the idea of 
crimes against humanity become a crime, but those who perpetrated the crimes, it was 
felt, were to be held responsible.  It is also interesting to note that these massacres 
were initially referred to as acts of persecution.30  
 
The Joint Declaration of 1915 was an important development in attempts to legislate 
crimes against humanity.  Roger S. Clark argues that there were three crucial factors 
                                                 
27 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble 
paragraph 8, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1908), Cmd. 4175, at 46.  See commentary from Rodney Dixon, 
“Introduction/General Remarks: Crimes Against Humanity” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1999) at 121.  Also, discussion in Cherif M. Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in 
Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 11 at 16. 
 
28 See generally: United Nations War Crimes Commission, (1948) History of the Nations War Crimes 
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War 35. 
 
29 The Armenian Memorandum Presented by the Greek Delegation to the Commission of Fifteen on 14 
March 1919. Quoted in Egon Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity” (1946) 23 British Yearbook of 
International Law 178 at 181.  
 
30 Egon Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity” (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178 at 
181.  
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driving the drafters of the Declaration which ultimately shaped the development of 
crimes against humanity, namely:   
(a) Their idea of crimes against humanity and civilization included killings of a minority 
ethnic group in a country by the group in political power.  
(b) Although the complaining states were never able to deliver on their promise, they had in 
mind individual criminal responsibility for those responsible.  
(c) The crimes involved were distinct from war crimes – they took place within Turkey itself 
and there was no serious effort by Britain, France, and Russia to link the killings directly 
to the then world-wide conflict in which Turkey was involved.31 
 
In the aftermath of the First World War, some delegates at the Paris Peace Conference 
of 1919 were determined to create an international court.  It was perceived that the 
purpose of the court, composed of Allied Judges, was to prosecute those perpetrators 
responsible for violating the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity.32  
However, the proposal to establish an International Court was vehemently opposed.  
Countries such as America and Japan voiced their concerns about establishing a court 
of such magnitude empowered to prosecute individuals in an unprecedented manner 
that was unknown to the customary practice of nations.33    
 
                                                 
31 Roger S. Clark, “Crimes Against Humanity” in George Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev, The 
Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990) at 178.  
 
32 Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment 
(London: University of Carolina Press, 1998) at 1.  See also Commission on the Responsibility of 
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace 
Conference (1919 Paris Peace Commission Report), Versailles, Mar. 1919, Conference of Paris, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No.32, Annex. 
As quoted in Rodney Dixon, “Introduction/General Remarks: Crimes Against Humanity” in Otto 
Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) at 122. 
 
33 Commission on the Responsibility of Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, “Report 
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919” (1920) 14 American Journal of 
International Law 95 at 145. 
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II. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION 
FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CREATED IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
Following World War Two, there were 3 international instruments dealing with 
crimes against humanity, namely: 
1. Article 6 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunal; 
2. Article II of the Control Council Law No.10; 
3. Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East. 
 
The first of these instruments, the Charter for the International Military Tribunal, was 
created in 1945.  It was the first international instrument that used the expression 
‘crimes against humanity’.  In all these 3 international instruments, ‘crimes of 
persecution’, summarized in the table below, were included.  The Charter for the 
International Military Tribunal was also the first instrument that expressly prohibited 
crimes of persecution.   
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Comparison of international instruments created in the aftermath of World War Two relating to 
crimes of persecution 
 
Terminology Rome Statute (1998) Nuremberg Charter 
(1945) 
CCL 10 (1945) 
 
Tokyo Charter (1946) 
 Article 7(1)(h) Article 6(c)  
 
Article II(1)(c)  Article 5(c) 
Description of the 
provision 
Crimes against 
humanity 
Crimes against humanity Crimes against 
humanity. Atrocities and 
offences 
Crimes against 
humanity 
Perpetrator - Individuals or members 
of organizations 
- Individuals or members 
of organizations 
Nexus to an armed 
conflict 
- - - - 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against any 
civilian population, 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against any 
civilian population 
- - - 
Persecution against 
group or collectivity 
Persecution against 
any identifiable group 
or collectivity 
- - - 
Specific grounds of 
Persecution 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial or 
religious grounds 
Political, racial or 
religious grounds 
Political or racial 
grounds 
Nexus requirement In connection with any 
acts in paragraph or 
crime within 
jurisdiction of the 
Court 
In execution of or in 
connection with any 
crime within jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal 
- In execution of or in 
connection with any 
crime within 
jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal  
Mens Rea With knowledge of the 
attack 
- - - 
 
Index 
Nuremberg Charter – Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals, appended to the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
CCL 10 – Control Council Law No. 10 
Tokyo Charter – Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East  
 
A. CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
 
The International Military Tribunal was created in the aftermath of the Second World 
War.  The Nuremberg Charter of the IMT was signed on 8 August 1945 to try and 
punish major war criminals of the European Axis.34   
 
                                                 
34 Article 1, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals, 
appended to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, U.N.T.S, Vol. 82, at 279.  
 
 45 
The IMT, and later the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, were a critical 
step in what could be described as the “first proper expression of international 
criminal law and procedure.”35 Benjamin Ferencz, a Prosecutor in the Einsatzgruppen 
case, later acknowledged that: “at that time, there were no precedents whatsoever for 
the trials.  We were simply trying to establish a rough kind of justice.”36  What made 
the Nuremberg Tribunal so significant was the simple fact that there was no 
precedent, law or legal infrastructure in place that had ever been established with the 
view to prosecute international crimes of such magnitude.  Prior to the IMT, there had 
only ever been “sporadic instances in history where efforts had been made to bring 
individuals to account for what would be regarded today as international crimes.”37  
 
Hence, the Nuremberg Charter was the first international instrument to prohibit 
crimes against humanity in international criminal law.38   This was a critical step 
because it was well established that the Nazi Regime had perpetrated the atrocities 
which were committed against the German Jews and minority groups.  The difficulty 
had been that although customary international law, be it the laws of aggression or 
war crimes, provided for the protection of civilians in an international armed conflict, 
the same laws did not include the protection of civilians in circumstances where the 
                                                 
35 Ilias Bantekas et al, International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
69.  
 
36 Benjamin Ferencz, “The Experience of Nuremberg” in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Crimes, 
Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, Inc., 2000) at 5. 
 
37 Ilias Bantekas et al, International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
69. See also Howard Ball, War Crimes and Justice: Contemporary World Issues Series (California: 
ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2002) at xv. 
 
38 Cherif M. Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 11 at 26.  See also 
B. V. A. Röling and Antonio Cassese (ed), The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of A Peacemonger 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) at 1.  
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atrocities were carried out by a State against its own citizens.  In essence, Article 6(c) 
was drafted into the Nuremberg Charter to prosecute those who had perpetrated the 
crimes committed on such a large scale against the German Jews and minority 
groups.39  
 
The Nuremberg Charter provided the first comprehensive provisions in international 
criminal law for crimes of persecution.  Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter 
established a list of prohibited acts which amounted to crimes against humanity.  
These included crimes of persecution:  
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated (emphasis added). 
 
One of the features of the definition of the crime of persecution was the specification 
of specific grounds on which the crime of persecution could be committed: political, 
racial or religious grounds.   
 
Yet, the Nuremberg Trials have been widely criticized.   The Trials are often referred 
to as victors’ justice because they displayed overwhelming lack of neutrality, 40 
supposedly applied ex post facto law,41 and one could even argue that the Trials were 
                                                 
39 Ilias Bantekas et al, International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
74.  See also Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 
at paragraph 169. 
 
40 Wilbourn E. Benton and Georg Grimm (eds), Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1955) at 102-103. 
 
41 Herman von Hebel, “An International Criminal Court – A Historical Perspective” in Herman von 
Hebel et al (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos 
(The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 1999) at 20. 
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a political act and not an exercise of law.42  Despite this, the Trials were not entirely a 
complete disappointment. They were hailed for providing precedents which 
established the necessary judicial competence to adequately resolve crimes which 
involved human rights violations.43  Of equal importance, one of the Tribunal’s most 
profound achievements was the fact that the State and its functionaries were being 
held liable for crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses that occurred 
within national borders.  Thus, the prohibition against such crimes was becoming 
firmly entrenched in international law.44  
 
Both the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia 
have commended jurisprudence originating from the Nuremberg Trials for having 
provided significant legal precedents articulating the crime of persecution in great 
detail.45   
 
The Streicher case, in particular, has been noted for signifying the severe gravity of 
crimes of persecution.  Streicher was a publisher of an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper 
from 1923 to 1945.  The Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced Streicher to death for his role 
                                                 
42 Richard Overy, “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making” in Philippe Sands (ed), 
From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 1 at 7. 
 
43 Christopher C. Joyner, “Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: the Universal 
Declaration and the Search for Accountability” (Summer, 1998) 26 Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy 591 at 597.  
 
44 Roger S. Clark, “Nuremberg and Tokyo in Contemporary Perspective” in T. H. L. McCormack and 
G. J. Simpson, Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) at 179. 
 
45 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 19;  
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, paragraph 
981; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case no. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 625, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, 
paragraph 708.       
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in the persecution of the Jews.  In the trial of Julius Streicher the Nuremberg Tribunal 
held:  
Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being 
killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial 
grounds in connection with War crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a crime 
against humanity.46 
 
B. CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10  
 
The Control Council Law No. 10 was signed in Berlin on 20 December 1945 at the 
time of the Nuremberg Trials.  It supposedly provided the authority to prosecute war 
criminals that fell outside the Nuremberg Tribunal jurisdiction.47  What made this 
Law readily applicable was the fact that it was drafted on the inspiration of the 
Nuremberg Charter and authorized occupying authorities to carry out prosecutions of 
perpetrators held in their custody.48  
 
Article II(1)(c) of the CCL 10 stipulates that its definition of crimes against humanity 
encompasses:  
 Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any 
                                                 
46 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 19, 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 708;  See 
also Judgment of the Military Tribunal For The Trial of German Major War Criminals, London, His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951 “Streicher” at 102. Available at: 
www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi?imt/tgmwc/judgment/j-defendants-streicher. Accessed 31 January 2004. 
 
47 Wilbourn E. Benton and Georg Grimm (eds), Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1955) at 149.  
 
48 Roger S. Clark, “Nuremberg and Tokyo in Contemporary Perspective” in T. H. L. McCormack and 
G. J. Simpson, Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) at 183.  
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civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in 
violation of the Domestic laws of the country where perpetrated… 49 (emphasis added). 
 
Prior to the CCL 10, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter had established that the 
crime of persecution could be committed “on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” 
(emphasis added).  CCL 10 omitted the nexus requirement, thus widening the scope 
within which to prosecute crimes of persecution.  Documentary evidence shows that 
numerous Nazi soldiers were prosecuted under this specific category, including those 
who committed offences before the war broke out.50  
 
The trial of Josef Altstötter et al, known as the Justice Trial, discussed the provisions 
stipulated in CCL 10 pertaining to crimes of persecution.  The trial involved the 
prosecution by the United States Military Tribunal of former Judges, Prosecutors and 
officials of the German Reich Ministry of Justice.  The Indictment charged the 
Accused with having “embraced the use of the judicial process as a powerful weapon 
for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the Nazi regime regardless 
of nationality and for the persecution and extermination of races.”51   
 
The Tribunal held that persecution of Jews and Poles constituted persecution by way 
of utilizing a legal system to facilitate a discriminatory policy.  The Tribunal 
                                                 
49 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946.  
 
50 Ilias Bantekas et al, International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
75. 
 
51 Indictment of the Justice Trial, NMT, Volume III, at 18, discussed in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, 
Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraphs 611-612.  See also Matthew 
Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Spring, 1997), 17 Boston College Third World Law Journal 
171 at 210-211. 
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identified that forms of persecution included excluding Jews from legal professions 
and passing decrees to that effect, disallowing intermarriages between Jews and 
Germans coupled with severe consequences in violation of such prohibitions, State 
confiscation of property belonging to Jews upon their death, etc.52  Commenting on 
CCL 10, the Tribunal held, the provision was “directed against offenses and inhumane 
acts and persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds systematically organized 
and conducted by or with the approval of government.”53 
 
C. CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FAR EAST 
 
Although South East Asia had endured wars of aggression instigated by Imperial 
Japan since 1928, the Second World War witnessed the expansion of Japanese 
aggression with the bombing of United States forces stationed at Pearl Harbour.54    
 
In the aftermath of the Pearl Harbour bombing, the Unites States expressed its view 
that the international community required, “epochal proceedings designed to 
formulate and codify standards of international morality.”55  Consequently, the ‘Big 
Four’ victorious allies, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet 
Union, and France issued a statement historically known as the Potsdam Declaration 
                                                 
52 Trial of Josef Alstötter and Others, NMT, Volume III, at 1063-64, discussed in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraphs 611-612. 
 
53 Matthew Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Spring, 1997), 17 Boston College Third World Law 
Journal 171 at 211-212, discusses Trial of Josef Alstötter and Others. 
 
54 Ilias Bantekas et al, International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
78.  
 
55 General MacArthur proclamation text as quoted in Richard H. Minear, Victor’s Justice – The Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) at 166.  
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which paved the way for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.  The 
Allies declared, “we do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or 
destroyed as a nation but stern justice shall be meted out to war criminals including 
those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”56  
 
Pursuant to Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter for the IMTFE,57 the following are 
crimes against humanity, including ‘persecutions’: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the Domestic law of the country where perpetrated… (emphasis added). 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF LEADING JUDGMENTS PERTAINING TO THE 
CRIME OF PERSECUTION THAT SHAPED INTERNATIONAL 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NUREMBERG 
ERA 
 
In the period following the Nuremberg Trials there were a number of national cases, 
for example, Barbie58 and Eichmann,59 discussed below, which established significant 
legal precedents pertaining to crimes of persecution.   
 
                                                 
56 Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945.  
 
57 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946). Special Proclamation by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as amended 26 April, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. 
 
58 Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants at Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 
Judgment of the Court of Cassation of 20 December, 78 International Law Reports 125 (1985). 
 
59 Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, District Court of Jerusalem. 
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A. FÉDÉRATION NATIONALE DES DÉPORTÉS ET INTERNÉS 
RÉSISTANTS AT PATRIOTES AND OTHERS V. BARBIE           
 
During the wartime occupation of France, the Accused, Klaus Barbie, was the Head 
of the Gestapo in Lyons from the period November 1942 to August 1944.  Although 
he left France at the end of the war and sought refuge in Bolivia, he was extradited 
back to France in 1983.  He was later convicted of 340 counts of the 17 charges of 
crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment.60   
  
In the 1985 judgment, later confirmed on Appeal,61 the Court defined crimes against 
humanity with reference to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.  It held crimes 
against humanity were: 
… inhumane acts and persecution committed in a systematic manner in the name of a State 
practicing a policy of ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of their 
membership of a racial or religious community, but also against the opponents of that policy, 
whatever the form of their opposition.62 
                                                 
60 Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants at Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 
Judgment of the Court of Cassation of 20 December, 78 International Law Reports, 125 (1985) 
discussed in Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity”, in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) see discussion at footnote 26 page 362. See also discussion in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraphs 569-570. 
 
61 On Appeal, the Court of Cassation in its 1988 Judgment further explained that “… deportation or 
extermination of the civilian population during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds, constituted not a distinct offence or an aggravating circumstance but rather an essential 
element of the crime against humanity, consisting of the fact that the acts charged were performed in a 
systematic manner in the name of the State practicing by those means a policy of ideological 
supremacy.  See Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants at Patriotes and Others v. 
Barbie, Judgment of the Court of Cassation of 3 June 1988, 78 International Law Reports, at 332 and 
336. Also discussed in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 
1998, paragraph 570.  For in depth analysis of the case see Leila Sadat Wexler, “Interpretation of the 
Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again” 
(1994) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 289.  
 
62 Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants at Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 
Judgment of the Court of Cassation of 20 December, 78 International Law Reports, 125 (1985) at 137, 
discussed in Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity”, in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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In addition, the Judgment of Prosecutor v. Tadić concurs with the views expressed by 
General M. Le Gunehec of the Court of Cassation in the Barbie case.  Bearing in 
mind Tadić was the first ICTY case, the Trial Chamber held that General M. Le 
Gunehec’s comments could be construed as a useful definition of the crime of 
persecution.63  General M. Le Gunehec had argued that the kinds of crimes discussed 
in the case undermined the core of the fundamental rights of mankind such as: rights 
to equality and rights to hold one’s own political or religious views.  The General 
made the observation that the consequence of such crimes in some cases led to death, 
and in other cases led to what he described as, “the violation of the dignity of all men 
and women”.  The reason why such deaths or violations attacked the core of 
fundamental rights of mankind was because the victims were “victimized only 
because they belong to a group other than that of their persecutors, or do not accept 
their dominion.”64 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2002) see discussion at footnote 26 page 362. See also discussion in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraphs 569-570. 
 
63 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 696, 
Report of Counsellor Le Gunehec, quoted in Antonio Cassese, “Klaus Barbie: The Exemplary Life of 
an Executioner” in Antonio Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age (1988), Cassese suggests 
that although the statement by the General was offered in the context of crimes against humanity, the 
definition is one that discusses the ‘persecution type’ of crimes against humanity.  See also reference in 
Micaela Frulli, “Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?” (2001), 12(2) 
European Journal of International Law 329, footnote 68 at 347.   
 
64 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 696, 
Report of Counsellor Le Gunehec, quoted in Antonio Cassese, “Klaus Barbie: The Exemplary Life of 
an Executioner” in Antonio Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age (1988).  See also reference 
in Micaela Frulli, “Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?” (2001) 12(2) 
European Journal of International Law 329, footnote 68 at 347. 
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B. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ISRAEL V. ADOLF EICHMANN 
 
Adolf Eichmann was the former Head of Jewish Affairs in the Office of the Reich 
Security.  In Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, the Accused was 
convicted and sentenced to death by the District Court for persecuting Jews, Gypsies, 
and Slavs by way of murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation, and deportation.  
The Supreme Court later upheld the District Court decision.65  Eichmann was charged 
pursuant to the Israeli Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law.  It is 
interesting to note that this provision incorporated Nuremberg Charter provisions on 
crimes against humanity.66  
 
The Supreme Court held that “it was proved with unchallengeable certainty that he 
[Eichmann] took his place not only among those who were active, but also those who 
activated the implementation of the ‘Final Solution’, the total extermination of the 
Jews of Europe.  The appellant was no petty killer in this undertaking, but took a 
leading part and had a central and decisive role.”67   The Court therefore, found 
                                                 
65 Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, District Court of Jerusalem, 
discussed in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 602. See also Matthew Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Spring, 1997) 17 Boston 
College Third World Law Journal 171 at 240.  
 
66 Matthew Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Spring, 1997) 17 Boston College Third World Law 
Journal 171 at 240. 
 
67 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36, International Law Reports, 277 
Supreme Court, 1962, at 340 discussed in Matthew Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Spring, 
1997), 17 Boston College Third World Law Journal 171 at 240.  See also general discussion in Micaela 
Frulli, “Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?” (2001) 12(2) European 
Journal of International Law 329 at 348-349. 
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Eichmann guilty of the persecution of Jews on national, racial, religious and political 
grounds.68  
 
IV. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION 
FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CREATED PRIOR TO 
THE 1998 ROME STATUTE 
 
Prior to the Rome Statute of 1998 there were 2 additional international instruments 
dealing with crimes against humanity.   Created almost fifty years after the Second 
World War, they were: 
1. Article 5 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia; 
2. Article 3 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
These 2 international instruments included ‘crimes of persecution’, summarized in the 
table below.   
 
                                                 
68 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36, International Law Reports, 277 
Supreme Court, 1962, at 340 discussed in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY 
Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 602. 
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Comparison of international instruments from ad hoc Tribunals created prior to the 1998 Rome 
Statute relating to crimes of persecution 
 
Terminology Rome Statute (1998) ICTY Statute (1993) ICTR Statute (1994) 
 Article 7(1)(h) Article 5(h)  Article 3(g)  
 
Description of the 
provision 
Crimes against humanity Crimes against humanity Crimes against humanity 
Perpetrator - - - 
Nexus to an armed 
conflict 
- Committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or 
internal 
- 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against any 
civilian population, 
Widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any 
civilian population 
And directed against any 
civilian population 
Widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian 
population on national, 
political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds 
Persecution against 
group or collectivity 
Persecution against any 
identifiable group or 
collectivity 
- - 
Specific grounds of 
Persecution 
Political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender or other grounds 
Political, racial and religious 
grounds 
Political, racial and religious 
grounds 
Nexus requirement In connection with any acts 
in paragraph or crime 
within jurisdiction of the 
Court 
- - 
Mens Rea With knowledge of the 
attack 
- - 
 
Index 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  
ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
 
A. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA69 
 
In 1993, the UN Security Council established an ad hoc Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia.  The jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established to bring about 
                                                 
69 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
Annex to Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993). 
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accountability for the “widespread violations of international humanitarian law within 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the practice of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’...considered by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and 
security.”70   
 
Creating the Tribunal was indeed a major step towards international accountability for 
the atrocities.  This was a gesture that represented collective humanitarian 
intervention initiated by the Security Council to prosecute perpetrators of massive 
human rights violations. 71   Theodor Meron, the current President of the ICTY, 
described the Tribunal as one of “cardinal importance” to the body of international 
humanitarian law.  Meron made the observation that in comparison to the last four 
decades since the Nuremberg Tribunals, international humanitarian law has 
progressed at a rapid pace since the ICTY’s inception and its prosecution of the 
atrocities that were committed in the former Yugoslavia.72 
 
Crimes against humanity, and in particular crimes of persecution, were articulated in 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.   Article 5 established that:  
The International Tribunal shall have power to prosecute persons responsible for the following 
crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against any civilian population:  
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
70 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 22.  
 
71 John R. W. D. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998) at 3.  
 
72 Theodor Meron, “War Crimes Come of Age” (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 462 
at 462- 463.  
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Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić was the very first case heard by the ICTY and also the first 
ICTY case to discuss the crime of persecution.  The Accused was charged under 
Count 1 with persecution pursuant to Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute.   The Trial 
Chamber described persecution as: “the violation of the right to equality in some 
serious fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right that 
constitutes persecution, although the discrimination must be on one of the listed 
grounds to constitute persecution under the Statute.”73  Pursuant to Article 5(h) of the 
ICTY Statute, the Chamber identified 2 elements which constitute the crime of 
persecution: 
1. The occurrence of a persecutory act or omission; and  
2. A discriminatory basis for that act or omission on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, 
religion or politics.74 
 
Persecution itself was defined for the first time at the ICTY in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreškić et al. 75   Persecution was defined as: “a gross or blatant denial, on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary 
or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as other acts prohibited in Article 
5.”76   
 
                                                 
73 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 697. 
 
74 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 715. 
 
75 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000. 
 
76 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 
621. 
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B. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA77  
 
An alarming humanitarian crisis occurred over the period of April 1994 to July 1994 
during which between half a million to a million civilians lost their lives in Rwanda78 
in what has been described as “one of the most appalling cases of genocide that the 
world had witnessed since World War II.”79  
 
The UN Security Council responded by enacting Chapter VII provisions of the UN 
Charter to set up a Rwandan ad hoc Tribunal.  It was believed that setting up a 
Tribunal to prosecute those that were responsible for the crimes, which were 
committed in a period of approximately 90 days, would somehow “contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation, and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”80  
 
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, much like the ICTY 
Statute, included provisions for prosecuting the crime of persecution.  A significant 
difference between the ICTY and ICTR Statutes is the requirement of discrimination 
                                                 
77 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States, Annex to Security Council Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 1994 S 
C. Res. & Dec. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994).  
 
78 Herman von Hebel, “An International Criminal Court – A Historical Perspective” in Herman von 
Hebel et al (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos 
(The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 1999) at 31.  For detailed discussion see Romeo A. Dallaire, “The 
End of Innocence, Rwanda 1994” in Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choices – Moral Dilemmas in 
Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1998) at 71.  
 
79 Paul Magnarella, Justice in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) at 41.  
 
80 Herman von Hebel, “An International Criminal Court – An Historical Perspective” in Herman von 
Hebel et al (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos 
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 1999) at 31.  
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for all crimes against humanity found in the chapeau of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.  
The ICTR Statute provided that crimes against humanity could only be committed by 
widespread or systematic attacks on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds.  In addition to this, the Statute provided that the crime of persecution could 
only be committed on political, racial or religious grounds.    
 
According to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute:  
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:  
(g) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (emphasis added).  
 
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, later confirmed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, was the first 
ICTR case that adopted a definition for the crime of persecution.  The Accused was 
charged under Count 2 with the crime against humanity of persecution pursuant to 
Article 3(h) of the ICTR Statute; he was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.81  In its 
reasoning, the ICTR Trial Chamber adopted the ICTY definition of persecution, that 
is, “a gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid 
down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as 
other acts prohibited in Article 5.”82   
 
                                                 
81 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 21; 
Confirmed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 
2003, paragraph 1072. 
 
82 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 
621.  See discussion of this definition in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial 
Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 21, confirmed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-
52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, paragraph 1072. 
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V. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS IN DRAFTING THE ROME 
STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, it became evident to the world community 
that some form of legislated means was essential to prohibit and punish what was 
referred to as “the kind of behaviour in peacetime that leads to the mass destruction of 
human lives.”83  This recognition was an important development simply because it is 
now well established that what makes crimes against humanity distinct is the fact that 
they involve grave violations of human rights, perpetrated on a large scale.  These 
grave large-scale violations are of concern because they are said to escalate into 
international crimes which ultimately threaten international peace and security.84   
 
With the lessons learnt from the World War as a driving force, the UN General 
Assembly mandated the International Law Commission, as early as 1947, to prepare a 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.  Although the 
ILC began its work on the Draft Codes as early as 1954, the work was stalled due to 
differences of opinion, but recommenced in 1981.  By 1990 the General Assembly 
mandate was more specific, requiring the ILC to investigate international criminal 
jurisdiction and draft a statute with the view to establishing a permanent international 
criminal trial mechanism.   In 1994, the ILC submitted its Draft Statute for the ICC.   
Following this, the ILC continued its work on the Draft Codes, in particular, the 1996 
                                                 
83 R. Lemkin, “Le genocide” Revue Internationale De Droit Penal, Paris, 1946, at 373.  
 
84 Iu A. Reshetov “Crimes against Humanity” in George Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev, The 
Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990) at 199.  
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Draft Code which is often referred to by ad hoc Tribunals.  Each of these Draft Codes 
contains provisions on the crime of persecution.85   
 
A. THE WORK OF THE ILC 
1. 1954 Draft Code  
 
Article 2(11) of the 1954 Draft Code provided that crimes against humanity 
encompass:  
Inhumane acts, such as: killing, extermination, enslavement, exile or persecution, committed 
against any civilian population out of political, religious or cultural motives by the authorities 
of any State or by private persons acting at the instigation of or in connivance of these 
authorities86 (emphasis added). 
 
This Draft Code was a progressive step in further establishing, in the post Nuremberg 
era, the crime against humanity of persecution.  The ILC not only expanded the 
grounds on which the crime of persecution could be committed to include cultural 
motives but it also articulated the role that State authorities or persons acting at their 
instigation must have played in furthering the perpetration of this crime.  Persecution 
committed on cultural grounds appears in the final text of Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute and Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
85 For further information on the negotiation and drafting process see the ILC website available at: 
www. un.org/law/ilc/convents.htm; Also see commentary on the 1996 Draft Code available at:  
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dccomfra.htm; the Report of the International Law Commission on the work 
of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, General Assembly Official Records, Forty Ninth 
Session Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10) available at: www.un.org/law/ilc/reporfra.htm; the ICC website 
general information on the Chronology of the ICC available at: www.icc-
cpi.int/php/whatistheicc/chronology.php 
 
86 [1954] 2 Yearbook International Commission 150.  Note that prior to announcing the Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission acknowledged 
the Nuremberg Charter and in 1950 affirmed that according to the Nuremberg Principles, “Crimes 
against Humanity included: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts 
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when 
such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime 
against peace or any war crime.” [U.N.G.A.O.R, 5th Session, Supp. No. 12, UN Doc. A/1316 (1950)].  
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Draft Code shows that by 1954 the crime of persecution was not only considered an 
international crime, but the perpetration of this crime breached the international peace 
and security of mankind.  
 
2. 1991 Draft Code  
 
Article 21 of the 1991 Draft Code, under the title systematic or mass violations of 
human rights, states:  
An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of 
human rights: murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, 
servitude or forced labour; persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural 
grounds in a systematic manner or on a mass scale; or deportation of forcible transfer of 
population shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced87 (emphasis added). 
 
The 1991 Draft Code is that the Draft established freedom from persecution as a 
human right.  It also criminalized the violation of this right.88   There were some 
concerned States who feared that the Draft provisions were too broad and had the 
potential to violate their sovereignty, so they did not wholeheartedly embrace the idea 
                                                 
87 The First Reading of the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report 
of the International Law Commission On Its Forty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No10, 
at 238, U.N. Doc A/46/10 (1991). 
 
88 Cherif Bassiouni presents an interesting argument to be discussed further in the next chapter within 
the context of severely depriving fundamental rights.  Bassiouni points out that although there were 
significant legal instruments after 1945 that prohibited discrimination which lead to persecution, there 
were no official instruments that rendered such activities a criminal act except for the Apartheid 
Convention Article II(f) of which the crime of apartheid includes persecutions of organizations and 
persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms on the basis of their opposition to 
apartheid.  Bassiouni then goes on to list legal instruments that have called for non-discriminatory 
practices.  They include the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights; 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid; Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against All Women; 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief.  Cherif M. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law  (2nd edn) (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 327-328. 
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of criminalizing human rights violations.  Those opposing the Draft Code provisions 
argued the Code should only seek to criminalize human rights violations that were 
particularly serious, that is, ones that threatened the peace and security of mankind as 
a whole.  Thus, to ease their concerns, the provision was drafted to indicate that the 
violations of human rights would have to be of such great magnitude, in terms of 
being widespread and systematic violations, so as to warrant serious international 
concern.89  
 
Hence, we find the 1991 Draft Code provides that in order to constitute the crime of 
persecution, the acts must be carried out in a systematic manner or as part of the 
implementation of a large-scale policy.  Machteld Boot has suggested that the term 
systematic refers, “to a constant practice or a methodical plan to carry out such 
violations,” and mass scale shows, “the number of people affected by such violations 
or the entity that has been affected.”90 
 
3. 1996 Draft Code  
 
Article 18(e) of the 1996 Draft Code states:  
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic 
manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization 
or group:  
                                                 
89 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 466-467.   
 
90 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 466.   
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(e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds;91 (emphasis added). 
 
This definition of crimes against humanity was drawn from the Nuremberg Charter 
and influenced by the international law developments at the ICTY.92   
 
The ILC, commenting on the provisions it drafted, stated that “the inhumane act of 
persecution may take many forms with its common characteristic being the denial of 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which every individual is entitled 
without distinction as recognized in the charter of the United Nations and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”93 
 
In addition, the ILC also explained that the expression ‘instigated or directed by a 
Government or by any organization or group’ was best illustrated in terms of what the 
alternative of the term meant.  In considering the alternative meaning of the 
expression the ILC argued that instances of isolated criminal conduct perpetrated by 
individuals acting on their own agenda would not amount to crimes against humanity.  
The expression was inserted into the Draft Code with the intention of excluding cases 
where individuals committed inhumane acts to further their own criminal plans which 
                                                 
91 The Second Reading of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report 
of the International Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 
at 9, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).  
 
92 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 467. 
 
93 International Law Commission Report, 1996 at paragraph 11, Commentary on Article 18, Crimes 
Against Humanity.  
 
 66 
were independent of what the ILC described as the “encouragement or direction” 
provided by a Government, group or organization.94  
 
The Commission also expanded the grounds on which the crime of persecution could 
be committed to include ethnic grounds.  Persecution committed on ethnic grounds 
appears in the final text of Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 3 of 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  However, social grounds were not 
included in the 1996 Draft Code.  
 
VI. THE 1998 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
  
In 1998, representatives from 160 UN State members and members of specialized 
agencies, organizations and other entities attended the UN Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries.  Commonly referred to as the Rome Conference, the deliberations 
were held in Rome from 15 June 1998 to 17 July 1998 in a bid to negotiate the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court.95   
 
The Parties that attended the Rome Conference adopted the Rome Statute at the 
conclusion of the month-long proceedings.  Article 5 of the Rome Statute empowers 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over 4 specific categories of crimes.  These crimes are 
                                                 
94 International Law Commission Report, 1996 at paragraph 5, Commentary on Article 18, Crimes 
Against Humanity. 
 
95 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Rome Italy, 15 June – 17 July 1998. A/CONF.183/10*, 17 July 1998. 
Annex II lists 160 State Members, Annex III lists 31 Organisations and other entities represented at the 
Conference by an observer, Annex IV lists 135 Non-governmental Organisations represented at the 
Conference by an observer.  
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said to amount to crimes of most serious concern to the international community.  
They are: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime 
of aggression.   
 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute is of particular concern to the subject discussed in this 
thesis.  The provision prohibits the perpetration of crimes against humanity, including 
crimes of persecution.  According to Article 7:  
1. Crimes against Humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack:  
(h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (emphasis added). 
 
Persecution is defined in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute as: “the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”  
 
In addition to the Rome Statute, the Preparatory Commission for the ICC drafted 
Elements of Crimes for each of the Court’s crimes.  The Rome Statute is the first 
international criminal instrument that is complimented by a set of Elements of 
Crimes, the significance of which is discussed in the Introduction.   
 
The Preparatory Commission for the ICC formulated 6 Elements for the crime of 
persecution.  The Elements of Crimes relating to persecution are found in Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  These Elements will assist in the interpretation 
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and application of the statutory provisions on the crime of persecution found in 
Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.    
 
According to Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, the Elements of the crime of 
persecution are:    
Element 1: The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more 
persons of fundamental rights.  
Element 2: The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a 
group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.  
Element 3: Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender…, or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible 
under international law.  
Element 4: The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, 
Paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+  
Element 5: The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
Element 6: The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
 
There are a number of differences, noted below, between the provisions in the Rome 
Statute on crimes against humanity and crimes of persecution and the provisions in 
international criminal instruments created prior to 1998.  For instance:  
1. The crime of persecution was given a statutory definition for the first time in Article 7(2)(g) of 
the Rome Statute.   
2. The Preparatory Commission formulated a set of 6 Elements of the crime of persecution to 
assist in the interpretation and application of the Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of the 
Rome Statute.  The Elements of the crime of persecution are established in Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Elements of Crimes.    
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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3. The concept of severely depriving a group or collectivity of fundamental rights is expressly 
stated in the Rome Statute unlike the other international instruments where the concepts have 
been inferred by the Trial Chambers. 
4. The Rome Statute significantly widened the grounds on which persecution could be 
committed. Up until the 1998 Rome Statute, customary international law had established that 
persecution could be committed on political, racial, or religious grounds.  Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Rome Statute, therefore, established that the crime of persecution is also committed on 
national, ethnic, cultural, gender, and other grounds recognized as impermissible under 
international law. 
5. The CCL 10, ICTY, and ICTR do not have a nexus requirement established for crimes of 
persecution.  However, this nexus requirement significantly narrowed the scope to prosecute 
crimes of persecution pursuant to the Rome Statute.  
6. The Rome Statute, unlike the ICTR Statute, does not require discriminatory intent to be 
established for all crimes against humanity.  
7. The Rome Statute, unlike the ICTY Statute, does not require a nexus to an armed conflict in 
order to prosecute crimes against humanity.  
 
VII. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE CRIME 
OF PERSECUTION FORMULATED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
1998 ROME STATUTE 
 
Following the Rome Statute of 1998 there have been 4 additional international 
judicial bodies created to date.  These 4 international judicial bodies exercise 
jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes against humanity including the 
crime of persecution and other international crimes.  They are: the Panels of Judges 
with Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Serious Criminal Offences Established within the 
District Courts in East Timor (2000); the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea (2001); the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002); and the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity (2003). 
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These international judicial bodies have been established with the power to prosecute 
crimes of persecution, tabled below, pursuant to the following statutory provisions:  
1. Section 5(1)(h) and 5(2)(f) of East Timor Regulation No. 2000/15 (2000); 
2. Articles 3 and 5 of Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001); 
3. Article 2(h) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002);  
4. Article 9 of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2003);  
5. Article 12(a)(8) and 12(b)(6) of the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Against Humanity (2003).  
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Comparison of international instruments created in the aftermath of the 1998 Rome Statute 
relating to crimes of persecution 
 
Terminology Rome Statute 
(1998) 
East Timor 
Regulation 
No. 2000/15 
(2000) 
ECCC Special 
Law (Cambodia) 
(2001) 
SCSL Statute 
(2002) 
 
UN/Cambodia 
Agreement 
(2003) 
IST Statute 
(2003) 
 Article 7(1)(h)  Section 5(1)(h)  
 
Article 5  Article 2(h)  Article 9 Article 12(a)(8) 
Armed conflict - - - - - - 
Widespread or 
systematic 
attack directed 
against any 
civilian 
population, 
Widespread or 
systematic 
attack directed 
against any 
civilian 
population 
Widespread or 
systematic 
attack AND 
directed 
against any 
civilian 
population 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against 
any civilian 
population on 
national, political, 
ethnical, racial or 
religious grounds 
Widespread or 
systematic 
attack against 
any civilian 
population 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against 
any civilian 
population 
Widespread or 
systematic attack 
directed against 
any civilian 
population 
Persecution 
against group 
or collectivity 
Persecution 
against any 
identifiable 
group or 
collectivity 
Persecution 
against any 
identifiable 
group or 
collectivity 
- - Persecution 
against any 
identifiable 
group or 
collectivity 
Persecution 
against any 
identifiable 
group or 
collectivity 
Specific 
grounds  
Political, 
racial, 
national, 
ethnic, 
cultural, 
religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, 
racial, 
national, 
ethnic, 
cultural, 
religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial 
and religious 
grounds 
Political, 
racial, ethnic 
or religious 
grounds 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, 
religious, gender 
or other grounds 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, 
religious, gender 
or other grounds 
Nexus In connection 
with any acts 
in the 
paragraph or 
crime within 
the jurisdiction 
of the Court 
In connection 
with any acts 
in the 
paragraph or 
crime within 
the jurisdiction 
of the Panel  
- - In connection 
with any acts in 
the paragraph or 
crime within the 
jurisdiction of 
the Court 
In connection 
with any acts in 
the paragraph or 
crime within the 
jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal 
Mens rea With 
knowledge of 
the attack 
With 
knowledge of 
the attack 
- - With knowledge 
of the attack 
With knowledge 
of the attack 
 
Index 
Rome Statute – Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
East Timor Regulation No. 2000/15 – Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels of Judges with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Over Serious Criminal Offences  Established within the District Courts in East Timor 
ECCC Special Law (Cambodia) – The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea  
SCSL Statute – Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone  
UN/Cambodia Agreement – Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea  
IST Statute – The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal for the Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity  
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A. PANELS OF JUDGES WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER 
SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENCES ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE 
EAST TIMOR DISTRICT COURTS 
 
In 1975, East Timor was annexed as the 27th province of Indonesia, following 
independence from the colonial Portuguese government.  In spite of a number of 
unsuccessful uprisings staged by Timorese revolutionary groups, it was not until June 
1999 that the Indonesian government announced it would hold a referendum for the 
people of East Timor to determine their future.  Up to 80% of the Timorese 
population voted for autonomy which resulted in a brutal campaign of violence 
perpetrated by pro-integration militias who favoured Indonesian rule.  Following calls 
for international assistance, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (hereafter referred to as UNTAET) assisted with the move to transitional 
independence of East Timor once the Indonesian authorities withdrew.  East Timor 
finally secured its independence on 20 May 2002.96  
 
According to the Report of the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly 
regarding the situation of human rights in East Timor, it was evident that the attacks 
which took place in East Timor were triggered by the overwhelming vote supporting 
independence from Indonesia.  The Report described the crimes which were 
committed in that territory, stating they included: “murder, torture, sexual violence, 
forcible transfer of populations and other persecution and inhumane acts, including 
                                                 
96 East Timor Government homepage: www.gov-rdtl.org; United Nations Mission of Support in East 
Timor, background information: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background/html.  
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destruction of property.”  Furthermore, the Report alleged that the crimes were 
committed in a widespread and/or systematic manner.97 
 
Consequently, UNTAET issued Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of 
Courts in East Timor, whereby Section 10(c) provided the Panels of Judges with 
exclusive jurisdiction for serious crimes.  More specifically, the provision dealt with 
crimes against humanity, including the crime of persecution, perpetrated in East 
Timor between 1 January 1999 and 25 October 1999.  
 
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels of Judges with 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, in particular Section 5(1)(h) 
established the following provisions regarding the crime of persecution: 
5.1 For the purposes of the present regulation, "crimes against humanity" means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack and directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in Section 5.3 of the present 
regulation, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the panels; (emphasis added). 
 
The crime of persecution was defined in Section 5(2)(f) as: “the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.” 
 
                                                 
97 United Nations Report: Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, dated 10 December 1999. General 
Assembly document: A/54/660, paragraph 71.  See also the Report from the Commission set up to 
Investigate Human Rights Violations in East Timor, “Executive Summary Report on the Investigation 
of Human Rights Violations in East Timor”, dated 31 January 2000, available at: 
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/KPPHAMe.htm ; accessed on 5 February 2004. 
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It is clear from the wording of Sections 5(1)(h) and 5(2)(f) of Regulation 2000/15 that 
the provisions on the crime of persecution are identical to those stipulated in Article 
7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.    
 
The first case from the Panels of Judges to discuss the crime of persecution, 
Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al, also observed that the wording of these two 
international provisions is identical.  Furthermore, the Panel expressed its general 
satisfaction with the provisions pertaining to crimes of persecution found in both the 
Rome Statute and the East Timor Regulations.98 
 
B. EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS WITHIN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA 
 
The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, (then known as the Democratic Republic of 
Kampuchea), perpetrated serious human rights violations in the 1970’s during which 
approximately one and half million people lost their lives.  Approximately twenty-five 
years later, the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia finalized negotiations to 
bring about accountability for the atrocities committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 
January 1979.  On 6 June 2003, the two authorities signed the “Agreement Between 
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.”  
The UN/Cambodia Agreement established Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
(ECCC) of Cambodia to prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
                                                 
98 Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at 
paragraphs 662-669.  
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grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and also crimes of homicide, torture 
and religious persecution pursuant to domestic Cambodian law.99 
 
Prior to the Agreement signed between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the 
UN, the King of Cambodia had, on 10 August 2001, signed the “Law on the 
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.”   
 
The two separate instruments, that is, the UN/Cambodia Agreement and the ECCC 
Special Law, both contain provisions that deal with crimes of persecution.  However, 
the laws pertaining to crimes of persecution stipulated in these two instruments are 
not consistent.  It is not surprising that there is some confusion as to which law will be 
applied by the ECCC when it shall eventually commence proceedings.100   
 
For example, there is an inconsistency between Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia 
Agreement and Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law.  Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia 
                                                 
99 See The Council of Ministers Press and Communication Department from the Cambodian 
Government website, available at: www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/default.htm.  In particular “Statement by 
the Cambodian Delegation to the United Nations Regarding the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers within the Courts of Cambodia” available at: 
www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/government144.htm; accessed on 3 February 2004.  Also 
“Remarks by His Excellency Sok An Senior Minister, Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council 
of Ministers Chairman of the Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Preparation 
of the Proceedings for the Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders at the Signing Ceremony of the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea,” 6 June 2003, Chaktomuk Theatre, Phnom Penh, available at: 
www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/government152.htm; accessed on 3 February 2004. See also 
Suzannah Linton, “New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor” (March 
2002) 84(845) International Review of the Red Cross 93 at 96.  
 
100 For further analysis on this issue see Sarah Williams, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers – A 
Dangerous Precedent for International Justice?” in Colin Warbrick (ed), Current Developments: Public 
International Law (January 2004) 53(1) International Comparative Law Quarterly 227-245.  Also, 
Suzannah Linton, “Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice” 
(2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 185-246. 
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Agreement stipulates which crimes fall within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.  According to 
Article 9: “the subject matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be… 
crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, and… such other crimes as defined in Chapter II of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 August 2001.”  
 
The difficulty with Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement is that when one turns 
to Chapter II of the Special Law, one finds a very different definition for crimes 
against humanity than the one established in the Rome Statute.  According to Article 
5 of the ECCC Special Law:  
Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any acts committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, 
political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds, such as:  
--persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; (emphasis added). 
 
The provisions under the ECCC Special Law are significantly different to those found 
in the 1998 Rome Statute for two reasons.  Firstly, the chapeau to Article 5 of the 
ECCC Special Law establishes that there is a discriminatory intent element required 
for all crimes against humanity.  Pursuant to Article 5 of the Law all crimes against 
humanity must be committed on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious 
grounds.  Secondly, Article 5 establishes that persecution is committed on political, 
racial, and religious grounds.  In contrast, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute does 
two things: it provides a much wider stipulation of the grounds on which the crime of 
persecution could be committed and, at the same time, narrows the crime by referring 
to a nexus requirement which is not evident in the ECCC Special Law.   
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In addition, Article 3, pursuant to Chapter II of the ECCC Special Law, establishes 
that the ECCC shall have the power to prosecute crimes prohibited in the 1956 Penal 
Code of Cambodia that were perpetrated between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.  
According to Article 3 of the Special Law this will include, inter alia, the crime of 
religious persecution which is prohibited in Articles 209 – 210 of the Penal Code.  
Furthermore, Article 3 of the ECCC Special Law, which came into power in August 
2001, establishes that the statute of limitations for the 1956 Penal Code shall be 
extended to include the crimes committed during the Democratic Kampuchea 
period.101  
 
There are a few difficulties with the provisions found in the UN/Cambodia Agreement, 
the ECCC Special Law, and the Penal Code.  Suzannah Linton makes the observation 
that, first of all, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law is “akin” to the ICTR provisions 
on crimes against humanity in that the discriminatory intent is required for all crimes 
against humanity and not specifically for persecution alone.  Linton, commenting on 
the conflicting provisions, argues that one cannot comply with Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia Agreement provision to use the ICC definition of crimes against 
humanity because the ICC definition was “a progressive one that advanced the 
definitions used in both the ICTR Statute and that of its sister Tribunal, the ICTY.”  It 
is on this basis that Linton points out what she refers to as “the cardinal importance of 
human rights law” which is simply the common understanding that a person cannot be 
                                                 
101 The difficulty with the Penal Code is that Article 3 clumsily extends the statutory limitation of the 
Code by an additional 20 years in order to cover the 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979 period.  
Furthermore, according to the UN Group of Experts, “…sources on Cambodian law are extremely 
scarce.  The primary source of criminal law prior to the Khmer Rouge period is the 1956 Code Pénal et 
Lois Pénales,… though it appears that no sources reliably and comprehensively update this law through 
1975.” See “Report of the Group or Experts for Cambodia” annexed to the Secretary General Report on 
Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, S/199/231.  See also Suzannah Linton, “Cambodia, East Timor and 
Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice” (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 185 at 193-194. 
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tried, convicted and punished for conduct which was not criminal at the time the 
conduct was committed.  Linton concludes that the error is probably typographic 
because Article 2 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement establishes that the ECCC Special 
Law has subject matter jurisdiction.102  
 
C. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
 
Sierra Leone had experienced a decade of civil war dating back to 1991.  In August 
2000, the government of Sierra Leone invited the United Nations to establish a 
Special Court, created 16 January 2002, for the prosecution of violations of 
international humanitarian laws and Sierra Leonean laws committed in the territory 
since 1996.103  
 
Article 2(h) of the SCSL Statute established that: 
2. The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following 
crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population: 
(h) Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; (emphasis added). 
 
Although the SCSL has recently commenced proceedings, it has not delivered any 
judgments pertaining to the crime of persecution as yet.  Neither have any of the 
                                                 
102 Suzannah Linton, “Comments on the Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea”, Searing for the Truth – Comment and Analysis, Special 
English Edition, April 2003, Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam) at 37-38.  Available at: 
www.dccam.org 
 
103 Jelena Pejić, “Accountability for International Crimes: From Conjecture to Reality” (March 2002) 
84(845) International Review of the Red Cross 13 at 19-20. Also United Nations Security Council, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 4 October 
2000, S/2000/915. 
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Accused indicted to date been charged with the crime against humanity of 
persecution.  
 
D. IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
 
Iraq, formerly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, was briefly governed by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (hereafter referred to as the CPA) which established a 
Special Tribunal for the prosecution of crimes against humanity.  The CPA came into 
power on 15 November 2003 by special agreement with the Iraqi Governing Council.  
In the aftermath of the American led campaign and military attack against the former 
Iraqi dictatorship, mass graves have been uncovered allegedly containing the bodies 
of up to one million Iraqis.  The victims were primarily opponents or critics of the 
former Ba’ath regime.104 
 
There have been some strong views expressed by academics concerning the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal and its Statute, recently described as suffering from ‘legal 
schizophrenia’.105  Much like the International Military Tribunal, the IST runs the risk 
of being dubbed ‘victor’s justice’ because it is said to reproduce the very 
stigmatization and vengeance that was eminent at the IMT.106  Michael P. Scharf, in 
                                                 
104 For general information on the Coalition Provisional Authority “Mass Grave Strategic Plan” refer to 
the plan posted on the CPA website, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/27000pf.htm; accessed 3 
February 2004.   
 
105 Yuval Shany, “Does One Size Fit All? Reading the Jurisdictional Provisions of the New Iraqi 
Special Tribunal Statute in the Light of the Statutes of International Criminal Tribunals” (2004) 2(2) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 338 at 345. 
 
106 Danilo Zolo, “The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?” (2004) 2(2) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 313 at 316-318. 
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his lengthy critique of the IST has echoed the sentiment that the Tribunal borders on 
being categorized as victor’s justice which he believes only serves to undermine the 
Tribunal’s efforts.  Scharf made the observation that “as currently structured, the IST 
risks being seen by both Iraqi’s and outsiders as a puppet of the Occupying Power, 
and as a tool for vengeance by Saddam Hussein’s enemies, rather than as the 
cornerstone of a new judicial system, committed to the rule of law.”107 
 
The IST Statute, modeled extensively upon the ICC Rome Statute, empowers the IST 
to prosecute crimes of persecution, amongst other stipulated crimes, committed since 
17 July 1968.  Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute established that:    
a.  For the purposes of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: 
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
(emphasis added). 
 
The crime of persecution was defined in Article 12(b)(6) as: “the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”  
 
It is clear from the wording of Articles 12(a)(8) and 12(b)(6) of the IST Statute that 
the provisions on the crime of persecution are identical to those stipulated in Article 
7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.    
 
                                                 
107 Michael P. Scharf, “Is It International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in light of 
the Goals of International Justice” (2004) 2(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 330 at 330. 
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The IST has not yet commenced legal proceedings; therefore, to date there are no 
judgments pertaining to the crime of persecution.  
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3. ELEMENT 1 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF 
CRIMES INDICATING THE KINDS OF DEPRIVATIONS THAT 
CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION 
 
The previous chapter traced the historical development of the law pertaining to the 
crime of persecution from as early as 1899 leading up to the Rome Statute of 1998.  
The chapter also analyzed provisions on the crime of persecution established pursuant 
to instruments formulated by ad hoc Tribunals created in the aftermath of the 
International Criminal Court.  The historical examination demonstrated that the crime 
of persecution had never been defined in any International Criminal Law instrument 
up until the Rome Statute provisions of 1998.   
 
In this chapter, the writer discusses the kinds of deprivations that constitute the crime 
of persecution under the Rome Statute.  The discussion will include an analysis of 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes stipulated by the Preparatory 
Commission for the ICC.  The writer will also compare Element 1 of the Elements of 
the crime of persecution with relevant parts of Article 7 of the Rome Statute as well as 
analyze customary international law laid down by ad hoc Tribunals pertaining to 
crimes of persecution.  
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I. ELEMENT 1 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, states:  
The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons of 
fundamental rights. 
 
A. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 1 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND ARTICLE 7(2)(G) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE   
 
Element 1 of the crime of persecution parallels the wording of the Rome Statute 
definition of the crime of persecution found in Article 7(2)(g).  Persecution is defined 
in Article 7(2)(g) as: “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”   
 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes differs slightly from Article 
7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.  The wording found in the Article 7(2)(g) Rome Statute 
definition contains two additional requisites that must be established in order to prove 
crimes of persecution.  These two additional requisites are intent, discussed below, 
and the requirement that the persecution is carried out by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity, discussed in the next chapter.  
 
The first limb of the Rome Statute definition of the crime of persecution stipulates 
that the deprivation of the fundamental rights be not only severe but also intentional.  
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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With the exception of Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, the 
Elements of the crime of persecution do not expressly stipulate any mens rea 
requirements.   
 
Regarding the requisite of intent, stipulated in Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, this 
is defined in Article 30 of the Rome Statute.  Article 30 establishes the mental 
element required for all the crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.  According 
to Article 30(2), “a person has intent where: (a) in relation to conduct that person 
means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”   
 
Requiring that crimes of persecution must be committed with intent reflects 
customary international law.  In the proceedings for Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić the 
Trial Chamber established that, “what is necessary is some form of discrimination that 
is intended to be and results in an infringement of an individual’s fundamental 
right.”108  This position appears to have been adopted in other cases before the ICTY 
Trial Chambers, in particular: Stakić, Krnojelac, Kvočka et al and Kordić and 
Čerkez.109   
 
 
 
                                                 
108 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997 paragraph 
697. 
 
109 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 738, 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 431, 
Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 2001, paragraph 
200, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 212. 
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B. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 1 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, ARTICLE 7(2)(G) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE AND LEADING JURISPRUDENCE FROM AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS 
 
There are three leading cases from ad hoc Tribunals which define crimes of 
persecution: Joni Marques et al from East Timor, Kupreškić et al from the ICTY and 
Ruggiu from the ICTR.  The Judgments of all three cases were executed after the 
Rome Statute provisions of 1998.  Two of the three cases, Joni Marques et al and 
Kupreškić et al, refer to the ICC Elements of Crimes and Rome statutory provisions 
on persecution in their reasoning.  What makes these Judgments particularly 
significant is that the definitions of the crime of persecution formulated by the 
respective Tribunals are similar to the wording of Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.   
 
1. Los Palos case - East Timor Panels of Judges 
 
Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al, also known as the Los Palos case, 110 establishes a 
significant legal precedent for the ICC.  The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 
provisions on the crime of persecution are exactly the same as those found in the 
Rome Statute.  
 
                                                 
110 Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001, hereafter 
referred to as the Los Palos case. 
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UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 empowers the Panels of Judges with exclusive 
jurisdiction over serious criminal offences established within the East Timor District 
Courts to prosecute the perpetration of crimes of persecution.  Persecution is defined 
in Section 5(2)(f) of Regulation 2000/15 as: “the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group 
or collectivity.”  It is clear that this definition of persecution is the same as that 
stipulated in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.  It is also similar to the wording 
found in Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crime.     
 
The Prosecution alleged in Count 4 of the Los Palos case indictment that between 8 
and 30 September 1999 the Accused, recognized by the victims, belonged to ‘Team 
Alpha’ members of the Indonesian Military personnel.  According to the indictment, 
the Accused “intentionally committed, aided, abetted or otherwise assisted in the 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights of persons by reasons of the identity of their 
group or collectivity in violation of Section 5(1)(h) of the UNTAET Regulation 
2000/15.” 111   
 
The Panel of Judges, assessing the evidence and testimonies, found four of the 
Accused guilty of the crime against humanity of persecution, ruling that the 
allegations listed in the indictment were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 112  The 
Panel further found that the definitions of persecution laid down pursuant to the 
                                                 
111 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at p. 9.  
 
112 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraph 842.  Although there 
were 10 Accused persons in this case, the Prosecution only charged 4 persons: Joni Marques, Alarico 
Fernandes, Paulo Da Costa, and Gonsalo Dos Santos, with the crime of persecution.  All four were 
found guilty of persecution.  
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UNTAET Regulation and the Rome Statute were satisfactory, observing that these 
definitions were the same.  The Panel also adopted the ICC Elements of Crimes. 113  
The Los Palos case had involved widespread and systematic destruction of dwelling 
properties and the forced transfer of villagers from their homes.  The Panel held that 
the conduct of the Accused amounted to unlawful displacement of villagers and 
deprivation of their fundamental rights.114   
 
Aside from establishing a significant legal precedent for the ICC, a major criticism of 
the case is that although the Prosecution and Defense put forward lengthy legal 
arguments on the law of persecution, the Panel only discusses the applicable law in 3 
of the 249 pages of the judgment.  In doing so, the Panel fails to justify their 
conclusions and adds no further authorities or findings to our understanding of this 
area of law.115 
 
2. Kupreškić et al case – ICTY   
 
This case is significant for being the first case from the ICTY to define the crime of 
persecution.  The wording of the definition formulated by the Trial Chamber is similar 
to that of Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes and Article 7(2)(g) 
of the Rome Statute to the extent that persecution is recognized as the gross or blatant 
denial of fundamental rights.  
                                                 
113 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 662-669.  
 
114 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 801, 816 & 825.  
 
115 For detailed analysis and criticisms of the Los Palos case see Sylvia de Bertodano, “Current 
Developments in Internationalized Courts,” (2003), 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 226 at 
232-234. 
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In Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, 6 Accused were charged under Count 1 with the 
crime of persecution pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Yugoslav Statute.  The 
Prosecution alleged in the indictment that between the period October 1992 until 
April 1993, the Accused persecuted Bosnian Muslim inhabitants of the Ahmici-
Šantici region with the aim of removing them from the village and surrounding area 
through systematic killing of the civilians, destruction of their homes and property 
and detention and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from the Ahmici-Šantici region.116 
 
In reaching its conclusions for a definition of the crime of persecution, the Chamber, 
having analyzed international and national case law, summarized the actus reus of 
persecution as entailing the following indicators:   
a) A narrow definition of persecution is not supported in customary international law. 
Persecution has been described by courts as a wide and particularly serious genus of crimes 
committed against the Jewish people and other groups by the Nazi regime.  
 
(b) In their interpretation of persecution courts have included acts such as murder, 
extermination, torture, and other serious acts on the person such as those presently enumerated 
in Article 5.  
 
(c) Persecution can also involve a variety of other discriminatory acts, involving attacks on 
political, social, and economic rights.   
 
(d) Persecution is commonly used to describe a series of acts rather than a single act. Acts of 
persecution will usually form part of a policy or at least of a patterned practice, and must be 
regarded in their context. In reality, persecutory acts are often committed pursuant to a 
discriminatory policy or a widespread discriminatory practice… 
 
(e) As a corollary to (d), discriminatory acts charged as persecution must not be considered in 
isolation. Some of the acts mentioned above may not, in and of themselves, be so serious as to 
constitute a crime against humanity. For example, restrictions placed on a particular group to 
curtail their rights to participate in particular aspects of social life (such as visits to public 
                                                 
116 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 33. 
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parks, theatres or libraries) constitute discrimination, which is in itself a reprehensible act; 
however, they may not in and of themselves amount to persecution. These acts must not be 
considered in isolation but examined in their context and weighed for their cumulative 
effect.117 
 
Having identified the actus reus of the crime of persecution, the Trial Chamber 
defined persecution as: “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a 
fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the 
same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5.”118  The wording of this 
definition is similar to that of Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes 
and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute whereby persecution is recognized as the 
denial of fundamental rights.  However, there are three major differences between the 
Article 7(2)(g) Rome Statute definition, Element 1 and the Kupreškić et al 
definition.119  Firstly, the two ICC international instruments use the terms ‘severe 
deprivation’ in contrast with ‘gross or blatant denial’.  Secondly, the Kupreškić et al 
definition uses a ‘same level of gravity’ test which is not enumerated in the ICC 
international instruments.  Thirdly, the Kupreškić et al definition refers to the concept 
of discriminatory grounds, whereas Rome Statute definition uses the phrase ‘by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’ and Element 1 is silent on the issue 
of discriminatory intent.  
 
With respect to charging an accused person with persecution, the Chamber 
determined that three elements must be present, namely: “(a) those elements required 
                                                 
117 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 615. 
 
118 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 621. 
 
119 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 621. 
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for all crimes against humanity under the Statute; (b) a gross or blatant denial of a 
fundamental right reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited under 
Article 5; and (c) discriminatory grounds.”120 
 
Applying the definition of persecution to the case, the Chamber stated that the 
deliberate and systematic killings of the Bosnian Muslims and the detention and 
expulsion of the same from their region constituted persecution as the gravity of the 
crimes qualify as murder etc crimes specifically noted in Article 5.  Regarding the 
destruction of property this was said to constitute a gross or blatant denial of 
fundamental rights, that is, the destruction of a specific population’s livelihood, 
which, when committed on discriminatory grounds amounted to persecution.121  
 
3. Ruggiu case – ICTR  
 
In Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, the Accused worked as a journalist and broadcaster at the 
RTLM.  According to the Prosecutor’s allegations set out in the indictment, “the 
RTLM propagated the Hutu extremist ideology, by systematically inciting ethnic 
hatred and violence against the entire Tutsi minority.”  The Accused was charged with 
persecution under Count 5 (later amended to Count 2) pursuant to Article 3(h) of the 
ICTR Statute.122     
 
                                                 
120 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 627 
 
121 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraphs 628-631. 
 
122 Indictment for Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, paragraphs 4.9 and 5. The indictment 
is available from ICTR website: www.ictr.org. 
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The Trial Chamber likened the gravity of the crimes committed by the Accused to 
those of Streicher, from the historic Nuremberg trials, asserting Ruggiu like his 
predecessor, “infected people’s minds with ethnic hatred and persecution.”123   
 
The Ruggiu case is important because it is the first case from the ICTR to discuss and 
define the crime of persecution.124   In doing so, the Chamber adopted the ICTY 
Kupreškić et al definition of persecution, that is, “a gross or blatant denial, on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary 
or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as other acts prohibited in Article 
5.”125   
 
Applying the definition of persecution to the facts of the case the Chamber indicated: 
… when examining the acts of the persecution which have been admitted by the accused, it is 
possible to discern a common element.  Those acts were direct and public radio broadcasts all 
aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic group and Belgians on discriminatory 
grounds, by depriving them of the fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity 
enjoyed by members of a wider society.  The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as 
its aim the death and removal of those persons from society in which they live alongside the 
perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.126 
  
                                                 
123 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 19. 
 
124 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000. 
  
125 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 621, see discussion in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 
June 2000, paragraph 21; confirmed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial 
Judgement, 3 December 2003, paragraph 1072.  
 
126 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgment, 1 June 2000, paragraph 22; 
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C. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENT 1 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES  
1. The Perpetrator  
 
a. Who is said to perpetrate crimes of persecution? 
 
The chapeau of Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute establishes that in order to amount to 
a crime against humanity, which includes crimes of persecution, there must be a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.  Article 
7(2)(a) defines the phrase ‘attack directed against any civilian population’ as: “a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 
1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”   
 
The Rome Statute is clear on the issue of who could be prosecuted for perpetrating 
crimes of persecution.  Basically, any perpetrator could be prosecuted.  The 
perpetrator does not have to be a State agent or organization at all.  In essence, the 
ICC could prosecute anyone who committed crimes of persecution so long as it could 
be shown that, in accordance with Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the perpetrator 
was acting pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.  
 
Geoffrey Robertson makes the claim that crimes against humanity are unique from 
other ordinary crimes because they must be committed pursuant to the policy of a 
State or organization.  Robertson states:  
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The Rome Statute crystallizes the concept of crimes against humanity and distinguishes it 
from other crimes by reference to its genesis in the policy of a State or political organization.  
It is not defined by the gravity of the offence… what sets (the crime) apart both in wickedness 
and in the need for special measures of deterrence is the simple fact that it is an act of real 
brutality ordained by government - or at least by an organization exercising or asserting 
political power.  It is not the mind of the torturer, but the fact that this individual is part of the 
apparatus of a state, which makes the crime so horrific and locates it in a different dimension 
from ordinary criminality.127 
 
Jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals also establishes that the involvement of a 
State agent is not necessary to constitute crimes against humanity, so long as the 
actions of the perpetrator stem from a policy or plan instigated or directed by a State, 
organization or other group.128 
 
Furthermore, analysis of national laws and prosecutions in countries such as Canada, 
Australia and France reveals that State action is not necessary to determine the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity.129  
 
b.  Individual Criminal Responsibility  
 
Ultimately, it is individuals who carry out the policies and operations of any legal 
entities. 130   The principle of individual criminal responsibility dates back to the 
International Military Tribunal judgment in which the Tribunal, with reference to 
                                                 
127 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (2nd edn) 
(England: Penguin Books, 2002) at 361.  
 
128 Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2003) paragraph 5-008 at 95. 
 
129 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 66-67.  
 
130 Cherif M. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, Inc, 2003) at 62.   
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Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, established that “crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”131  
i. Individual Criminal Responsibility pursuant to the Rome 
Statute 
 
The ICC is empowered to prosecute individuals.   According to Article 25(1) and (2) 
of the Rome Statute:  
(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons;   
(2) A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment. 
 
Article 25(3) establishes the circumstances in which a person shall be held 
individually responsible.  According to subparagraphs (a) to (d) these include, inter 
alia, responsibility for: committing a crime, ordering, soliciting, or inducing the 
commission of a crime, or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of 
a crime.   
  
Article 27 of the Rome Statute establishes that a person shall be held criminally 
responsible for the perpetration of crimes regardless of what official position that 
person holds.  Article 27(1) stipulates that “this Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity.  In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility…”  In addition, Article 27(2) establishes that the Court 
                                                 
131 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment of the IMT 66 (1947), for detailed 
discussion see Cherif M. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 2003).   
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shall not be barred from exercising its jurisdiction over persons granted immunities or 
special procedural rules pursuant to any national or international laws.  
 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute goes so far as to hold commanders and superiors 
criminally responsible for the actions of forces or subordinates under their effective 
control, so long as the commander or superior in question knew or should have known 
and failed to take the necessary or reasonable measures to prevent or repress the 
commission of the crimes in question.     
ii. Individual Criminal Responsibility pursuant to customary 
international law  
 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates Court and Others, ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3),132 referred to as Pinochet III, is a significant precedent in 
international law that reinforces the concept of individual criminal responsibility.  The 
ruling makes it clear that former heads of state are not immune from prosecution of 
international crimes.133  The Pinochet III ruling also sets a significant precedent in 
international law for the current trial of Slobodan Milošević, former leader of 
Yugoslavia.  Milošević was indicted in 1999 by the ICTY where he is charged with 
persecution, on political, ethnic and racial grounds, amongst other crimes.134  
 
                                                 
132 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates Court and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 3) [1999] 2 All England Reports 97 (House of Lords).  
 
133 See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates Court and Others, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 2 All England Reports 97 (House of Lords). For detailed discussion on the 
outcome of this case, see Reed Brody and Michael Ratner (eds) The Pinochet Papers: The Case of 
Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).  
 
134 See ICTY website for online information case sheet available at: www.icty.org 
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The Pinochet III Judgment has set a significant precedent in customary international 
law as one sees the likes of Hissein Habre, exiled former dictator of Chad, indicted in 
Senegalese courts for crimes against humanity committed during his tenure.135  Also, 
the Royal Cambodian Government in collaboration with the UN has recently finalized 
agreements to set up the long awaited ECCC to prosecute surviving leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge for the mass abuses committed during their brief 1975 to 1978 reign.136   
 
Regarding the responsibility of superiors, it is interesting to note the Judgment in 
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al. 137  The case involved a superior who assumed 
command on 1 April 1993, but failed to punish subordinates for crimes, the 
Prosecution alleged, committed in January 1993.  The Trial Chamber agreed with the 
Prosecution.  The Chamber ruled that under the doctrine of command responsibility, a 
commander may be found liable for crimes committed prior to the time at which the 
commander assumed command.138  The Defence appealed and the Appeal Chamber, 
                                                 
135 For further details on the indictments of international leaders and the far reaching implications of the 
Pinochet III case see Reed Brody and Michael Ratner (eds) The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto 
Pinochet in Spain and Britain (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).  
 
136 See The Council of Ministers Press and Communication Department from the Cambodian 
Government website, available at: www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/default.htm.  In particular “Statement by 
the Cambodian Delegation to the United Nations Regarding the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers within the Courts of Cambodia” available at: 
www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/government144.htm; accessed on 3 February 2004.  Also 
“Remarks by His Excellency Sok An Senior Minister, Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council 
of Ministers Chairman of the Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Preparation 
of the Proceedings for the Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders at the Signing Ceremony of the 
Agreement between de United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea,” 6 June 2003 Chaktomuk Theatre, Phnom Penh, available at: 
www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/government152.htm; accessed on 3 February 2004.  
See also Suzannah Linton, “New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor”, 
(March 2002) 84(845) International Review of the Red Cross 93 at 96.  
 
137 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al, Case No. IT-01-47, ICTY Decision on Interlocutory 
Application Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, Appeals Chamber, 16 
July 2003, paragraphs 48, 51.  
 
138 See Daryl Mundis, “Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals” (2003) 1 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 520 at 525 discussing Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al. 
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by a majority of three to two votes, overturned the Trial Chamber decision.  The 
Appeal Chamber referred to Article 28(a)(1) of the Rome Statute.  The Chamber 
relied on this provision and found that Article 28 did not extend to hold superiors 
criminally responsible for crimes committed by a subordinate prior to the superior’s 
assumption of command over that subordinate.139   
 
The Prosecutor’s submissions in Hadžihasanović et al140 were based on the Kordić 
and Čerkez Judgment which had previously adopted a much wider view of command 
responsibility.141   The Trial Chamber in Kordić and Čerkez held, “the duty to punish 
naturally arises after a crime has been committed.  Persons who assume command 
after the commission are under the same duty to punish.  This duty includes at least an 
obligation to investigate the crimes to establish the facts and to report them to the 
competent authorities, if the superior does not have the power to sanction himself.”142   
                                                                                                                                            
 
139 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al, Case No. IT-01-47, ICTY Decision on Interlocutory 
Application Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, Appeals Chamber, 16 
July 2003, paragraphs 48, 51.  For in-depth discussion on this case see Christopher Greenwood, 
“Command Responsibility and the Hadžihasanović et al Decision” (2004) 2(1) Journal of International 
Justice 598 – 605. 
 
140 Prosecution’s Brief Regarding Issues in the ‘Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction Arising from the 
Amended Indictment’, 10 May 2002, paragraph 62. 
 
141 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 446. 
 
142 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 446, cited in the Prosecution’s Brief Regarding Issues in the ‘Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction 
Arising from the Amended Indictment’, 10 May 2002, paragraph 62. 
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2. Severely deprived  
 
a. What does severely depriving one or more persons entail? 
 
 
Although Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the 
perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons of 
fundamental rights,” the provision fails to provide the meaning of the phrase ‘severely 
deprived’.   
 
In addition, Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute defines persecution as: “the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”  The definition of persecution 
found in Article 7(2)(g) also fails to indicate how to interpret the phrase ‘severely 
deprived’.   
 
Standard dictionaries provide a plain meaning for the word ‘severe’; this is defined as: 
“harsh, extreme, serious, stern, methodical, strict, and austere.”143  To ‘deprive’ is 
defined as: “to divest, strip, bereave, and dispossess of a possession.” 144 
  
Machteld Boot proposes that “the word ‘severe’ does not refer to the character of an 
act of persecution as such, but refers to the character of the deprivation of rights.”145   
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.”  
 
143 Macquarie Dictionary and Thesaurus (New South Wales: Macquarie Library Pty Ltd, reprinted 
1993), at 366, Collins Gem Dictionary and Thesaurus (Britain: HarperCollins Publishers, reprinted 
1996) at 506.  
 
144 Oxford English Dictionary Vol III D-E (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprinted 1969) at 221.  
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For example, this could include the widespread or systematic nature of the deprivation 
of the rights i.e. the methodic planning of the deprivation of rights or the large scale 
number of victims deprived of their rights.  Similarly, “the term ‘deprivation’ already 
implies that more is needed than the mere nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise of these fundamental rights.” 146 
 
b. How do ad hoc Tribunals interpret ‘severely deprived’? 
 
In the proceedings for Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić the Trial Chamber indicated that the 
deprivation of the fundamental right must be serious enough to justify the label of a 
crime of persecution.  The Chamber held that it is “the violation of the right to 
equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic right that 
constitutes persecution.”147  
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al developed a level of gravity test 
which assesses the severity of the deprivation of rights to determine if they constitute 
crimes of persecution.   According to the Chamber: 
Although the realm of human rights is dynamic and expensive, not every denial of a human 
right may constitute a crime against humanity.  Accordingly, it can be said that at a minimum, 
                                                                                                                                            
145 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 519.  The Author refers to the Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, paragraph 535 and Prosecutor v. Kupreškić 
et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000 paragraph 622.      
 
146 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 519.  The Author refers to the Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 697.       
 
147 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 697.       
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acts of persecution must be of an equal gravity or severity to the other acts enumerated under 
Article 5. 148  
This ‘same level of gravity’ test has been adopted in leading cases from the ICTY149 
and also at the ICTR.150   
 
The Kordić and Čerkez Judgment went one step further and added, “it recognizes that 
the ‘same level of gravity’ test may indeed result in the exclusion of some acts from 
the realm of criminal persecution, yet finds this to be a wholly valid result.” 151   The 
Trial Chamber had relied on the Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al reasoning that not all 
deprivation of rights amount to crimes against humanity.152  However, the Chamber 
did emphasize that not only are crimes of persecution unique, but, when considering 
whether the acts satisfy the formulated gravity threshold, they must be evaluated in 
context as a crime of cumulative effect.  Therefore, the Trial Chamber was of the 
opinion that the overall consequence of crimes of persecution must offend humanity 
so as to be termed ‘inhumane’.153    
                                                 
148 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000 
paragraphs 618-619. 
 
149 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 736, 
Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 2003, 
paragraph 635, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, 
paragraph 434, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 
February 2001, paragraph 195. 
 
150 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, 
paragraph 1072, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, 
paragraph 347, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, 
paragraph 21. 
 
151 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 196. 
 
152 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 196, see also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 
January 2000, paragraph 618. 
 
153 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 199, see also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 
January 2000, paragraph 622, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 
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The Prosecutor, in the Los Palos case, relying on the customary international law 
recognized in Kupreškić et al, Kordić and Čerkez, and Tadić, argued that there are 
three levels of seriousness of discriminatory acts which may distinguish the gravity of 
crimes of persecution.  These are: 
a. Acts which are sufficiently serious to constitute persecution on their own even if only one 
act was committed;  
b. Acts which are less serious but which, together with other acts, through their cumulative 
effect reach the necessary level of gravity; and  
c. Acts which even cumulatively are not sufficiently serious to amount to persecution.154 
 
The definitions of the crime of persecution pursuant to Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome 
Statute and Section 5(2)(f) of the East Timor Regulation 2000/15 are exactly the 
same.  It remains to be seen whether the ICC will also adopt the ‘three levels of 
seriousness’ test found in the Los Palos case.   
 
3. One or more persons 
 
a. Negotiations at the Preparatory Commission 
 
There was much debate from delegates at the Preparatory Commission over the 
specific wording of Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes with 
                                                                                                                                            
2 November 2001, paragraph 185, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 
15 March 2002, paragraph 434. 
 
154 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at p. 32-33, Prosecutor v. Kordić 
and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, paragraph 199, Prosecutor 
v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000 paragraphs 56, 622, & 
615, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 70.  
The three levels of seriousness of discriminatory acts are also discussed in Kai Ambos and Steffen 
Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) Criminal Law Forum 1 at 76.  
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regard to who exactly could be severely deprived of their fundamental rights.  The 
delegates were divided, the Canadian and German representatives preferred to adopt 
the phrase ‘by reason of their membership in an identifiable group or collectivity’ 
whereas the Arab States and the US preferred ‘identifiable group or members of that 
group.’  The debate continued as delegates conceded that depriving a group of 
fundamental rights inevitably resulted in depriving individual members of the group 
of their rights too.  The debate remained unresolved until the second reading where 
US delegates suggested the Preparatory Commission refrain from identifying ‘groups’ 
in Element 1 and instead introduce the concept of groups or collectivities into 
Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes.  The delegates adopted the 
US proposal and drafted Element 1 as we see it today. 155   
 
b. Comparison of the Elements of Crimes and the Rome 
Statute 
 
The resolution of the debate amongst delegates of the Preparatory Commission over 
the specific wording of Element 1 which sought to identify who exactly could be 
severely deprived of their fundamental rights is problematic.  The delegates failed to 
maintain consistency between the Elements of Crimes and the Rome Statute.  Element 
1 of the crime of persecution refers to the severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
carried out against one or more persons.  In contrast, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute refers to persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity.  Similarly, 
Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute refers to a group or collectivity; this terminology 
                                                 
155 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 96.  See also the following Preparatory 
Commission documents: PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.36; PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39; 
PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.1. 
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is supported in Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes which also 
refers to the targeting of a group or collectivity.  Reading through Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute as well as Elements 5 and 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes, one finds phrases such as: ‘widespread’, ‘systematic’ and ‘attacks directed 
against any civilian population’.  These phrases provide a context that indicates these 
crimes must be perpetrated on a large scale.  Therefore, the notion of a handful of 
victims described in Element 1 as ‘one or more persons’ falls short somehow and does 
not seem to reflect the Rome Statute provisions or the remaining Elements of the 
crime of persecution.   
 
4. Contrary to International Law 
 
Both Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes and the Article 7(2)(g) 
Rome Statute definition of persecution established that the severe deprivation of the 
fundamental rights must be contrary to international law.  The inclusion of the phrase 
‘contrary to international law’ generated much debate amongst delegates at the 
Preparatory Commission.  On the one hand, delegates felt the inclusion of the phrase 
was unnecessary as it restated the general nature of the unlawfulness of the crimes, a 
concept that was already stipulated throughout the Rome Statute and, more 
specifically in paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes.  On 
the other hand, delegates felt that it was necessary to explicitly adhere to statutory 
language and spell out the requirement that the severe deprivation of the fundamental 
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rights be contrary to international law.  The debate was resolved by adding a footnote 
to the text of Element 1 instead.156   
 
5. Fundamental rights  
 
Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute defines the crime of persecution as: “the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the group or collectivity.”  Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements 
of Crimes, which parallels the wording of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute, states: 
“the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons 
of fundamental rights.”  The Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes do not define 
the phrase ‘fundamental rights’.  Neither do these instruments provide examples of 
what constitutes such rights.  
 
There was much debate from delegates at the Preparatory Commission regarding the 
issue of fundamental rights and how they would be recognized in the context of 
Element 1 of the Elements of the crime of persecution.  Some delegates were of the 
opinion that the concept of ‘universal recognition’ was to be applied to fundamental 
rights.  However, this argument was opposed when it became apparent that the 
negotiators of the Rome Statute had already stipulated that universal recognition 
                                                 
156 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 96.  The footnote to Element 1 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “this requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the 
General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes.”  Paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the 
Elements of Crimes stipulates that “the requirement of ‘unlawfulness’ found in the Statute or in other 
parts of international law, in particular international humanitarian law, is generally not specified in the 
Elements of Crimes.”   
 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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would be applied to the new grounds of persecution besides those enumerated in 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute.  The debate was concluded by dealing with the concept 
of universal recognition in paragraph 1 of the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes 
of crimes against humanity, instead of placing the phrase ‘universal recognition’ as a 
specific requisite in the text of Element 1.157   
 
Egyptian delegates at the Preparatory Commission made some valid statements worth 
mentioning regarding the need to clarify what the Commission considered as 
fundamental rights.  The Egyptians wanted to ensure that States would not be held 
liable for failing to observe values or norms that were only recognized in some States 
or civilizations but not in others.158  The delegates felt that it was crucial to clearly 
explain what fundamental rights were. They argued, “such fundamental rights should 
be those which are recognized and accepted on the universal level, that is to say, those 
rules applicable vis-à-vis the State, either because they constitute international custom 
as a source of international law or because the State has accepted them through its 
conventional obligations.”159 
 
                                                 
157 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 96. See also the Preparatory Commission 
document PCNICC/2000/L.1/Rev.1/Add.2. 
 
158 Summary of Statements Made in Plenary in Connection with the Adoption of the Report of the 
Working Group on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Report of the Working Group on 
Elements of Crime, Preparatory Commission document PCNICC/2000/INF/4, dated 13 July 2000 at 
p.3.  
 
159 Summary of Statements Made in Plenary in Connection with the Adoption of the Report of the 
Working Group on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Report of the Working Group on 
Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Commission doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/4, dated 13 July 2000 at p.3.  
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a. Rights in general 
 
In order to determine which rights are fundamental or not, it is the writer’s opinion 
that one would first need to establish that there is in fact an identifiable right to begin 
with.  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter referred to as 
UDHR) is arguably the first international instrument that mandates global 
responsibility for human rights. 160   Although not binding as an enforceable 
instrument, the declaration has emerged as customary international law.161  
 
The UDHR is profoundly significant because it paved the way for what is widely 
understood today as the International Bill of Rights.162   This Bill consists of the 
UDHR, and two other important international legal instruments.  These are: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter referred to as ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter 
referred to as ICESCR).   
i. Civil and Political Rights  
 
Civil and political rights are established pursuant to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  They include rights such as: the right of self-
determination, the right to equality before courts and tribunals, the right to freedom of 
                                                 
160 For more details see the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development 
Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 
161 Christopher C. Joyner, “Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal 
Declaration and the Search for Accountability” (Summer, 1998) 26 Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy 591 at 591. See also Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas, “Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Universal Challenge” in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 
3. 
 
162 Douglass Cassel, “International Human Rights Law in Practice: Does International Human Rights 
Law Make a Difference?” (Spring 2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 121 at 134-135. 
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expression, the right not to be imprisoned for the inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation etc. 
 
The ICCPR is significant in international law because it contains certain rights from 
which a State can never depart, regardless of the circumstances, be they internal or 
international in nature.  These rights and freedoms are identified as non-derogable 
rights.  These non-derogable rights represent the absolute minimum standard rights 
that should not be infringed or amended.163  Non-derogable rights, tabled below, are 
found listed in Article 4(2) of the ICCPR which stipulates that “no derogation from 
Articles 6, 7, 8(1)(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.”   
 
                                                 
163 Fausto Pocar, “Human Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Armed Conflicts” in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (eds) Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of 
Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 732-733.  Also Françoise Bouchet-
Saulnier edited and translated by Laura Brav, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002), see generally the discussion and definitions on 
fundamental guarantees and non-derogable rights at 107 – 109. Also Sigrun I. Skogly, “Crimes Against 
Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights?” (Spring, 2001) 5(1) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 58 at 66-67. 
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Non-derogable rights stipulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
PROVISION NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS 
 
Article 6  (1)  Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life 
(2)  In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious 
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of 
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can 
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.  
Article 7  No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.  In particular, no one shall 
be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.  
Article 8  (1)  No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all forms shall be prohibited.  
(2)  No one shall be held in servitude. 
Article 11  No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation 
Article 15  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed, if subsequent to the commission of 
the offence, provision is made by aw for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when 
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.  
Article 16 Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.  
Article 18 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in a community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.  
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.  
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal 
guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
 
ii. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights are established pursuant to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  They include rights such as: the 
right to social security, the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work, the right to take part in a cultural life and enjoy arts and share in scientific 
advancements and its benefits etc.  
 
The general view expressed by delegates at the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights was that “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.” 164   Yet, economic, social and cultural rights, dubbed programmatic 
                                                 
164 World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN 
doc.A/CONF.157/23, Part I, paragraph 5, discussed in Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas, “Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge” in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas 
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rights, have traditionally been thought of as legally unenforceable.165  Asbjørn Eide 
and Allan Rosas have observed that civil and political rights have gained more 
support and attention over the years than economic, social and cultural rights which 
have remained underdeveloped to a large extent.166   There are two reasons why 
economic and social rights, in particular, have been described as underdeveloped.  
These rights are underdeveloped mainly because of the way the provisions are worded 
and the weakness of the monitoring mechanisms of the treaty provisions put in place 
by the international community.167  The inadequacy of defining and enforcing poorly 
worded economic rights is raised by Philip Alston, who argues that “it is generally 
agreed that the major shortcoming of the existing international arrangements for the 
promotion of respect for economic rights is the vagueness of many of the rights as a 
formulated in the Covenant and the resulting lack in the clarity as to their normative 
implications.”168 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001) at 3-5.   
 
165 Sigrun I. Skogly, “Crimes Against Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social 
Rights?” (Spring, 2001) 5(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 58 at 67. 
 
166 Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge” in 
Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 3-5.   
 
167 Martin Scheinin, “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights” in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause 
and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001) 27 at 30. 
 
168 Philip Alston, “No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the 
Economic Rights Covenant” in A. Eide and J. Helgesen (eds), The Future of Human Rights Protection 
in a Changing World (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991) at 86 quoted and discussed in Martin 
Scheinin, “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights” in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan 
Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001) 27 at 30-31. 
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b. Fundamental rights 
 
i. Factors which could indicate fundamental rights 
 
Once you have established that there is an identifiable right, then the next step would 
be to determine whether or not that right is in fact a fundamental right.  It is this 
writer’s opinion that the rights enumerated in the International Bill of Rights could be 
considered as fundamental rights.  
 
It may be noted that there are numerous international instruments which recognize 
rights.  For instance, Section 2 of Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the 
Transitional Administration in East Timor compiled a list of internationally 
recognized human rights standards.  Section 2 provides:  
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in 
East Timor shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards, as reflected, in 
particular, in:  
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948; 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and its 
Protocols; 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966; 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 
1965; 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 17 
December 1979,  
The Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 17 December 1984; 
The International Covenant on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. 
 
However, the writer will restrict the discussion of fundamental rights to an analysis of 
the rights established under the International Bill of Rights.  The discussion of these 
rights is by no means exhaustive, but provides examples as to which rights could be 
fundamental.   
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ii. How do ad hoc Tribunals interpret the phrase 
‘fundamental rights’?  
 
To date, there are only three cases that have been heard by the Panels of Judges in 
East Timor which involve crimes of persecution.  In the first case, the Los Palos 
Judgment failed to explain how the Panel interpreted the phrase ‘fundamental rights’.  
The Panel merely stated its satisfaction with the definition of the crime of persecution 
stipulated under both the UNTAET Regulation and the Rome Statute and its Elements 
of Crimes. The Panel neglected to explain the concept of fundamental rights any 
further.169  Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, the Panel 
upheld the Los Palos case to adopt the ICC Elements of Crimes.  However, the Panel 
failed, again, to define any of the terms used in Regulation 2000/15 or the ICC 
Elements of Crime.170  Instead, the Panel described persecution as: “the violation of 
the right to equality in a serious manner that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or 
fundamental right.”171  As for the third case, Prosecutor v. Marcelino Soares, this too 
fails to define the phrase ‘fundamental rights’.172 
 
                                                 
169 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001, paragraphs 662-669. 
 
170 Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, Case No. 1/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 10 December 2003, 
paragraph 73. 
 
171 Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, Case No. 1/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 10 December 2003, 
paragraph 74. 
 
172 Prosecutor v. Marcelino Soares, Case No. 11/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2003. 
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To date, there are only 3 cases from the ICTR that discuss the crime of persecution, 
namely: Nahimana et al, Semanza, and Ruggiu.173  Although two of the cases refer to 
the Rome Statute in their reasoning, all three cases fail to define fundamental rights.   
 
There are over a dozen cases from the ICTY that have handed down judgments which 
deal with crimes of persecution.  Most of these cases only provide examples of what 
kinds of severe deprivations of fundamental rights amount to persecution without 
actually defining the phrase ‘fundamental rights’.  Examples of these rights include: 
the inherent right to life, the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, the right to property, etc.174  
 
To date, it appears that only two cases from the ICTY, Kupreškić et al175 and Stakić, 176 
have discussed what constitutes fundamental rights.  Although both cases declined to 
define the phrase ‘fundamental rights’, they both seemed to agree that providing such 
a definition would not only be immaterial but would also not serve the interests of 
justice in doing so.  
 
In Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al the Trial Chamber declined to define fundamental 
rights, stating instead that: 
The Trial Chamber does not see fit to identify which rights constitute fundamental rights for 
the purposes of persecution.  The interests of justice would not be served by so doing, as the 
                                                 
173 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, Prosecutor v. 
Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000. 
 
174 See, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, paragraphs 
129-160 and the authorities cited in the Judgment. 
 
175 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000.  
 
176 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003. 
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explicit inclusion of particular fundamental rights could be interpreted as the implicit 
exclusion of other rights (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).  This is not the approach taken 
to crimes against humanity in customary international law, where the category of “other 
inhumane acts” also allows courts flexibility to determine the cases before them, depending on 
the forms which attacks on humanity may take, forms which are ever-changing and carried out 
with particular ingenuity.  Each case must therefore be examined on its merits. 177 
 
The Prosecutor v. Stakić Judgment echoed similar sentiments.  It too declined to 
define fundamental rights, stating instead:  
This Trial Chamber opines that it is immaterial to identify which rights may amount to 
fundamental rights for the purpose of persecution.  Persecution can consist of the deprivation 
of a wide variety of rights, whether fundamental or not, derogable or not. 178  
 
In contrast, it should be noted that both Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes expressly stipulate that it is 
the severe deprivation of fundamental rights that constitutes the crime of persecution.  
 
                                                 
177 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraphs 
622-623. 
 
178 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 773. 
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c. Examples of fundamental rights under the International 
Bill of Rights the deprivation of which could amount to 
crimes of persecution 
 
Summary of some of the rights established pursuant to the International Covenants on Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
RIGHT  ICCPR ICESCR UDHR 
Right of self determination to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social 
and cultural development 
     
Rights exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status 
      
Right to gender equality for the enjoyment of rights set out in the covenants      
Right to life      
No-one shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment      
No-one shall be held in slavery      
Right to liberty and security of person including right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile 
     
No-one shall be imprisoned for inability to fulfill a contractual obligation     
Right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence       
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In determination of a criminal charge shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
     
Right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law      
Right to protection of law against interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence or attacks on 
honour and reputation 
     
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion      
Right to freedom of expression      
Advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law 
    
Right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized       
Right to freedom of association     
Widest possible protection and assistance should be afforded to the family       
Right to marriage and found a family without limitation due to race, nationality or religion      
Every child shall have without discrimination… the right to such measures of protection as are required by 
his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State 
     
Rights of a citizen      
All persons equal before the law       
Right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, profess or practice their own 
religion, or use own language 
    
Right to work      
Right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work      
Right to equal pay for equal work without discrimination      
Right to form and join trade unions     
Right to social security      
Right to adequate standard of living including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions 
     
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance       
Right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health     
Right to education       
Right to take part in a cultural life and enjoy arts and share in scientific advancements and its benefits      
Right to protection of moral and material interests in scientific, literary or artistic production of which the 
person is the author 
     
Right to effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights     
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty      
Right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries from persecution     
Right to own property     
Right to take part in government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives      
Right to rest and leisure     
 
Index 
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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Persecution is defined in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute as: “the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”  In addition, Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes, states: “the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to 
international law,∗ one or more persons of fundamental rights.”  Therefore, in order to 
satisfy the requirements of these provisions it must be shown that, firstly, the 
fundamental right of one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived.  
Secondly, the deprivation of such right was contrary to international law.  Thirdly, the 
deprivation of such right was carried out on discriminatory grounds, that is, by reason 
of the identity of the group or collectivity.   
 
Furthermore, both Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 4 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes establish a nexus requirement for crimes of 
persecution, discussed in the Introduction in Chapter 1.  It is necessary to establish 
that the crime of persecution was committed in connection with any act enumerated in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute or in connection with any crime that falls within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.    
 
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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Right to security and liberty of person including right not to be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile 
The right to security and liberty of person is a fundamental right that is recognized in 
the International Bill of Rights.  Both the ICCPR and UDHR recognize this right 
pursuant to Articles 9 and 3, respectively.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?   It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to security and liberty of person, contrary to international law, and that this 
deprivation was carried out by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  If 
this could be shown, then the requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  
Furthermore, as a result of the nexus requirement established for crimes of 
persecution the effect of the statutory provisions would aggravate the provision found 
in Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute which prohibits imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, 
thus, satisfying the nexus requirement.   
 
Jurisprudence from the ICTY,179 ICTR,180 and the Panels of Judges in East Timor181 
all establish that the prolonged routine imprisonment and confinement of civilians or 
                                                 
179 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 642, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 
2002, paragraph 438, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 
November 2001, paragraphs 186, 189, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY 
Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, paragraph 302, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY 
Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 220, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY 
Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 629. 
 
180 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003 
paragraph 1072, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, 
paragraph 21. 
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the organized detention of civilians infringes upon their fundamental freedom.  When 
carried out on discriminatory grounds this infringement amounts to the crime of 
persecution.   
 
Right to life  
The right to life is a fundamental right that is recognized in the International Bill of 
Rights.  Both the ICCPR and UDHR recognize an inherent right to life pursuant to 
Articles 6 and 3, respectively.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to life, contrary to international law, and that this deprivation was carried out by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the 
requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is committed 
in connection with, for example, murder under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, 
then this could amount to persecution.  
 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, referring to Article 3 of the UDHR, held that the infringement 
of the right to life, if committed on discriminatory grounds, constituted persecution.182  
                                                                                                                                            
 
181 Prosecutor v. Marcelino Soares, Case No. 11/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2003, paragraphs 
21-22, Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, Case No. 1/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel 
for Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 10 December 2003, 
paragraph 75. 
 
182 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 220. 
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The right to life has also been upheld as a fundamental right in numerous ICTR cases, 
including, Nahimana et al183 and Ruggiu.184 
 
Right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment 
The right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is a fundamental right that is recognized in the International Bill of 
Rights.  Both the ICCPR and UDHR recognize this right pursuant to Articles 7 and 5, 
respectively.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, contrary to international law, and that this deprivation was carried out by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the 
requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, as a result of the nexus 
requirement established for crimes of persecution the effect of the statutory provisions 
would aggravate the provision found in Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute which 
prohibits torture, thus, satisfying the nexus requirement.   
 
                                                 
183 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, 
paragraph 1072. 
 
184 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Trial Judgement, 1 June 2000, paragraph 21. 
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Prosecutor v. Blaškić, referring to Article 5 of the UDHR, held that the infringement 
of the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, if committed on discriminatory grounds, constituted persecution.185   
 
Right not to held in slavery or in servitude 
The right not to be held in slavery or in servitude is a fundamental right that is 
recognized in the International Bill of Rights.  Both the ICCPR and UDHR recognize 
this right pursuant to Articles 8 and 4, respectively.   
 
It may be noted that UNDP statistics estimate that approximately 1.2 million women 
and girls under the age of 18 are trafficked into prostitution through illicit transactions 
every year.186   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right not to be held in slavery or in servitude, contrary to international law, and that 
this deprivation was carried out by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  
If this could be shown, then the requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute 
and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  
Furthermore, as a result of the nexus requirement established for crimes of 
persecution the effect of the statutory provisions would aggravate the provision found 
                                                 
185 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 220.  
See also Prosecutor v. Marcelino Soares, Case No. 11/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2003, 
paragraph 21. 
 
186 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 4.  
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in Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute which prohibits sexual slavery and enforced 
prostitution, or, Article 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute which prohibits enslavement, 
defined in Article 7(2)(c) to include the trafficking of women and girls, thus, 
satisfying the nexus requirement.   
 
The provisions articulated in Article 7(1)(c) and Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute 
are of historic significance because the Statute “codified for the first time the crime of 
sexual slavery and established a new definition of enslavement which includes 
trafficking in persons.”187   
 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, referring to Article 5 of the UDHR, the Trial Chamber held that 
the infringement of the right not to be held in slavery or servitude, if committed on 
discriminatory grounds, constituted persecution.188 
 
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion including freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion including freedom to have or 
to adopt a religion is a fundamental right that is recognized in the International Bill of 
Rights.  Article 18 of both the ICCPR and the UDHR recognizes the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.   
 
                                                 
187 Barbara Bedont, “Gender Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court” in 
Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 183 at 199.   
 
188 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 220. 
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Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, contrary to international law, 
and that this deprivation was carried out by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the 
Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes would be 
satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is committed in connection with, for example, 
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health under Article 7(1)(k) of the 
Rome Statute, then this could amount to persecution.   
 
Right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence 
The right to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose one’s residence is a 
fundamental right that is recognized in the International Bill of Rights.  Both the 
ICCPR and the UDHR recognize this right pursuant to Articles 12 and 13, 
respectively.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose one’s residence, contrary to 
international law, and that this deprivation was carried out by reason of the identity of 
the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the requirements of Article 
7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is committed in connection 
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with, for example, deportation or forcible transfer of population under Article 7(1)(d) 
of the Rome Statute, then this could amount to persecution.   
 
Stakić 189 the Los Palos case, 190 Kvočka et al 191 and Kordić and Čerkez, 192 all held 
that the deportation or forcible transfer of a civilian population on discriminatory 
grounds violated a fundamental right and thus amounted to persecution.193   
 
Right to adequate standard of living including adequate food, housing and health 
Sigrun I. Skogly proposes that the violation of the right to food, the right to health and 
the right to housing infringe on economic and social rights inflicting suffering that 
fundamentally amounts to crimes against humanity.  Skogly proposes that violation of 
the right to food amounting to a crime against humanity would be the “denial of 
access to food to particular individuals or groups.”  The violation of the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health amounts to a crime against humanity when “the 
State or other organizations would deliberately use mental or physical health 
deterioration in order to inflict serious harm on people.”  Regarding the violation of 
the right to housing, Skogly addresses this from the perspective of forced evictions 
                                                 
189 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 769. 
 
190 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 757-841. 
 
191 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 2001, 
paragraph 186. 
 
192 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 205. 
 
193 See, Krstić explaining the differences between deportation and forced transfer. Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, paragraphs 519, 521.  This position has been 
confirmed in Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 
March 2003, paragraph 670, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 
March 2002, paragraphs 474. However, see arguments in Stakić rejecting the notion that the definition 
of ‘deportation’ requires transfers across State borders. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY 
Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraphs 679, 684.  
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and suggests the core issue is in the outcome and determining whether the eviction 
can be categorized as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts.  However, the 
assessment of whether these violations amount to crimes against humanity of other 
inhumane acts, according to Skogly, should be made on a case-by-case basis in order 
to determine the gravity of the crime.194  
 
The right to an adequate standard of living including adequate food, housing and 
health is a fundamental right that is recognised in the International Bill of Rights.  The 
ICESCR recognizes the right to an adequate standard of living including adequate 
food, housing and health pursuant to Articles 11 and 12.  This right is also established 
pursuant to Article 25 of the UDHR.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to an adequate standard of living including adequate food, housing and health, 
contrary to international law, and that this deprivation was carried out by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the requirements of 
Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements 
of Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is committed in connection 
with, for example, extermination under Article 7(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, then this 
could amount to persecution.  Extermination is defined under Article 7(2)(b) of the 
Statute as: “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of 
                                                 
194 Sigrun I. Skogly, “Crimes Against Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social 
Rights?” (Spring, 2001) 5(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 58, discussed generally at 66-
73. 
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access of food, medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population.” 
 
Right to education  
The right to education is a fundamental right that is recognized in the International 
Bill of Rights.  Both the ICESCR and UDHR recognize the right to education 
pursuant to Articles 13 and 26, respectively.   
 
Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier argues that the right to education is a fundamental or 
principal economic, social and cultural right.195  Yet it is interesting to note that 
UNDP statistics indicate that up to 90 million children worldwide at primary school 
level alone do not attend school.196   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to education, contrary to international law, and that this deprivation was carried 
out by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then 
the requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is 
committed in connection with, for example, other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
                                                 
195 For further references see generally Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier edited by and translated by Laura 
Brav, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 
2000) at 126. 
 
196 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 4.  
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health under Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, then this could amount to 
persecution.  
 
Right to own property including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s 
property 
The right to own property including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s 
property is a fundamental right that is recognized in the International Bill of Rights.   
This right is recognized pursuant to Article 17 of the UDHR.   
 
Could the deprivation of this fundamental right amount to a crime of persecution?  It 
must be shown that one or more persons was intentionally and severely deprived of 
right to own property including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s 
property, contrary to international law, and that this deprivation was carried out by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.  If this could be shown, then the 
requirements of Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes would be satisfied.  Furthermore, if this crime is committed 
in connection with, for example, other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health under Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, then this could amount to 
persecution.  
 
The wanton destruction or property, acts of plundering and looting if carried out on 
discriminatory grounds have been found to constitute the crime of persecution in 
Stakić, 197  Naletilić and Martinović, 198  Kvočka et al, 199  Kordić and Čerkez, 200 
                                                 
197 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 764. 
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Blaškić,201 Kupreškić et al,202 and Tadić.203  According to Kordić and Čerkez 204 and 
Blaškić. 205  This includes the wanton destruction and damage to religious or 
educational institutions when carried out on discriminatory grounds.  
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović held, “plunder of 
personal belongings may rise to the level of persecution if the impact of such 
deprivation is serious enough.  This is so if the property is indispensable and a vital 
asset to the owners.”206 
 
Prosecutor v Blaškić took the liberty of defining the phrase ‘destruction of property’.  
The Chamber stated that ‘destruction of property’ means: “the destruction of towns, 
villages and other public or private property belonging to a given civilian population 
                                                                                                                                            
 
198 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 701. 
 
199 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 2001, 
paragraph 186. 
 
200 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 205. 
 
201 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraphs 227, 
234. 
 
202 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 631. 
 
203 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraphs 707, 
710.       
 
204 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraph 206. 
 
205 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 227. 
 
206 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 699. 
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or extensive devastation not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully, 
wantonly and discriminatorily.”207 
 
 
                                                 
207 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000 at paragraph 234. 
Confirmed in Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, 
paragraph 102. 
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4. ELEMENTS 2, 3, 4, & 5 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES WHICH CONCERN THE MANNER 
OF DEPRIVATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE CRIME OF 
PERSECUTION 
 
 
To reiterate briefly, the previous chapter analyzed Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes which indicates the kinds of deprivations that constitute the crime 
of persecution under the Rome Statute.  The analysis addressed the issue of a 
perpetrator who severely deprives, contrary to international law, one or more persons 
of their fundamental rights. 
 
In this chapter the writer will discuss the manner of deprivations required for the 
crime of persecution under the Rome Statute.  The discussion will include an analysis 
of Elements 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes stipulated by 
the Preparatory Commission for the ICC.  The writer will also compare each of these 
4 Elements with the relevant Rome Statute provisions on the crime of persecution 
along with customary international law laid down by ad hoc Tribunals.  
 
I. ELEMENT 2 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: 
The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or 
collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such. 
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A. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 2 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES AND ARTICLE 7(2)(G) OF THE 
ROME STATUTE  
 
Element 2 of the Elements of the crime of persecution states: “the perpetrator targeted 
such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted 
the group or collectivity as such.”  Element 2 parallels the wording found in the 
second limb of the Article 7(2)(g) Rome Statute definition of persecution.  
Persecution is defined in Article 7(2)(g) as: “the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group 
or collectivity.”  However, Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes 
differs slightly from Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute in that it specifically 
introduces the concept of targeting, discussed below.   
 
B. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENT 2 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
1. Perpetrator targeted such person/s  
 
a. Reflections on what targeting of person/s entails  
 
The idea of targeting in the context of Element 2 of the crime of persecution implies 
the notion of a perpetrator who engages in discriminatory behaviour that is aimed or 
directed at particular persons.  When you speak of targeting particular persons, this 
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writer’s mind conjures up images of secluding, segregating, directing and focusing all 
of one’s attention and resources towards carrying out a particular plan or objective 
directed against such particular persons.  One associates the idea of targeting with an 
individual who mulls, and probably schemes intricate and detailed plans of harmful 
intent towards particular victims.  The term victim is used here to describe persons 
who are unable to protect themselves, persons rendered powerless by a perpetrator 
who is in a position to exert authority over them.   
 
Cherif M. Bassiouni has described the practice of discrimination as the unjustifiable 
rejection of a particular group of people.  This is achieved by manipulating the legal 
system so that the group is no longer able to claim the protection of criminal laws that 
are readily available to all other members of society.  Furthermore, this could also 
include subjecting the group to discriminatory laws that all other members of society 
are exempted from.  What makes this prejudicial practice intolerable is that the group 
which is set apart, based solely on their identity, suffers as a result of the harsh, 
unjustifiable or unlawful rejection.208  
 
b. How do ad hoc Tribunals describe the targeting of 
person/s under customary international law?  
 
Analysis of ICTR jurisprudence indicates that persecution, pursuant to the ICTR 
Statute, is distinct from other crimes against humanity.  One distinction is the 
                                                 
208 Cherif M Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999) at 260.  
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discriminatory intent required for the perpetration of crimes of persecution; these 
crimes are perpetrated on racial, religious or political grounds. 209    
 
The ICTY also recognizes that the crime of persecution specifically requires the 
intention to discriminate.210  The ICTY has said that it is this discriminatory intent 
that distinguishes persecution from all the other acts of crimes against humanity.211  
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović discussed this issue in 
great detail.  Firstly, the Chamber upheld previous case law from the Tribunal which 
established that the elements of the crime of persecution include, inter alia: “the 
perpetrator commits a discriminatory act or omission”, and “the perpetrator carries out 
the act or omission with the intent to discriminate on racial, religious or political 
grounds.”212 
      
Secondly, the Chamber clarified the issue of what discriminatory intent entails.  In 
essence, the Chamber explained that the group is targeted because of a particular 
religious, political, or racial characteristic.  More specifically, the Chamber explained 
that “a discriminatory basis exists where a person is targeted on the basis of religious, 
                                                 
209 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 350, 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, paragraph 
1071. 
 
210 For example, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 
2000, paragraph 607, see the cases referred to in the judgment.  
 
211 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 607.  
 
212 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 633.  For detailed reference on which cases the Naletilić and Martinović Judgment 
upheld, see footnotes 1563 and 1566 of the Judgment.   
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political or racial considerations, i.e. for his or her membership in a certain victim 
group that is targeted by the perpetrator group”213 (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, the Simić et al Judgment has explained what constitutes a targeted group.  
They are described as: “the victimized persons… specifically selected or 
discriminated on political, racial, or religious grounds”214 (emphasis added). 
 
A number of cases from the ICTY have discussed the issue of discrimination in 
greater detail.  For example, in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, the Chamber indicated 
that discrimination is the targeting of persons for an attack in which the perpetrator 
distinguishes persons on discriminatory grounds to deprive them of the rights enjoyed 
by the rest of society.  The perpetrator deprives the persons of their rights with the 
view to removing the persons from society and ultimately humanity itself. 215    
 
The Blaškić Judgment summarizes the issue succinctly.  The Trial Chamber reasoned 
that it is due to the presence of such discriminatory grounds, be it, political, racial, or 
religious grounds, that what would otherwise be a simple crime is transformed into a 
grave criminal act that ultimately deprives a person of an elementary right.  The 
Chamber specifically concluded:   
The underlying offence of persecution requires the existence of a mens rea from which it 
obtains its specificity.  As set down in Article 5 of the Statute, it must be committed for 
specific reasons whether these be linked to political views, racial background or religious 
                                                 
213 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 636. 
 
214 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
50. 
 
215 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 634.  
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convictions.  It is the specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a 
particular community or group, rather than the means employed to achieve it, that bestows on 
it its individual nature and gravity and which justifies its being able to constitute criminal acts 
which might appear in themselves not to infringe directly upon the most elementary rights of a 
human being, for example, attacks on property 216 (emphasis added). 
In addition, the Blaškić Appeal Chamber held that it must be shown that the acts of 
persecution were of equal gravity or severity as the acts found in Article 5 of the 
ICTY Statute.  The Chamber stated that “it is not enough that the underlying acts be 
perpetrated with a discriminatory intent.”217 
 
2. By reason of the identity of the group or collectivity  
 
a. Group or collectivity  
 
i. What is a group or collectivity?  
 
Before determining the reason why an attack occurs, it is important to understand just 
whom the attack is directed against.  Element 2 of the Elements of the crime of 
persecution refers to the targeting of person/s.  However, such targeting must occur 
because of the reason of the identity of a group or collectivity.   
 
In the mind of this writer, the terms ‘group’ or ‘collectivity’ imply a body of more 
than one person, identifiable on a specific basis.  People that share common 
objectives, goals, and traditions etc.  One has a sense of a body or people that actively 
                                                 
216 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 235. 
 
217 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, paragraph 160. 
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maintain a specific identity that they assert or affiliate themselves with.  Ultimately, 
this is what would distinguish one group or collectivity from another.  
 
The natural meaning of the word ‘group’ denotes “a number of persons [or things] 
located close together, or considered or classed together.”218  ‘Collectivity’ simply 
means: “either a group or the community.”219  
 
Having articulated the natural meaning of the terms ‘group’ or ‘collectivity’, one 
could venture to suggest that these terms leave the reader to conclude that group and 
collectivity really refer to one and the same concept.  However, in a circumstance 
where a number of minority ethnic groups are attacked, the sum of these groups 
would not be a ‘group’ but would preferably be referred to as a collectivity.   In any 
event, for the purposes of this thesis the writer shall address the terms ‘group’ and 
‘collectivity’ as distinct concepts for that is how they appear in the Elements of 
Crimes and the Rome Statute. 
                                                 
218 The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Current English (8th edn, 1990) at 522.  See discussion of this 
term in Machteld Boot and Christopher K Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1999) at 147. 
 
219 Used in the French context: le public, l‘esenblément des citoyens. Collins Robert French-English 
English-French Dictionary (3rd edn, 1993) at 154.  See discussion of this term in Machteld Boot and 
Christopher K Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) at 
147. 
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ii. Negotiations at the Rome Conference and the Preparatory 
Commission 
 
There is some discrepancy among experts in international criminal law as to why the 
negotiators of the Rome Statute adopted the terms, ‘group’ and ‘collectivity’, 
separately.   
 
Observers’ at the Rome Conference, Machteld Boot and Christopher K. Hall, 
criticized negotiators for their seeming contentment in concluding the so-called phrase 
debate, i.e., group versus collectivity, by stating the obvious: the ideology of 
distinguishing between group and collectivity remains uncertain.220  
 
The negotiators at the Preparatory Commission were faced with a similar dilemma as 
to how they would describe the relation between the group or collectivity on the one 
hand and the concept of the targeting of one or more persons on the other.  Georg 
Witschel and Weibke Rückert listed three options of phrases that were available to the 
negotiators:  
1. “By reason of their belonging to an identifiable group or collectivity” - said to be too restrictive,  
2. “By reason of their support for an identifiable group or collectivity” - said to be too vague, and 
3. “By reason of their identification with a group or collectivity” - said to be too subjective.   
Witschel and Rückert indicated that as a result of the unresolved debate amongst the 
negotiators, they opted to resolve matters by drafting Element 2 of the Elements of the 
                                                 
220 Machteld Boot and Christopher K Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1999) at 147.  
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crime of persecution to reflect Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute as closely as 
possible and leave future case law to deal with any ambiguities.221  
 
Negotiators at the Preparatory Commission concluded that “the group or collectivity 
as such can be the target of the crime, with the suffering of individual victims being a 
kind of unavoidable ‘byproduct’.”222  Although this would seem somewhat cynical, 
Machteld Boot has made the observation that the phrase ‘group or collectivity’ when 
taken at face value seems to exclude crimes of persecution committed against 
individuals.  Boot, relying on the Tadić Judgment, points out though that “persecution 
concerns the deprivation of fundamental rights and, in general, individuals are 
subjects of these rights.”223  He states that a single act committed against a single 
individual may indeed amount to persecution.224  It should also be borne in mind that 
Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes uses the phrase ‘one or more 
persons’ to describe the perpetration of acts which amount to the crime of persecution.  
Element 1 of the Elements of the crime of persecution states: “the perpetrator severely 
deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons of fundamental rights” 
(emphasis added). 
                                                 
221 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 97.  
 
222 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 97.  
 
223 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 523.   
 
224 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 523.   
 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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Machteld Boot’s comments are consistent with customary international law.  In 
particular, the Kupreškić et al Judgment discussed this issue and determined that a 
single act, i.e., murder, committed against a single individual as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack, if committed with discriminatory intent amounted to a crime of 
persecution.225    
 
b. Why does the perpetrator target the person/s or the group 
or collectivity?  
 
Element 2 of the Elements of the crime of persecution states: “the perpetrator targeted 
such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted 
the group or collectivity as such.”  Element 2 shows that the reason why a group or 
collectivity is targeted would be because of the identity of the group or collectivity.   
 
To date, there appears to be both a broad and narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘by 
reason of the group or collectivity’.  This has led to conflicting views expressed in 
customary international law and discussions from leading academics.   
 
The Prosecution in the East Timor Los Palos case analyzed the phrase ‘by reason of 
the identity of the group or collectivity’. The Prosecution argued that, pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 5(2)(f) of Regulation No. 2000/15, the phrase referred to the 
persecution of a number of individuals who could be identified by common 
characteristics.  The Prosecution specifically proposed that “persecution of a group is 
                                                                                                                                            
 
225 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 624. 
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understood as a multiplicity of individuals which share a common feature.  
Accordingly, persecution can be committed, for example, by reason of the victim’s 
gender or the victims’ common characteristics of their opposition to the 
government.”226 
 
The Prosecution then defined the phrase ‘identity of the group or collectivity’, and 
suggested it had to be interpreted in a broad manner.  Therefore, the phrase ‘identity 
of the group or collectivity’ is described as: “the common feature according to which 
the victims were singled out by the perpetrators, whether that is ‘on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender grounds’”.227 
 
What makes the Prosecutor’s arguments significant is that firstly, the definition of 
persecution found in Section 5(2)(f) of Regulation No. 2000/15 is worded exactly the 
same as the definition in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.  Secondly, although the 
Panel of Judges neither disputed nor concurred with the Prosecution, the Panel 
repeated the Prosecution’s arguments in great detail in their judgment then simply 
stated that they were satisfied with the provisions pertaining to the crime of 
persecution stipulated in the Elements of Crimes and the Rome Statute. 228   
 
Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth queried: could the phrase ‘by reason of the identity of 
the group’ imply that the crime of persecution is carried out only against a group that 
                                                 
226 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at p. 33.  
 
227 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at p. 33.  
 
228 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 662-669.  
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has formed itself as such and thus is identifiable by a certain identity?  Ambos and 
Wirth reject this line of reasoning as a narrow interpretation of the Rome Statute and 
the East Timor Regulation 2000/15 provisions.  Instead, the Authors suggest that 
“persecution can be committed, for example, by reason of the victim’s gender.  
Persecution of women, however, does not refer to a group in the narrow sense but 
rather to a group understood as a multiplicity of individuals which share a common 
feature.” 229   The views expressed by Ambos and Wirth clearly reinforce the 
Prosecutor’s arguments in the Los Palos case.  Neither do the views of Ambos and 
Wirth narrow the writer’s comments earlier with respect to the definition of a 
collectivity.  
 
As for jurisprudence from the ICTY, the Blaškić Judgment put forward the 
proposition that the individual is not the target in crimes of persecution but rather the 
perpetrator targets the individual’s membership to a particular group, be it a racial, 
religious or political group.230 
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović took the view that the 
group that is targeted need not necessarily be made up of persons who personally have 
a religious, racial or political characteristic of the group.  The Chamber held that the 
group which is targeted may include persons, “defined by the perpetrator as belonging 
to the victim group due to their close affiliations or sympathies for the victim group.”  
The Chamber reasoned that it is the perpetrator who defines the victim group.  
                                                 
229 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 77.  
 
230 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 235. 
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Ultimately, the targeted victims exert no influence or control on how they are defined 
by the perpetrator.231 
 
In Kvočka et al, the Chamber ruled that the discrimination element was met if a 
person was targeted for abuse merely on the suspicion of belonging to a Muslim 
group, even if such suspicion was inaccurate.232  However, the Krnojelac Judgment 
rejected this line of argument.  The Krnojelac Chamber held, “the existence of a 
mistaken belief that the intended victim will be discriminated against, together with 
an intention to discriminate against that person because of that mistaken belief, may 
amount to the inchoate offence of attempted persecution, but no such crime falls 
within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal”233 (italics emphasized in Judgment).   
 
Of particular concern to the Chamber in the Krnojelac case was the point that failure 
to require “discrimination in fact” would result in a situation where a person could be 
convicted for persecution regardless of whether or not the persecution was carried out.  
The Chamber expressed the view that:  
Logic argues in favour of a requirement that the act be discriminatory in fact.  Without such a 
requirement, an accused could be convicted of persecution without anyone actually having been 
persecuted… Although the Statute does not expressly require that the discrimination take place 
                                                 
231 Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, paragraph 636.  The description of a targeted group is upheld in Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case 
No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 49. 
 
232 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 2001, 
paragraph 195. 
 
233 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, footnote 1292 
referenced in paragraph 432.  For an in-depth discussion of this discrepancy see Daryl A. Mundis, 
“Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals” (2003) 1 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 197 at 203.  Also the Naletilić and Martinović Judgment criticised the 
interpretation adopted by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac Judgment with regards to the 
decision expressed in Kvočka et al concerning the definition of a targeted group stating the Chamber 
had taken an overly narrow view which as a result ignored the specific nature of crimes of persecution.  
See Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 
2003, footnote 1572 referenced in paragraph 636. 
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against a member of the targeted group, this is a necessary implication of the occurrence of an 
act or omission on a discriminatory basis.234 
 
It should be noted, however, that Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute differ from customary international 
law on this point.  Both the Elements of Crimes and Rome Statute provisions 
expressly require that the discrimination take place against a member of the targeted 
group.   
 
 
II. ELEMENT 3 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: 
Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender… or 
other grounds universally recognized as impermissible under international law. 
 
A. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 3 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 
 
The first limb of Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 3 of the Elements of 
the crime of persecution contain similar provisions.  Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute establishes that the crime of persecution is an act that is perpetrated “against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender…, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
                                                 
234 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 432.   
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under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”  These grounds, on which the crime of 
persecution could be committed, found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, are repeated 
in Element 3 of the Elements of the crime of persecution.  
 
B. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 3 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
The discriminatory grounds on which the crime of persecution could be perpetrated 
are much wider under the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes than those 
indicated in previous international legal instruments.  
 
Drawing on customary international law, the ILC, in its Draft Codes prepared 
between 1954 until 1996, significantly widened the grounds on which the crime of 
persecution could be perpetrated.   
 
Comparison of the Draft Codes prior to the establishment of the ICC indicating the grounds on 
which persecution could be perpetrated 
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes & Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Rome Statute 
Article 2(11) of the 
1954 Draft Code  
 
Article 21 of the 1991 
Draft Code  
Article 18(e) of the 1996 
Draft Code  
Political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender or other 
grounds recognized as impermissible 
under international law 
Political, religious or 
cultural motives 
Social, political, racial, 
religious or cultural 
grounds 
Political, racial, religious or 
ethnic grounds 
 
It is clear, as the table above indicates, that according to the ILC the grounds on which 
the crime of persecution could be perpetrated included: political, religious, cultural, 
social, racial, and ethnic grounds. 
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Other than the Draft Codes, between 1945 and 1998, analysis of international legal 
instruments spanning from the Nuremberg Charter to the ICTR Statute, tabled below, 
indicates that crimes of persecution could be committed on political, racial and 
religious grounds.     
 
Comparison of international instruments prior to the 1998 Rome Statute indicating the grounds 
on which persecution could be perpetrated 
 
Element 4 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes 
& Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Rome Statute 
Article 6(c) of 
the Nuremberg 
Charter  
Article II(c) of 
Control Council 
Law No. 10 
Article 5(c) of 
the Tokyo 
Charter  
Article 5(h) of 
the ICTY Statute  
Article 3(g) of 
the ICTR Statute 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial or 
religious grounds 
Political, racial or 
religious grounds 
Political or racial 
grounds 
Political, racial 
and religious 
grounds 
Political, racial 
and religious 
grounds 
 
It should be noted that the general chapeau concerning crimes against humanity 
pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, seeks to prosecute those responsible for 
crimes “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”   
 
The requirement of discrimination for all crimes against humanity under Article 3 of 
the ICTR Statute was criticized for exceeding the customary international law 
requirements established for crimes against humanity.  Furthermore, the issue was 
raised as to whether the discriminatory grounds applied to the attack itself or the 
individual act, and whether the discriminatory grounds introduced an additional 
mental element.235  The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema attempted to 
                                                 
235 Simon Chesterman, “An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against 
Humanity” (Spring/Summer 2000) 10 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 307 at 326. 
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clarify this point.  The Chamber recognized that the requirement of discrimination for 
all crimes against humanity was unique to the ICTR Statute, but held the 
discriminatory grounds were to “be read as a characterization of the nature of the 
‘attack’ rather than the of mens rea of the perpetrator.”236  
 
Comparison of international instruments created in the aftermath of the 1998 Rome Statute 
indicating the grounds on which persecution could be perpetrated 
 
Element 4 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes 
& Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Rome Statute 
Section 5(1)(h) of 
Regulation 
2000/15 (2000) 
Article 5 of the 
ECCC Special 
Law (2001) 
Article 2(h) of 
the SCSL   
Statute (2002) 
Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia 
Agreement 
(2003) 
Article 12(a)(8) 
of the IST 
Statute (2003) 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial 
and religious 
grounds 
Political, racial, 
ethnic, or 
religious grounds 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
Political, racial, 
national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, 
gender or other 
grounds 
 
Analysis of international statutory provisions on the crime of persecution created in 
the aftermath of the 1998 Rome Statute, tabled above, indicates that three of the five 
instruments have the exact same grounds as the Rome Statute.  These grounds are 
enumerated in: Section 5(1)(h) of Eats Timor Regulation No. 2000/15, Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the Iraqi Statute, respectively.   
 
Article 2(h) of the Sierra Leone Statute adopted a much narrower list of the grounds 
on which the crime of persecution could be committed, recognizing only political, 
racial, ethnic or religious grounds.  The same could be said for the Special Law of the 
Extraordinary Chambers within the Cambodian Courts.  However, much like the 
ICTR Statute, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law further requires a discriminatory 
intent for all crimes against humanity.  According to Article 5, in order to amount to 
                                                 
236 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, paragraph 81.  
See also detailed discussion of this issue in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, Trial Judgement, 21 May 1999, paragraphs 130-132. 
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crimes against humanity the attack must be committed on national, political, ethnical, 
racial, or religious grounds.  
 
In addition, there are a number of international instruments that prohibit 
discrimination carried out on similar grounds identified above.   For example, Article 
2 of the UDHR, the ICCPR and ICESCR all advocate for “rights without distinction 
of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, or social origin, property, birth, or other status.” 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENT 3 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
1. Targeting based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender… or other grounds recognized as 
impermissible under international law  
 
As indicated above, both Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes and Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Rome Statute establish that the crime of persecution can be committed on 
“political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender… or other grounds 
recognized as impermissible under international law.”   The writer will analyze each 
of these grounds separately in the discussion that follows.  It should be noted, 
however, that this discussion is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but rather an 
attempt to identify what these grounds are and whether they are significant at all.   
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a. Political grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
The natural meaning of the adjective ‘political’ is: “involving or characteristic of 
politics or parties or politicians.”237 
 
A wide interpretation of political persecution could be that the term ‘political’ is also 
understood to mean: “including public affairs issues such as environment and 
health.”238 
ii. Is this ground significant? 
 
Political persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in numerous statutory 
instruments239 and a few other international instruments.240   
 
It is this writer’s opinion that the statutory provisions for political persecution are 
significant.  There are a number of cases in customary international law where the 
prosecution of crimes of political persecution has provided a significant precedent.   
The circumstances in East Timor, following the vote for independence from Indonesia 
in the Popular Consultation of 30 August 1999, provide a good example of political 
                                                 
237 See, Dictionary.com available at: http://dictionary.reference.com 
 
238 Machteld Boot and Christopher K Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1999) at 148-149. 
 
239 See, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article II(c) of CCL 10, Article 5(c) of the Tokyo 
Charter, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law, Article 2(h) of the 
SCSL Statute, Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
240 See, Article 25 of the ICCPR, Article 21 of the UDHR. 
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persecution.  In the case of the Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, the 
Panel of Judges found that it was clear that the victim, Albino Nahak, was a pro-
independence supporter.  Furthermore, it was clear that he was arrested, abducted and, 
later tortured and killed for this simple reason alone.  The Panel held that Accused’s 
actions were discriminatory on political grounds and therefore amounted to 
persecution.241 
b. Racial grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
The natural meaning of the noun ‘race’ is defined as: “a local geographic or global 
human population distinguished as a more or less distinct group by genetically 
transmitted physical characteristics.”242 
 
In a working definition proposed by the European Union, racial persecution occurs in 
circumstances “where the persecutor regards the victim of his persecution as 
belonging to a racial group other than his own, by reason of a real or supposed 
difference, and this forms the grounds for his action.”243 
 
                                                 
241 Public Prosecutor v. Damiao Da Costa Nunes, Case No. 1/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 10 December 2003, 
paragraph 75.  For another example of political persecution see Prosecutor v. Marcelino Soares, Case 
No. 11/2003, Trial Judgement, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese Transitional 
Administration, Dili District Court.   
 
242 See, Dictionary.com available at: http://dictionary.reference.com 
 
243 European Union Draft Guidelines for the Application of the Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
(November 1994) discussed in Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and 
Human Rights (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) paragraph 1-048 at 33. 
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Also, it is now well established that the crime of apartheid is an extreme form of 
institutionalised racial discrimination.  According to Article 7(2)(h) of the Rome 
Statute the crime of apartheid is an inhumane act that is “committed in the context of 
an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of 
maintaining that regime.”244  
ii. Is this ground significant?  
 
Racial persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in numerous statutory 
instruments245 and a large number of other international instruments.246   
 
It is this writer’s opinion that the statutory provisions for racial persecution are 
significant.  There are numerous cases from ad hoc Tribunals that have provided 
significant legal precedents for crimes of racial persecution.  Throughout history, 
there have been countless instances of racial persecution. For example, the crimes 
committed against Jews by the Nazi Regime, as well as crimes committed by Serbians 
against Croatians, Bosnians etc., in the former Yugoslavia.   
                                                 
244 Note also Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid.   
 
245 See, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article II(c) of CCL 10, Article 5(c) of the Tokyo 
Charter, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law, Article 2(h) of the 
SCSL Statute, Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
246 See, Article 1 and 2 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Article 5(b) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Article 20 of the ICCPR. See also the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities.  
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c. National grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts suggest, “any group which is defined as having full 
citizenship are seen as comprising a national group.”247  However, Machteld Boot and 
Christopher K. Hall, suggest persecution carried out on national grounds could be 
considered as a concept in much broader terms, independent of the idea of citizenship.  
The term ‘national’ is said to encompass all the attributes of a group that believe or 
assert themselves as a nation despite their members being dispersed and located in 
more than one State.248  
ii. Is this ground significant?  
 
National persecution is prohibited in international criminal law, but in fewer statutory 
instruments249 and a handful of other international instruments250 than any of the other 
grounds discussed in this Chapter.  It is not defined in any international instrument.  
 
Of particular concern here is that the Rome Statute was the first international criminal 
instrument to criminalize national persecution.  Therefore, it is this writer’s opinion 
                                                 
247 Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2003) paragraph 1-050 at 33. 
 
248 Machteld Boot and Christopher K. Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1999) at 149.  
 
249 See, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
250 See, Article 20 of the ICCPR. Also Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 
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that the statutory provisions for national persecution should have been articulated in a 
much clearer manner.   
 
An example of an act of national persecution might be derived from the Japanese 
bombing of Pearl Harbour.  If the bombing of Pearl Harbour had occurred today and it 
was proven that Japan sought to persecute only American nationals because they were 
American, then the argument could be made that pursuant to the Rome statutory 
provisions the Japanese could be prosecuted for crimes of national persecution.    
 
Another example of national persecution is found in the ILC suggestion that the crime 
of persecution could encompass a prohibition on the use of a national language, even 
in private circumstances.251     
d. Ethnic grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
Ethnic groups are defined as pertaining to “peoples who conceive of themselves as 
one kind by virtue of their common ancestry (real or imagined), who are united by 
emotional bond, a common culture and by concern with the preservation of their 
group.”252  
                                                 
251 Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.464/Add.4 (1991) Article 21, Commentary paragraph 9.  
 
252 R. Burkey, Discrimination and Racial Relations, Report on the International Research Conference 
on Race Relations (Colorado, 1970) at 2.  
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ii. Is this ground significant?  
 
Ethnic persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in a number of statutory 
instruments253 and other international instruments.254   
 
One illustration of what could be perceived as ethnic persecution is evidenced by the 
Rwandan atrocities of 1994.  Rwanda’s ethnic problems can be traced back to the 
colonial days of Belgian rule.  Belgian colonial powers openly and prejudicially 
favoured one ethnic race over the other, namely the minority Tutsi over the majority 
Hutu.  The roots of ethnic intolerance gradually built up and were firmly entrenched 
by the time the ethnic atrocities began in 1994.  The results were staggering.  It is 
estimated that extremist Hutu killed up to 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 
approximately 100 days.255 
 
Bearing in mind the ICTR Statute establishes that the crime of persecution could be 
committed on political, racial, or religious grounds, it is interesting to observe the 
comments passed in the Nahimana et al Judgement.  The ICTR Trial Chamber, in 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, held:  
                                                 
253 See, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 2(h) of the 
SCSL Statute, Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
254 See, the Universal Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. See also the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities.  
 
255 For further details on the Rwandan ordeal see: the historical analysis in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998.  Also Helen Fein, “The Three P’s of Genocide 
Prevention: With Application to a Genocide foretold – Rwanda” in Neal Riemer (ed), Protection 
Against Genocide: Mission Impossible? (London: Praeger Publishers, 2000) at 41-66; Paul J. 
Magnarella, Justice in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide, its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) at 22-27 & 41-57; Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), Global War Crimes Tribunal Collection, Volume 
1: The Rwanda Tribunal, (GLA/Wolf Global Legal Publishers, 1997) 270. 
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As the evidence indicates, in Rwanda the targets of attack were the Tutsi ethnic group and the 
so-called moderate Hutu political opponents who supported the Tutsi ethnic group.  The 
Chambers considers that the group against which discriminatory attacks were perpetrated can be 
defined by its political component as well as its ethnic component.  At times the political 
component predominated… RTLM, Kangura and CDR, as has been shown by the evidence, 
essentially merged political and ethnic identity, defining their political target on the basis of 
ethnicity and political positions relating to ethnicity.  In these circumstances, the Chamber 
considers that the discriminatory intent of the Accused falls within the scope of the crime against 
humanity of persecution on political grounds of an ethnic character.256  
e. Cultural grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
The noun ‘culture’ denotes: “customs, arts, social institutions, etc., of a particular 
group or people.” 257   Therefore, in practical terms, one would think cultural 
persecution would be an attack on the very customs, arts, and social institutions of a 
particular group of people.  
ii. Is this ground significant?  
 
Cultural persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in a number of 
statutory instruments258 and a handful of other international instruments.259   
 
As early as 1991, the ILC proposed that forms of persecution could include the 
destruction of buildings, monuments, and books etc., that belong to a particular 
                                                 
256 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, 
paragraph 1071. 
 
257 Oxford’s Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (4th edn 1989) at 291.  
 
258 See, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
259 See, for example, Article 1 and 15 of the ICESCR. 
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cultural group.260  It is now well established in customary international law from the 
ad hoc Tribunals that the destruction and plundering of buildings or monuments, 
when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to crimes of 
persecution.261  For example, the Trial Chamber in Kordić and Čerkez expressed the 
view that attacks of this nature, when committed with the necessary discriminatory 
intent, constitute an attack on the culture and its objects to the extent that it becomes 
an attack on the cultural identity of the group, and therefore amounts to 
persecution.262    
f. Religious grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
The noun ‘religion’ is defined as: “belief in and reverence for a supernatural power or 
powers regarded as creator and governor of the universe.”263  The adjective ‘religious’ 
denotes a concern with “sacred matters or religion or the church.”264   
 
                                                 
260 Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.464/Add.4 (1991) Article 21, Commentary paragraph 9.   
 
261 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 764, 
Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 2003, 
paragraph 701, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 
2001, paragraph 186, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, 
paragraphs 227, 234, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 
January 2000, paragraph 631, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 
May 1997, paragraphs 707, 710.   
 
262 See arguments presented in Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial 
Judgment, 26 February 2001, paragraph 207. 
 
263 See, Dictionary.com available at: http://dictionary.reference.com 
 
264 See, Dictionary.com available at: http://dictionary.reference.com 
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ii. Is this ground significant? 
 
Religious persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in numerous statutory 
instruments265 and other international instruments.266   
 
The September 11 attacks carried out against the United States of America could, 
arguably, amount to religious persecution if it could be shown that the US was 
attacked because it was a Christian country.  The international community, ushered 
vocally by the United States, asserts that the al-Qaida organization carried out these 
attacks in what is now commonly referred to as ‘terror attacks.’  If, for example, it 
could be shown that al-Qaida acted pursuant to an organizational policy to commit a 
widespread or systematic ‘jihad’ or holy war directed against the US civilian 
population, then this could constitute religious persecution.   In any event, if the 
September 11 events really did ignite a holy war, then perhaps the prosecution of 
crimes of religious persecution will gain even greater significance in the years to 
come as the infamous ‘terror attacks’ are increasing around the world.  
                                                 
265 See, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article II(c) of CCL 10, Article 5(h) of the ICTY 
Statute, Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of 
Regulation 2000/15, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law, Article 2(h) of the SCSL Statute, Article 9 of 
the UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
266 See, Article 2(b) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Also Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 
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g. Gender grounds 
 
i. What does this mean? 
 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute establishes that persecution can be carried out on 
grounds of gender.  Of all the grounds on which the crime of persecution could be 
perpetrated, gender is the only one that has been defined by the Rome Statute.   
 
Article 7(3) of the Statute establishes that the term ‘gender’ refers to: “the two sexes, 
male and female, within the context of society.”  Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute 
does not take into account sexual orientation.  The deliberations at the Rome 
Conference became so contentious that the issue of defining the term ‘gender’ to 
include sexual orientation was left for the ICC judges to determine at a later stage.267  
Clearly, this issue needs to be addressed.  The shortcoming in this area of the law is 
discussed by Geoffrey Robertson, who describes the definition of gender, articulated 
in Article 7(3), as ‘distasteful’.  He argues that “persecution is a crime if directed 
against men as men, or women because they are female, but homosexuals and 
lesbians may still suffer the thumbscrew and the rack, the ‘intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights’ when this is ‘within the context of society’, i.e. 
approved by a gay-bashing government or culture.”268 
                                                 
267 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 522. 
 
268 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (2nd edn) 
(England: Penguin Books, 2002) at 360-361. 
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ii. Is this ground significant? 
 
Gender persecution is prohibited in international criminal law in a handful of statutory 
instruments269 and a number of other international instruments.270   
 
Specifically articulating provisions that protect the male gender pursuant to the 
provisions in the Rome Statute is a remarkable development as most international 
instruments generally prohibit the discrimination of women based solely on their 
identity as women.271  
 
An example of how men would be discriminated against on gender grounds could 
include, for example, a perpetrator implementing a specific policy aimed at 
effectively eliminating men and male children so as to end the lineage of a specific 
group or collectivity from society.  The events of Prosecutor v. Krstić that took place 
in Srebrenica and Potočari illustrate what could, arguably, have been gender 
persecution.  It should be noted though that the Trial Chamber determined that these 
events were in fact ethnic persecution.  The facts of the case established that Serb 
forces separated, transferred and killed thousands of mainly men and male children 
from groups of Bosnian Muslim refugees.  The Trial Chamber described the events as 
‘catastrophic’, and sympathized with the difficulties of the surviving women in re-
                                                 
269 See, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Section 5(1)(h) of Regulation 2000/15, Article 9 of the 
UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Article 12(a)(8) of the IST Statute. 
 
270 See, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
 
271 See, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Also the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
 
 157 
establishing their lives in the aftermath of what the Tribunal referred to as the 
“elimination of virtually all the men.”272   
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al discussed the concept of gender 
persecution in the context of the Rwanda conflict and ruled:  
Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for persecution.  The portrayal of the Tutsi women 
as femme fatal, and the message that Tutsi women were seductive agents of the enemy was 
conveyed repeatedly by RTLM and Kangura.  The Ten Commandments, broadcast on RTLM 
and published in Kangura, vilified and endangered the women… By defining the Tutsi 
woman as an enemy in this way, RTLM and Kangura articulated a framework that made the 
sexual attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them.273 
h. Other grounds universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law 
 
i. What does this mean?  
 
The Rome Statute negotiators agreed that the concept of universal recognition would 
be applied to new grounds relating to the crime of persecution other than the grounds 
enumerated in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.274  Neither Element 3 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes nor Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute contains an 
exhaustive list of the grounds on which persecution could be perpetrated.  Instead, 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements 
of Crimes state that persecution can be committed on: political, racial, national, 
                                                 
272 See factual analysis from Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 August 
2001 paragraphs 11-96 and specifically conclusion reached in paragraph 91.  
 
273 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Case No.ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, 3 December 2003, 
paragraph 1079. 
 
274 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 96. See also the Preparatory Commission 
document PCNICC/2000/L.1/Rev.1/Add.2. 
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ethnic, cultural, religious, gender… or other grounds recognized as impermissible 
under international law. 
 
There were numerous debates at the Rome Conference and the Preparatory 
Commission as to whether or not to include the phrase ‘universally recognized’ in 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements 
of Crimes.   On the one hand were delegates proposed that crimes of persecution 
could be perpetrated on grounds that were ‘universally recognized under customary 
international law’.  The majority of delegates argued that such requirements were 
impractical.  The opposing delegates were of the view that the expression ‘universally 
recognized under customary international law’ imposed conditions that could not be 
met.  The expression implied that all the states in the world were obliged to recognise 
whatever the ground was in order for it to be impermissible.  The debate was resolved 
with the delegates adopting the expression ‘universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law’.275  Therefore, the expression ‘universally recognized’ found 
in the phrase ‘universally recognized as impermissible under international law’ simply 
means: “widely recognized.”276  
ii. Is this ground significant?  
 
The expression ‘universally recognized as impermissible under international law’ 
could be interpreted broadly.  For example, Article 2 of the ICCPR, ICESCR, and 
                                                 
275 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 96. 
 
276 Machteld Boot and Christopher K. Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1999) at 150.  
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UDHR, established that when a State Party is enforcing the rights set out in the 
instruments, no distinction of any kind should be made on grounds “such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”  Article 2 of ICCPR, ICESCR, and UDHR (commonly 
referred to as the International Bill of Rights) established a much wider set of grounds 
than those enumerated in the Rome Statute.  Article 2 of the respective provisions 
added: language, colour, social origin, property, and birth.  Therefore, does the 
expression ‘other grounds universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law’ mean that the ICC can also prosecute crimes of persecution committed on 
grounds of language, colour, etc?  Furthermore, how will the ICC deal with issues 
such as: mental or physical disability, economic or age related instances of 
discrimination.277   
 
It is this writer’s opinion that, pursuant to Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and 
Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, the ICC should prosecute 
crimes of most serious concern to the international community committed on grounds 
of language, colour, social origin, property, birth, as well as mental or physical 
disability, economic or age related instances of discrimination if they otherwise 
amount to crimes of persecution.  It is clear that these grounds are established in 
international law, for example, pursuant to the International Bill of Rights.  Therefore, 
the expression ‘other grounds universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law’ should include persecution committed on these grounds.  
 
                                                 
277 For in-depth discussion of these grounds and the challenges that lie ahead for the ICC see Machteld 
Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights Research 
Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 521-522. 
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III. ELEMENT 4 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: 
The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, paragraph 1, 
of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+  
 
A. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 4 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ROME 
STATUTE   
 
Element 4 of the Elements of the crime of persecution parallels the wording found in 
the second limb of Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.  Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute prohibits “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, 
or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international 
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court” (emphasis added).    
 
                                                 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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B. COMPARISON OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT IN ELEMENT 4 
OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND 
ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ROME STATUTE WITH OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS  
 
Element 4 of the Elements of the crime of persecution, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute and, prior to the Rome Statute, Article 5(c) and Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg 
Charter, tabled below, are the only international legal instruments with a nexus 
requirement narrowing the scope of crimes of persecution.  Article 3(g) of the ICTR 
Statute, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, and Article II(1)(c) of CCL 10 do not have a 
nexus requisite for crimes of persecution.    
  
Comparison of the nexus requirement in international legal instruments created prior to the 1998 
Rome Statute 
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Elements of Crimes 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome 
Statute 
Article 5(c) of the Tokyo 
Charter 
Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter 
… the conduct was committed 
in connection with any act 
referred to in Article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute or 
any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.+  
… in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or 
any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
… in execution of or in 
connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal… 
… in execution of or in 
connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal…  
 
Analysis of international statutory provisions on the crime of persecution after the 
1998 Rome Statute indicates that there are only 3 international legal instruments 
which stipulate a nexus requirement.  These are: Article 12(a)(8) and 12(b)(6) of the 
IST Statute, Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, and Section 5(1)(h) and 
5(2)(f) of Regulation No. 2000/15.  These provisions reflect the exact same wording 
found in the Rome Statute.   
                                                 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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There are two international legal instruments formulated in the aftermath of the 1998 
Rome Statute provisions that do not require a nexus requirement for crimes of 
persecution.  These are: Article 2(h) of the SCSL Statute and Article 5 of the ECCC 
Special Law.  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENT 4 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
1. What is this nexus requirement? 
 
a. Acts connected to crimes of persecution  
 
Delegates at the Rome Conference, after much deliberation, came to the agreement 
that persecution would be a crime only when connected to other crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction.  At the time of the Conference the general consensus indicated 
that a restrictive prerequisite for the crime of persecution was a necessary precaution.  
The delegates felt that persecution was a vague notion in itself with the potential to far 
outweigh the desired focus on the criminal aspect of the crime.278   
 
Hence, a nexus requirement was introduced to highlight the criminal aspect of the 
crime of persecution.279  The crime of persecution must be committed in connection 
                                                 
278 Darryl Robinson, “Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43 at 54.  
 
279 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 95.  
 163 
with any act enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, or the crime of persecution 
must be committed in connection with any other crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
that is, those crimes stipulated in Article 5 of the Rome Statute.  
i. Acts of persecution charged in connection with acts under 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute 
 
Element 4 of the Elements of the crime of persecution requires that in order to 
constitute persecution, “the conduct was committed in connection with any act 
referred to in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”+ (emphasis added).  Also, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, requires 
acts of persecution be “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” (emphasis added). 
 
The crime of persecution can be committed in connection with any of the acts 
enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  According to Article 7(1) of the Statute 
these enumerated acts, are: Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, 
or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international 
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; 
                                                                                                                                            
 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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Other inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
 
These enumerated acts are defined in Article 7(2) and 7(3) of the Rome Statute.280   
ii. Acts of persecution charged in connection with any other 
crimes under the Rome Statute 
 
The crime of persecution can also be committed in connection with any of the crimes 
established in Article 5 of the Rome Statute.  Article 5(1) of the provision lists all the 
crimes which fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.  These include: the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.  
 
                                                 
280  Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute states:  
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:  
 (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such attack;  
 (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to 
food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;  
 (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a 
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children;  
 (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted 
under international law;  
 (e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a 
person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;  
 (f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.  
This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;  
 (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international 
law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;  
 (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, 
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;  
 (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with 
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.  
 
Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute states:      
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, 
within the context of society.  The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above. 
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b. How does the nexus requirement affect the crime of 
persecution? 
 
This nexus requirement differentiates the role of persecution between the ICC, on the 
one hand, and persecution at the international judicial bodies such as: the ICTY, 
ICTR, SCSL, and ECCC.  The nexus requirement found in Element 4 of Article 
7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes and Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute differs 
from the statutory provisions on the crime of persecution found in most of the ad hoc 
Tribunals.281   
 
The ICTY has rejected the notion of establishing a nexus requirement for crimes of 
persecution.  The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al held that Article 
7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute did not reflect customary international law, arguing that 
the Statute of the ICC was felt to indicate the opinio juris of the participating State 
Parties.  The Judgment rejected the idea that the crime of persecution must be 
committed in connection with other crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.  It was the opinion of the Trial Chamber that the application of Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute is restricted by Article 10 of the Statute which states, “nothing in the 
Statute shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute” (emphasis 
appears in Judgment).  Based on this, the Chamber reasoned that the “provision 
clearly conveys the idea that the framers of the Statute did not intend to affect, 
                                                 
281 It should be borne in mind that the IST Statute, Regulation 2000/15, and the UN/Cambodia 
Agreement are worded exactly the same as the Rome Statute provisions on the crime of persecution. 
Also the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters establish a nexus requirement for crimes of persecution. 
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amongst other things, lex lata as regards such matters as the definition of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide.”282   
 
Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez upheld the approach taken in Kupreškić et al. 
However, the Trial Chamber made the observation that despite the Rome Statute 
limiting the scope of the crime of persecution with the nexus requirement, the reality 
though, was that the remainder of the provisions generally widened the scope of the 
crime.  The Chamber held, “in practice, the list of acts which may potentially be 
characterised as persecution is extensive in view of the broad range of crimes listed 
thereunder.”283  
 
The nexus requirement recognizes that the crime of persecution is committed in 
connection with any act found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute; therefore, the 
argument could be made that this could include the very act of persecution itself.284   
 
Another point to consider concerning the nexus requirement is made by Herman von 
Hebel and Darryl Robinson.  Von Hebel and Robinson argue that the crime of 
persecution could be ascertained by proving a nexus with any act of murder, torture, 
rape, or other inhumane act.  Because of the nexus requirement, the act, connected to 
the persecution, need not have been committed as a widespread or systematic attack.  
Von Hebel and Robinson were of the opinion that “the possibility of connection to 
                                                 
282 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 580. 
 
283 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
paragraphs 193, 197. 
 
284 See Machteld Boot and Christopher K. Hall, “Persecution” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1999) at 151. 
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any inhumane act ensures that persecution will not be a mere auxiliary offense or 
aggravating factor.”285 
 
Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth propose that the nexus requirement established for 
crimes of persecution operates in two ways.  Firstly, the crime of persecution, 
pursuant to the provisions established in Article 7 of the Rome Statute and Section 5 
of the East Timor Regulation 2000/15,286 is connected to what they term a “complete 
crime”, that is, any crime within the jurisdiction of Court.  Secondly, the same 
provisions establish persecution is connected to what they term “individual criminal 
acts”, that is, any act referred to in the specified statutory provisions.287   
 
Ambos and Wirth provide the following illustration to explain the nexus requirement: 
Consequently, the persecutory conduct must only be connected to a (single) murder and not to 
a murder which is part of a widespread or systematic attack consisting of other enumerated 
inhumane acts... In other words, a multiplicity of grave human rights violations (which are 
not, as such, enumerated among the inhumane acts), e.g., severe attacks on personal property, 
can be transformed into the crime of persecution by a single connected murder. 288 
 
The authors continue the illustration by arguing that if a murder, that is an inhumane 
act, is committed with discriminatory intent, then the persecutory murder is not 
required to be connected to another murder, because as they suggest, “the connection 
                                                 
285 Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court” in Roy S. 
Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 101-102. 
 
286 It must be borne in mind that the provisions established in Section 5(1)(h) of the East Timor 
Regulation 2000/15 are identical to those found in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. 
 
287 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 71-72.  
 
288 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72.  
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requirement would be met by the identity of the persecutory act (murder) and the 
connected act (murder).” 289   
 
Taking the above context of the nexus requirement into account the authors reach the 
conclusion that there are two types of persecution: persecution that is an autonomous 
crime or an aggravated form of original underlying act.  Ambos and Wirth state that 
“first, persecution may be an autonomous crime, if it is committed through conduct 
which is not enumerated among the inhumane acts but it is connected with an 
enumerated inhumane act.  Second, persecution can be an aggravated form of an 
enumerated inhumane act, if the act is committed with discriminatory intent; a further 
connection to yet another inhumane act is not required.”290     
 
 
IV. ELEMENT 5 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
Element 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: 
The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population. 
 
                                                 
289 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72.  See also discussion in Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights Research Series (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia, 2002) at 525-526.   
 
290 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72.  
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A. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 5 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 
 
Element 5 of the Elements of the crime of persecution parallels the general wording of 
the chapeau to crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  The 
chapeau to Article 7 states, “for the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ 
means any of the following acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack…”  
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines the phrase ‘attack directed against any 
civilian population’ as: “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of 
acts… against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”  
 
The provisions stipulated in Element 5 and the chapeau for Article 7 are consistent 
with customary international law to the extent that both provisions require that crimes 
against humanity must be perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.  For example, Prosecutor v. Blaškić held, “a 
crime against humanity is made special by the methods employed in its perpetration 
(the widespread character) or by the context in which these methods must be framed 
(the systematic character) as well as by the status of the victims (any civilian 
populations)”291 (italic emphasis and brackets appear in the Judgment). 
 
                                                 
291 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 201. 
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B. COMPARISON OF ELEMENT 5 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
Analysis of international legal instruments prior to the 1998 Rome Statute reveals 
only one of these instruments, the ICTR Statute, specifically mentions the phrase 
‘widespread or systematic attacks’ when describing crimes against humanity.  
However, the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ appear in all international 
instruments created in the aftermath of the 1998 Rome Statute.  These include: Article 
12 of the IST Statute, Article 9 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, Article 2 of the 
SCSL Statute, Article 5 of the ECCC Special Law, and Section 5 of Regulation No. 
2000/15.  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENT 5 OF ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
It should be noted that the discussion of Element 5 which follows below, concerning 
the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ and phrase ‘attack directed against any civilian 
population’, is not exclusive to crimes of persecution.  These expressions have been 
interpreted and discussed extensively in the general context of crimes against 
humanity by academics and in leading judgments from ad hoc Tribunals.  
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1. Defining the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ 
 
a. Interpreting the ‘widespread or systematic’ provisions of 
Element 5 of the Elements of the crime of persecution and 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute 
 
The 1996 ILC Draft Code adopted the expression ‘systematic manner or on a large 
scale’.  Regarding the concept of systematic manner, the ILC commentary clarified 
that the expression ‘systematic manner’ required that the conduct, be it repeated or 
continuous, was committed pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy.  This 
requirement is what is said to distinguish crimes against humanity from ordinary 
crimes.  The ILC made it clear that “the thrust of this requirement is to exclude a 
random act which was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy.” 292 
 
Similarly, the ILC explained that the phrase “on a large scale” denoted what the 
Commission referred to as: “the multiplicity of victims”.  The ILC was particularly 
concerned with excluding isolated inhumane acts which were perpetrated by persons 
operating out of their own initiative or inhumane acts which were directed against a 
single victim.  The expression “large-scale” was of particular significance to the ILC 
because the Commission felt the terminology was sufficiently broad enough to cover, 
for example, situations that were the “result of the cumulative effect of a series of 
inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary 
magnitude.”293 
 
                                                 
292 International Law Commission Report, 1996 at paragraph 3, Commentary on Article 18: Crimes 
Against Humanity. 
 
293 International Law Commission Report, 1996 at paragraph 4, Commentary on Article 18: Crimes 
Against Humanity. 
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The terms widespread and systematic generated much debate at the Rome Conference 
negotiations.  Delegates, drawing on case law from ad hoc Tribunals dating back to as 
early as the Nuremberg Trials, agreed that ‘widespread’ is described as: “requiring a 
large-scale action involving a substantial number of victims.”  ‘Systematic’ is 
described as: “requiring a high degree of orchestration and methodical planning.”  
However, the source of contention was whether to adopt the tests as disjunctive, that 
is, widespread or systematic, or to adopt the terms as conjunctive tests, i.e., 
widespread and systematic.  One the one hand, a group of States favoured the 
disjunctive test which they argued reflected customary international law.  On the other 
hand, the remaining States and members of the Security Council advocated for the 
conjunctive test, criticizing the disjunctive test which they described as potentially 
over-inclusive.294  
 
Leading academics, such as Rodney Dixon, agree that multiplicity and policy are 
elements required to show the widespread nature or systematic character of an attack.  
Dixon proposes that the level of occurrence is proven by a substantial number of 
incidents carried out in furtherance of a distinct policy.  Having established 
multiplicity, and a policy, the evidence should show one of two things: either the 
attack was carried out on a widespread or massive scale, or the attack adhered to a 
systematic or regular pattern.295  
 
                                                 
294 Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and 
the Dictates of the Public Conscience” in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds.), Essays on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 139 at 152-153.   
 
295 Rodney Dixon, “Definitions of Crimes or their Elements” in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1999) at 159.  
 
 173 
Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams also hold the same opinion that crimes against 
humanity are set apart by the distinguishing factor which is the pattern of occurrence.  
The aim, according to Ratner and Abrams, is to determine whether the crime is one 
that is abhorred for its large scale, that is, the large number of victims or systematic 
planning, that is, “directed against a specific ‘population’ and not merely random 
individuals.”296 
 
b. How do ad hoc Tribunals interpret the terms ‘widespread’ 
or ‘systematic’?  
 
The Panel of Judges in the East Timor Los Palos case discussed the terms 
‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’.  The Panel defined ‘widespread’ confusingly, as: “an 
attack as the multiple commission of acts with the requirement of inhumane acts…”  
Systematic is defined as: “an attack ‘carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or 
plan’”.297 
 
The terms ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ do not appear in the ICTY Statute. 
According to Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, drawing on customary international law, the 
terms were implied.  The Chamber found:  
It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion of crimes against 
humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be directed against a 
civilian "population", and either a finding of widespreadness, which refers to the number of 
                                                 
296 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 57.  
 
297 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 636-637.  The Panel 
adopted the Blaškić interpretation of widespread and adopted the Bagilishema interpretation of 
systematic.  See Judgment for further details.  
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victims, or systematicity, indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is evident, fulfils this 
requirement.298 
 
Regarding what aspect of the crime is required to be widespread or systematic; the 
Appeal Chamber in Kunarac et al has made it clear that “only the attack, not the 
individual acts of the accused, must be widespread or systematic.”299 
 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić has defined the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’.  The 
Chamber held, “the widespread characteristic refers to the scale of the acts perpetrated 
and to the number of victims.” 300   The systematic character of crimes against 
humanity is identified by the following 4 elements:   
a. The existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated or 
an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a 
community;  
b. The perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of civilians or the 
repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another;  
c. The preparation and use of significant public or private resources, whether military or other;  
d. The implication of high-level political and/or military authorities in the definition and 
establishment of the methodical plan.301  
 
In Prosecutor v. Stakić the Trial Chamber explained that ‘systematic’ referred to what 
the Chamber referred to as: “the organized nature of the acts of violence and the 
improbability of their random occurrence.”  The Chamber provided 4 elements that 
determine if an attack is either widespread or systematic, and listed the elements as: 
                                                 
298 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 648.       
 
299 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 96 
referring to Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001, 
paragraph 431. 
 
300 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 206. 
 
301 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 203. 
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1. The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population; 
2. The number of victims; 
3. The nature of the acts; and 
4. The possible participation of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of 
crimes.302 
In addition, the Trial Chamber recognized that in assessing these 4 elements the “acts 
of the accused need only be a part of this attack.” 303   
 
The ICTR has also discussed the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’.  Initially there 
was some discrepancy between the English and French versions of the ICTR Statute.  
The English Statute used the terms disjunctively, whereas the French version of the 
Statute used them conjunctively, i.e., généralisée et systematique. 304   The Trial 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Musema clarified the Tribunal’s position and held that 
customary international law favoured the disjunctive test.  Thus the Musema 
Judgement adopted the English version of the Statute.305   
 
According to the Akayesu Judgement, the term ‘widespread’ means: “massive, 
frequent, large scale action carried out collectively with considerable seriousness.”306  
                                                 
302 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 625, 
upheld Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 
95. 
 
303 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 625, 
upheld Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 
96. 
 
304 Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and 
the Dictates of the Public Conscience” in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds), Essays on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 139 at 153.  See also 
discussion in Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Judgement, 27 January 2000, 
paragraphs 202-204, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, 
paragraph 328, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, 
paragraphs 869-870. 
 
305 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Judgement, 27 January 2000, paragraph 203. 
 
306 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraph 580.  
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‘Systematic’ denotes a plan that is “thoroughly organized and following a regular 
pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private 
resources.”307   The Akayesu definitions of widespread or systematic attacks were 
adopted in other ICTR cases, namely: Kajelijeli, Semanza, Bagilishema, and 
Musema.308   Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana not only adopted the Akayesu 
definitions, but it also explained why the ICTR requires crimes against humanity to be 
widespread or systematic.  The Chamber held, “either of these conditions will serve to 
exclude isolated or random inhumane acts committed for purely personal reasons.”309 
 
Ultimately, the ICTR and ICTY have concluded that the criteria for identifying the 
terms ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ will overlap.  The Blaškić Judgment, referring to 
case law from both the Tribunals, held: 
The fact still remains however that, in practice, these criteria will often be difficult to separate 
since a widespread attack targeting a large number of victims generally relies on some form of 
planning or organization.  The quantitative criterion is not objectively definable as witnessed 
by the fact that neither international texts nor international and national case-law set any 
threshold starting with which a crime against humanity is constituted.310  
 
                                                 
307 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraph 580.  
 
308 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, paragraphs 
871-872, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 
329, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, paragraph 77, 
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Judgement, 27 January 2000, paragraph 204. 
 
309 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgement, 21 May 1999, 
paragraph 123. 
 
310 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, paragraph 207.  
The conclusion reached in the Blaškić Judgment concerning the overlap in identifying the criteria for 
‘widespread or systematic’ has been adopted by the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, paragraph 77. 
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2. Attack directed against any civilian population 
 
Element 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the conduct was 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population” (emphasis added).   
 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute specifically defines the phrase ‘attack directed 
against any civilian population’ as: “a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 (of Article 7) against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.”   In addition, paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Elements of Crimes defines 
the phrase ‘attack directed against a civilian population’ as: “a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to article 7, paragraph 1, of the 
Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”  It is clear that these two definitions are 
substantially the same.  It may be noted that the Rome Statute refers to ‘a’ civilian 
population whereas the Elements refer to ‘any’ civilian population.    
 
The discussion of the Article 7(2)(a) Rome Statute and paragraph 3 of the 
Introduction to the Elements of crimes against humanity definitions of an ‘attack 
directed against any civilian population’ can be divided into four components:  
- The attack or course of conduct; 
- Multiple commission of acts; 
- Directed against any civilian population; 
- Pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. 
 
 178 
a. The attack or course of conduct 
 
i. Negotiations at the Rome Conference and Preparatory 
Commission 
 
Delegates at the Preparatory Commission, particularly the Arab States, debated over 
whether to include the Rome Statute Article 7(2)(a) definition of the phrase ‘attack 
directed against any civilian population’ as a separate Element in the Elements of 
Crimes.  Instead of adopting the definition as a separate Element, the agreement was 
reached to repeat the definition in paragraph 3 of the Introduction to the Elements of 
crimes against humanity provisions.311  
 
Regarding the phrase ‘attack directed against a civilian population’, paragraph 3 of 
the Introduction to the Elements of crimes against humanity further stipulates that 
“the acts need not constitute a military attack.”  Prior to this clarification, a group of 
delegates had proposed that the attack should either be a military attack or one carried 
out by violent means.  There was confusion, amongst the Preparatory Commission 
delegates, between the concept of attack in the context of Article 8 which pertains to 
war crimes, and attack in the context of crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 7 
of the Rome Statute.  Delegates at the Rome Conference had faced a similar dilemma.  
They came to the conclusion that the term ‘attack directed against any civilian 
population’, when considered in the context of crimes against humanity, acquired its 
very own special meaning.  It followed, therefore, that an ‘attack’, when spoken of in 
                                                 
311 Darryl Robinson, “The Context of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers Inc, 2001) at 73-74.  See also Preparatory Commission document 
PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39. 
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the context of crimes against humanity did not necessarily have to adopt the same 
meaning as attack in the context of war crimes.312   
ii. Customary international law 
 
The term ‘attack’ was defined by Chambers at the ad hoc Tribunals, discussed below.  
This jurisprudence can be relevant at the ICC to interpret the provisions found in 
paragraph 3 of the Introduction to the Elements of crimes against humanity and 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.   
 
The Stakić Judgment described an attack as something that can “precede, outlast, or 
continue during the armed conflict, but need not be part of it.”  In addition, an attack 
“is not limited to the use of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the 
civilian population.”313   
 
The ICTR has defined the term ‘attack’.  An attack is: “an unlawful act, event, or 
series of events of the kind listed in Article 3(a) through (i) of the Statute.”314   The 
Tribunal has further stipulated that “an ‘attack’ does not necessarily require the use of 
armed force; it could also involve other forms of inhumane mistreatment of the 
civilian population.”315    
 
                                                 
312 Darryl Robinson, “The Context of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers Inc, 2001) at 73-74. 
 
313 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 623. 
 
314 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 327 
summarized ICTR case law on the point and upheld the original definition of an attack outlined in the 
Akayesu Judgement.  
 
315 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 327.  
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b. Multiple commission of acts 
 
i. Negotiations at the 1998 Rome Conference 
 
Delegates at the Rome Conference felt that the phrase ‘course of conduct involving 
multiple commission of acts’ found its context in the fact that this course of conduct 
was directed against any civilian population.  This in itself suggested an element of 
massive scale.316   The terminology ‘multiple commission of acts’ was preferred over 
the phrase ‘commission of multiple acts’.  This was because delegates were concerned 
the latter phrase was open to misinterpretation, and could be construed as requiring 
the commission of more than one type of inhumane act.317  
ii. Customary international law 
 
The negotiators had also relied on the case law from the ICTY Tadić Judgment.  The 
Tadić Chamber was of the opinion that the prosecution of crimes should focus not on 
one particular act but on a course of conduct and, secondly, that use of the word 
‘population’ was intended to “imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude 
single or isolated acts.”318  The purpose of these provisions is generally to exclude 
isolated or small-scale events that do not reach the necessary level of seriousness 
                                                 
316 Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and 
the Dictates of the Public Conscience” in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds), Essays on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 139 at 155-156. 
 
317 Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and 
the Dictates of the Public Conscience” in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds), Essays on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 139 see footnote 83 at 
156. 
 
318 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 471-472. 
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required for international adjudication. 319  Tadić supports the view that the 
international community is concerned with international crimes as opposed to random 
acts that could be prosecuted within the domestic jurisdiction.320  
 
On the issue of whether crimes could be perpetrated as a series of acts or a single act, 
jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals indicates that “a crime may be widespread or 
committed on a large-scale by ‘the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts of 
the singular effect or an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude’”.321   It should be 
noted that the Simić et al, Krnojelac, and Kupreškić et al judgments, in particular, 
have all determined that “although persecution relates to a series of acts, a single act 
may be sufficient.”322 
 
                                                 
319 Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and 
the Dictates of the Public Conscience” in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds), Essays on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente, 1999) 139 at 156. 
 
320 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, paragraph 
653.  The Chamber held “the reason that crimes against humanity so shock the conscience of mankind 
and warrant intervention by the international community is because they are not isolated, random acts 
of individuals but rather result from a deliberate attempt to target a civilian population.” 
 
321 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
43, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 96, 
where the Appeal Chamber ruled “a single or relatively limited number of acts on his or her (the 
accused) part would qualify as a crime against humanity, unless those acts may be said to be isolated or 
random.”  See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000, 
paragraph 206, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, 
paragraph 649.     
 
322 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
50, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 433, 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraph 
624. 
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c. Directed against any civilian population  
 
i. Negotiations at the Rome Conference and Preparatory 
Commission 
 
According to delegates at the Rome Conference, use of the term ‘any’ in the phrase 
‘any civilian population’ indicated that the civilians did not have to be nationals of a 
specific foreign power.  The phrase ‘any civilian population’ encompassed civilians of 
any nationality as well as stateless civilians.323   
ii. Customary international law 
 
The phrase ‘directed against any civilian population’ is discussed below.  The 
discussion of jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals that follows is significant 
because the terms used by the Tribunals and the ICC are substantially the same.   
 
In the case of Prosecutor v. Stakić the Trial Chamber stated that the context of an 
attack is found in the phrase ‘directed against any civilian population’.  Therefore, it is 
important to show that the civilian population was the primary object of the attack.324  
According to the Simić et al Judgment, some of the factors that indicate the civilian 
population was the primary object of the attack include the method used in the attack, 
                                                 
323 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 485. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-
94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 634.   
 
324 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgement, 31 July 2003, paragraph 624, see 
also ICTR position in Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, 
paragraph 330 confirmed in Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 
October 2003, paragraph 42. 
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the discriminatory nature of the attack, the number of victims and their status, the 
nature of the crimes carried out in the course of the attack, etc.325 
 
The common view expressed in customary international law, such as the Geneva 
Conventions, is that the definition of ‘civilian’ includes “all persons who have taken 
no active part in hostilities, or are no longer doing so, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and persons placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention or any other reason.”326  This definition of ‘civilian’ has been 
adopted by both the ICTY and ICTR.327  
 
The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadić adopted a wide definition of ‘civilian population’.  
The Chamber held: “the emphasis is thus not on the individual victim but rather on 
the collective, the individual being victimised not because of his individual attributes 
but rather because of his membership of a targeted civilian population.”328   
 
                                                 
325 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
42. 
 
326 These are the prescribed categories of persons protected by Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. Note the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia adopted the same definition of 
civilian in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ICTY Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, 
paragraphs 637-638, see also Prosecutor v.  Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial 
Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraphs 547-548.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
adopted the same definition of civilian in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-T, Trial 
Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraph 582. 
 
327 For example, see Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ICTY Opinion and Judgment, 7 
May 1997, paragraphs 637-638; Prosecutor v.  Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial 
Judgment, 14 January 2000, paragraphs 547-548; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-T, Trial 
Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraph 582, and Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, 
Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, paragraph 873. 
 
328 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997, paragraph 644, 
discussed in Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity” in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume 1, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 353 at 367.     
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Regarding the population component of the phrase ‘directed against any civilian 
population’, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stakić was of the opinion that it is not 
necessary to show that the entire population in a geographic region were the object of 
the attack.  It is sufficient to show that the civilian population was the target of the 
attack as opposed to an attack directed against a random number of individuals.329   
 
d. Pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy 
 
i. Negotiations at the Rome Conference and Preparatory 
Commission 
 
The 1996 ILC Draft Code refers to the concept of a policy or plan in describing the 
systematic manner by which crime against humanity are instigated or directed by a 
Government or by any organization or group.  The ILC explained the reason for 
imposing this policy or plan requirement on crimes against humanity.  The ILC 
commentary on the Draft Code reveals that the purpose of this requirement is to 
exclude any isolated random acts that had nothing to do with the broader plan or 
policy.330 
 
                                                 
329 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 624 which 
upheld the reasoning in Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 
2002, paragraph 90.  Regarding the issue that a civilian population is not determined by the geographic 
territory or area, see ICTR judgements: Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial 
Judgement, 7 June 2001, paragraph 80; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial 
Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 330; and Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial 
Judgement, 1 December 2003, paragraph 875. 
 
330 International Law Commission Report, 1996 at paragraph 3, Commentary on Article 18: Crimes 
Against Humanity. 
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The Rome Statute is the first international instrument that specifically articulates the 
requirement that an attack must be committed pursuant to a State or organizational 
policy.331  Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines the phrase ‘attack directed 
against any civilian population’ as: “a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts… against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of 
a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”  (emphasis added).  
 
It is interesting to note that Canadian delegates at the Rome Conference had proposed 
that the Article 7(2)(a) Statute definition of the phrase ‘attack directed against any 
civilian population’ refer to a State or organizational “policy to commit such acts”.  
Concern was expressed by the Women’s Caucus of the NGO Coalition for the 
Establishment of the ICC about the Canadian proposal.  The concern was that, for 
example, if the phrase was ‘policy to commit such act’, then this could be construed 
as requiring that there had to be a policy to commit rape in order to prosecute a 
perpetrator for the crime against humanity of rape.  Hence, the wording was altered to 
‘policy to commit such attack’.332 
 
Negotiations at the Preparatory Commission on the issue of a State’s action or 
inaction were the most controversial.  On the one hand delegates were concerned that 
the ICC would infer a policy to encourage crimes where a State failed to act for purely 
innocent reasons.  For example, a State’s inaction could be attributed to “lack of 
                                                 
331 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, “The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against 
Humanity” (May 2000) 22(2) Human Rights Quarterly 335 at 368. 
 
332 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, vol 12, School of Human Rights 
Research Series (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002) at 479-480.  See also Nicole Eva Erb, “Gender Based 
Crimes Under the Draft Statute for the Permanent International Criminal Court” (Spring, 1998) 29 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 401. 
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awareness of the crimes, or a collapse of authority, or other inability to respond.”  By 
the second reading the majority of delegates were concerned about a situation in 
which, through methods of inaction, it could be concluded that a State or organization 
deliberately encouraged crimes by failing to respond.  The fear was that “terms like 
‘tolerate’ or ‘acquiescence’ might lead the court to leap from the simple fact of 
inaction to an inference of a policy, without considering the circumstances 
surrounding the inaction (e.g., an inability to respond).”333 
ii. Customary international law 
 
Jurisprudence from the ICTY and the ICTR differs from the provisions recognized in 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute and paragraph 3 of the Introduction to the 
Elements of crimes against humanity.  According to these provisions, the phrase 
‘attack directed against any civilian population’ is defined as: “a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts… against any civilian population, pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack” 
(emphasis added).   
 
In contrast, analysis of jurisprudence from the ICTY reveals that under customary 
international law there is no requirement to show that the acts which form the attack 
adhere to a policy or plan.  However, for evidentiary purposes, a plan or policy may 
be relevant to prove that there was a widespread or systematic attack, as well as show 
                                                 
333 Darryl Robinson, “The Context of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers Inc, 2001) at 74-75.  See also discussion in Mauro Politi, “Elements of Crimes”, in Antonio 
Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 443 at 464-465. 
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whether or not the actions of the accused were part of the attack.334  The Kunarac et al 
Judgment further explained that the existence of a policy or plan did not constitute a 
separate legal element of the crime.335 
 
As for analysis of jurisprudence from the ICTR, the Akayesu Judgement held: “there 
is no requirement that this policy must be formerly adopted as a policy of a state. 
There must however be some kind of preconceived plan or policy” 336  (italics 
emphasized).  Also Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, which confirmed prior ICTR and ICTY 
jurisprudence, held that, although a plan or policy may be evidentially relevant and 
show widespread or systematic attacks directed against a civilian population, the 
existence of a policy or plan does not formulate a separate legal element.337    
 
 
 
                                                 
334 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 551, footnote 811 quoting wide interpretations from Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999 paragraph 653, Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. 
IT-94-2, ICTY Trial Judgment, Rule 61, 9 October 1995, paragraph 26, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case 
No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 58, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case 
No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 98, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-
98-32, ICTY Trial Judgment, 29 November 2002, paragraph 36, Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-
95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 44. 
 
335 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, paragraph 98. 
 
336 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paragraph 580.  
 
337 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, paragraph 
872. See also Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, 
paragraph 329 and Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23/1, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, 
paragraph 98. 
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5. THE MENS REA REQUIRED FOR THE CRIME OF 
PERSECUTION 
 
In this chapter the writer will discuss the mens rea required to establish the crime of 
persecution.   
 
I. MENS REA PROVISIONS FOR ALL THE CRIMES THAT FALL 
WITHIN THE ICC’S JURISDICTION 
 
A. ROME STATUTE PROVISIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS AT THE 
ROME CONFERENCE 
 
The mental element for all crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction is established 
in Article 30 of the Rome Statute.  According to Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute, 
“unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”   
 
Article 30 is the first of its kind in any international instrument.  Not only does it 
require ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’, it also expressly defines the terms ‘intent’ and 
‘knowledge’.  Analysis of the numerous statutory instruments created prior to the 
Rome Statute reveals that although these instruments contained provisions which 
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articulated the criminal responsibility of perpetrators, none of them ever actually 
defined the required mens rea.338  
 
The specific definitions for the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ are established 
pursuant to Article 30(2) and (3) of the Statute.  The terms are defined in the 
following manner: 
(2) A person has intent where:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b) In relation to consequences, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.  
(3) ‘Knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur 
in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed 
accordingly.  
 
The distinction between the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ is simple.  ‘Intent’ refers 
to “the intent to commit the underlying offence.” 339   ‘Knowledge’ refers to 
“knowledge of the broader context in which that offence occurs.” 340 
 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute addresses two aspects of the mens rea requirement.  
Firstly, the provision deals with the degree of the mens rea, that is, the required 
intensity of the intent or knowledge in the mind of the perpetrator.   Secondly, the 
provision deals with the scope of the perpetrator’s intent or knowledge, that is, the 
                                                 
338 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: 
Justice for the New Millennium, International and Comparative Criminal Law Series (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002) at 208.  See for example Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, CCL 10, 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes. 
  
339 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraphs 556-557.  It may be noted that the Trial Chamber analyses customary international law 
from the ICTY and ICTR to reach this distinction between the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’.  
 
340 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraphs 556-557.  It may be noted that the Trial Chamber analyses customary international law 
from the ICTY and ICTR to reach this distinction between the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’.  
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analysis of the connection between the mens rea of the perpetrator and the material 
elements for the specific crime.341   
 
One criticism of the Article 30 provision, according to Leila Nadya Sadat, is that it is 
“narrow in scope”.  Sadat argues that the consequence of the conveners at the Rome 
Conference adopting the phrase “unless otherwise provided” in Article 30(1) of the 
Statute, expressly excludes other forms of criminal culpability, such as negligence or 
recklessness.342    
 
The phrase “unless otherwise provided”, the Article 30 provision actually leaves open 
the possibility of including other mental elements which are specified elsewhere in the 
Rome Statute.  For example, command responsibility for negligence.    
 
Van Sliedregt states that the scope of Article 30 of the Rome Statute does not extend 
to include recklessness because of the gravity of the crimes.343  Antonio Cassese is of 
the view that there are other forms of mens rea besides intent, for example, negligence 
and recklessness.  Cassese argues that mere negligence in light of the gravity of 
                                                 
341 Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, “General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of 
Crimes” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 28, 35.  
 
342 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: 
Justice for the New Millennium, International and Comparative Criminal Law Series (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002) at 208-209.   
  
343 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2003) at 52. 
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crimes against humanity would indeed be insufficient.344  Cassese discusses whether it 
would be appropriate to include recklessness, however, the discussion is not clear.345    
 
B. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND NEGOTIATIONS AT THE 
PREPARATORY COMMISSION 
 
Establishing a relationship between Article 30 of the Rome Statute and the Elements 
of Crimes was a major source of concern for the Preparatory Commission.  Delegates 
were faced with three dilemmas: should a mental element be defined for every crime? 
Was Article 30 of the Rome Statute sufficient on its own?  Should this decision be left 
up to the judges to decide for themselves?346  
 
Consequently, the Preparatory Commission resolved the dilemma by drafting 
paragraphs 2 – 4 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crime.  These 
paragraphs achieved two goals: they incorporated the Commission’s comments which 
it was hoped would clarify Article 30 of the Rome Statute and they also provided 
guidelines for the judges without necessarily creating additional Elements of 
Crimes.347   
 
                                                 
344 Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity” in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 
364. 
 
345 Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity” in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 
364-365. 
 
346 Knut Dörmann, with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War 
Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 11. 
 
347 Mauro Politi, “Elements of Crime”, in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 460. 
 
 192 
Paragraphs 2 – 4 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes stipulate the 
following provisions concerning mens rea:  
2. As stated in article 30, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.  Where no reference is made in the 
Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or 
circumstance listed, it is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or 
both, set out in article 30 applies.  Exceptions to the article 30 standard, based on the Statute, 
including applicable law under its relevant provisions, are indicated below. 
3. Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.  
4. With respect to mental elements associated with elements involving value judgement, such as 
those using the terms “inhumane” or “severe”, it is not necessary that the perpetrator 
personally completed a particular value judgement, unless otherwise indicated.   
 
Paragraph 2 of the General Introduction is often referred to as the ‘default rule’.348  
This default rule is significant because paragraph 2 explains how the mental element, 
articulated in Article 30 of the Rome Statute, shall be applied to the Elements of 
Crimes.349  The default rule, in simple terms, means unless otherwise provided Article 
30 of the Rome Statute will automatically apply to all the Elements of Crimes.  
Therefore, the implication is that the definitions of ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ provided 
in Article 30 are “applicable to any conduct, consequence or circumstance contained 
in the elements of crimes.”  Failure to apply the Article 30 provisions would mean 
that the perpetrator would not incur criminal responsibility.350  
 
                                                 
348 Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, “General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of 
Crimes” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 29-30. 
 
349 Knut Dörmann, with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War 
Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 11. 
 
350 Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, “General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of 
Crimes” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 29. 
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Paragraph 3 came about as a result of the general feeling at the Preparatory 
Commission that the Elements of Crimes placed an “excessive burden” of proof on 
the Prosecutor.351  Essentially, paragraph 3 states that the Prosecutor could infer the 
required mens rea from the relevant circumstances.  
 
There were concerns amongst delegates at the Preparatory Commission regarding the 
specific wording of paragraph 4.  If Article 30 was applied in a strict sense it would 
impose a heavy burden of proof on the Prosecutor.  For example, the Prosecutor 
would have to show that the perpetrator had reached an accurate conclusion about the 
legal terms and made a value judgment that the consequences of his or her acts were 
‘severe’ or ‘grave’.  Delegates felt that in order to show individual criminal 
responsibility it was not necessary that the perpetrator had legal knowledge of the 
terms or that the perpetrator had made a value judgment.352  Hence, paragraph 4 was 
drafted as we read it today.  
 
Paragraph 4 is particularly significant to crimes of persecution because Element 1 of 
Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes does in fact use the term ‘severe’.   Element 
                                                 
351 Knut Dörmann, with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War 
Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 12. 
 
352 Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, “General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of 
Crimes” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 35, the Authors stated it was 
sufficient if “the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that formed the basis for a certain 
conclusion as to a legal circumstance or a certain value.”  See also Knut Dörmann, with contributions 
by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) at 12-13.  Antonio Cassese argues that “the requisite mental element need not imply that the 
offender be cognizant of the legal definitions or legal implications of crimes against humanity.  It is 
sufficient for him to be aware of the factual conditions brought about by his conduct or of the likely 
factual consequences of his actions.” (Italics appear in the text). See Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against 
Humanity”, in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 365. 
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1 of the crime of persecution states: “the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to 
international law,∗ one or more persons of fundamental rights.”  In addition, 
persecution is defined in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute as: “the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”  Applying paragraph 4 of the General 
Introduction, it is not necessary for the Prosecution to show that the perpetrator made 
a value judgment with respect to the matter of severity. 
 
In addition to the provisions found in paragraphs 2 – 4 of the General Introduction to 
the Elements of Crimes, paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes 
against humanity states:  
The last two elements for each crime against humanity describe the context in which the 
conduct must take place.  These elements clarify the requisite participation in and knowledge 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.  However, the last element 
should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all 
characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or 
organization.  In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if 
the perpetrator intended to further such attack.   
 
The majority of delegates at the Preparatory Commission were in agreement that the 
perpetrator must at least possess knowledge of the overall context of their acts, that is, 
the attack was widespread or systematic and directed against a civilian population.353  
Therefore, paragraph 2 refers to knowledge of the contextual elements, i.e., 
widespread or systematic nature of the attack.  According to the provision, the 
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
 
353 Darryl Robinson, “The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 64.  
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Prosecutor is not required to prove that the perpetrator knew all characteristics of the 
attack.354  As for knowledge of the policy itself, the Prosecution would not have to 
prove that the perpetrator knew the precise details of the policy.355  
 
II. THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE 
PROVISIONS STIPULATED IN THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES ON 
THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION 
 
A. MENS REA FOR CRIMES OF PERSECUTION IN GENERAL 
 
All the provisions discussed above are applicable to crimes of persecution.  In keeping 
with the provisions stipulated in paragraph 2 of the General Introduction, the mental 
elements for crimes of persecution are found in the mens rea requirements resulting 
from Article 30 of the Rome Statute.356   
 
                                                 
354 See discussion in Darryl Robinson, “The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee 
(ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 72-73. 
 
355 See discussion in Kai Ambos, “Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the 
Crimes of the ICC Statute and of the Elements of Crimes” in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (eds), Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003) at 14. 
 
356 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 97.  
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B. THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A DISCRIMINATORY 
BASIS 
 
In addition to the provisions discussed above the crime of persecution has two further 
mental elements: (1) the discriminatory intent with which the crime is committed, and 
(2) the mental element found in Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes, discussed further below.  
 
Persecution is distinct from all other crimes against humanity because of the 
discriminatory basis by which the crime is committed.  The victims are targeted by 
reason of their identity.  The discriminatory grounds are found listed in Element 3 of 
the Elements Crimes and Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute.  They are: political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender… or other grounds universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law.    
 
Antonio Cassese, discussing the discriminatory nature of crimes of persecution, states 
“the element of persecution amounts to an aggravated criminal intent (dolus specialis, 
‘dol spécial’)” (emphasis appears in the text).   Cassese is of the view that in order to 
amount to crimes of persecution “the intent must be to subject a person or group to 
discrimination, ill-treatment, or harassment so as to bring about great suffering or 
injury to that person or group on religious, political or other such grounds.”357 
 
                                                 
357 Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity” in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 
364. 
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Customary international law from the ad hoc Tribunals supports the view that the 
“mens rea of persecution is the intent to discriminate forcibly against a group or 
members thereof by grossly and systematically violating their fundamental human 
rights.” 358   The Simić et al Judgment held that the perpetrator must intend to 
discriminate.  According to the Trial Chamber, “it is not sufficient for the accused to 
be aware that he is in fact acting in a way that is discriminatory; he must consciously 
intend to discriminate.”359  Regarding the discriminatory intent, the Trial Chamber in 
Krnojelac held, “the discriminatory intent must relate to the specific act charged as 
persecution rather than the attack in general, even though the latter may also in 
practice have a discriminatory aspect.”360 
 
C. WHAT MENS REA IS REQUIRED FOR ELEMENTS 1 – 6 OF 
ARTICLE 7(1)(H) OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES? 
 
Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute defines persecution as: “the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”  Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes, which parallels the wording in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute, states: 
                                                 
358 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
120-121, see detailed discussion of case law dealing with this matter.  
 
359 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
51.  The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac took a broad approach and held “while the intent to discriminate 
need not be the primary intent with respect to the act, it must be a significant one.” Prosecutor v. 
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 435.  See also 
Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Judgment, 2 November 2001, paragraphs 
194-198. 
 
360 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 436, 
reasoning upheld in Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 
2003, paragraph 51. 
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“the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more persons 
of fundamental rights.”  One could argue that the intent requisite which appears in the 
Article 7(2)(g) definition of persecution must also be read into the Element 1 
provision.  As noted previously, the term ‘intent’ is defined in Article 30(2) of the 
Rome Statute.  The perpetrator must intend to engage in the conduct, that is, the act of 
severely depriving, contrary to international law, one or more persons of their 
fundamental rights.  Furthermore, the perpetrator must have meant to cause that 
consequence, that is, the severe deprivation of fundamental rights, or have been aware 
that such severe deprivation of fundamental rights would occur in the ordinary course 
of events. 
 
Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the perpetrator 
targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of the a group or collectivity 
or targeted the group or collectivity as such.”  One could argue that the targeting of a 
group or collectivity requires the knowledge that a group or collectivity is being 
targeted by reason of their identity, referred to previously under the discussion of 
Antonio Cassese’s view regarding the discriminatory nature of crimes of persecution.  
The perpetrator must be aware that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur 
in the ordinary course of events as a result of his targeting the group or collectivity.  
Arguably, the resulting consequence that flows from the perpetrator’s actions, referred 
to in Element 1 of the Elements of the crime of persecution, is the deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law. 
 
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “Such targeting was 
based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.” 
According to Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, it is clear that Element 3 does not 
require a specific mental element because this could be ascertained objectively from 
the facts and circumstances.361  However, it is this writer’s opinion that the perpetrator 
must have intended to discriminate against a group or collectivity on the grounds 
previously articulated above under the discussion of Antonio Cassese’s view 
regarding the discriminatory nature of crimes of persecution.  The perpetrator must 
have intended to engage in conduct that was discriminatory, that is, discriminate 
against a specific group or collectivity.  The perpetrator must have meant to cause the 
consequence or was aware that it would occur in the ordinary course of events, that is, 
discriminating against a group or collectivity would result in the deprivation of their 
fundamental rights contrary to international law.  
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes establishes the nexus 
requirement for crimes of persecution.  Element 4 states: “the conduct was committed 
in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 1, of the Statute or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”+   
 
There are two issues to be considered regarding the mens rea surrounding Element 4. 
Firstly, there is a footnote to Element 4 which states: “it is understood that no 
                                                 
361 Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 97.  
 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that inherent in 
element 6.”  Element 6, discussed in detail below, requires that the perpetrator has 
knowledge of the overall context of the widespread or systematic attack that is 
directed against any civilian population.362  Secondly, according to Kai Ambos and 
Steffen Wirth, this nexus requirement established for crimes of persecution pursuant 
to both the Rome Statute and East Timor Regulation 2000/15 is said to be a 
jurisdictional requirement.363  Thus, Ambos and Wirth argue that it is not necessary 
for the perpetrator to know about the nexus requirement.  The requirement enables the 
court to exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute only those crimes of persecution “which 
are of an elevated objective dangerousness.”364   
 
According to paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes against 
humanity the context for each crime against humanity is described in the last two 
elements of each crime.  It follows, therefore, that Elements 5 and 6 of Article 7(1)(h) 
of the Elements of Crimes describe the context of crimes of persecution.  In addition, 
paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes against humanity stipulates 
that with regard to the last element, in this case Element 6, it is not necessary to show 
proof that the perpetrator knew “all characteristics of the attack or the precise details 
of the plan or policy of the State or organization.” 
 
                                                 
362 See discussion these Elements in Georg Witschel and Weibke Rückert, “Article 7(1)(h) – Crime 
Against Humanity of Persecution” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001) at 97.  
 
363 It must be borne in mind that Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes parallels the 
wording found in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.  Furthermore, the provisions established in 
Section 5(1)(h) of the East Timor Regulation 2000/15 are identical to those found in Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Rome Statute.  
 
364 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” (2002) 13(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72-74.  
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Element 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the conduct was 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.” Arguably, Element 6 establishes the mens rea required for Element 5.  
Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “The perpetrator knew 
or intended that the conduct was part of or intended to be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”    
 
The mens rea established in Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes 
reflects similar wording found in the chapeau to Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  
Essentially, the provision establishes that crimes against humanity must be committed 
with knowledge.  The chapeau simply describes crimes against humanity as: “acts 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.”  
 
The Rome Statute is the first international criminal instrument to expressly state that a 
perpetrator must have knowledge of the widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population.  In drafting the Rome Statute provisions, the 
negotiators were aware that a requirement for knowledge of such an attack could be 
inferred from customary international law. Also, Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
expressly established the mental element required for all crimes that fall within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.  Yet, despite this, delegates at the Rome Conference strongly 
expressed the view that knowledge of the attack had to be expressly stated in the 
Article 7 provisions in order to exclude any ambiguity on the matter.365 
                                                 
365 Darryl Robinson, “The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S. Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001) at 64.  
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The terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ which appear in Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Elements of Crimes are defined in Article 30(2) and (3) of the Rome Statute, 
discussed above.   
 
The mens rea provision found in Article 30 of the Rome Statute is, however, 
ambiguous when read in conjunction with Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes and Article 7 of the Rome Statute.   
 
Firstly, the provision does not clearly state what the knowledge of the perpetrator is 
supposed to relate to.  The perpetrator’s knowledge could relate to any of the 
following possibilities: “the existence of an attack against the civilian population?  
The nature of this attack (widespread or systematic)?  Or, the political and ideological 
principles of the attack that render it systematic?”366  Regarding these questions, it 
may be noted that Paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes against 
humanity requires that the perpetrator had knowledge of the context of the attack, that 
is, the widespread or systematic nature of the attack directed against any civilian 
population.   
 
Secondly, there is some confusion when Article 30 of the Rome Statute is read 
together with the chapeau to Article 7 and the Article 7(2)(a) definition of ‘attack 
directed against any civilian population’.  One is left wondering, for example, what 
exactly is the perpetrator required to know concerning the attack.  Also, is the 
                                                 
366 Kai Ambos, “Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the 
ICC Statute and of the Elements of Crimes” in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (eds), Man’s Inhumanity to 
Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at 27. 
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perpetrator required to know that the attack is pursuant to a state or organizational 
policy to commit such attack?367 
 
Ultimately, the perpetrator does not need to be aware of the precise details of the 
policy.  However, s/he must be aware of the overall context of the attack, that is, 
knowledge of their own role in the widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population. 368   In any event, the perpetrator’s knowledge could be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the perpetrator’s conduct.369  
 
The second limb of Element 6 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states that 
the perpetrator must have known “the conduct was part of or intended to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”  
 
Why is it so important that the perpetrator has knowledge of the widespread or 
systematic attack directed against the civilian population?  Simply because failure of 
such knowledge, be it actual or constructive, renders the crime an ordinary crime.  
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute describes crimes against humanity as widespread or 
systematic attacks directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the 
                                                 
367 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, “The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against 
Humanity” (May 2000) 22(2) Human Rights Quarterly 335 at 379-380.  DeGuzman argues the Article 
30 “requirement of intent and knowledge… does not apply to the chapeau of elements of crimes 
against humanity since the chapeau states that knowledge alone is sufficient.”  
 
368 Paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes against humanity.  See also, Kai Ambos, 
“Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the ICC Statute and of 
the Elements of Crimes” in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (eds), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on 
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 14. 
Also, Cherif M Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd rev edn) (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 264.  
 
369 Paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Elements for crimes against humanity.  See also Cherif M 
Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd rev edn) (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999) at 264.  
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attack.  Thus, knowledge of the widespread or systematic nature of the attack directed 
against a civilian population is required in order to establish the perpetration of crimes 
against humanity.  In addition, knowledge of the context of the widespread or 
systematic attack restricts the application of these international legal principles from 
ordinary isolated random acts or crime waves that do not amount to crimes against 
humanity.370   
 
III. HOW HAVE AD HOC TRIBUNALS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF 
MENS REA? 
 
Concerning the perpetrator’s knowledge of the context of an attack the Panel of 
Judges, in the East Timor Los Palos case, took into account the views laid down by 
both the ICTR and ICTY.  The Panel concluded that the perpetrator must have 
knowledge of the attack in the sense that the perpetrator should at least be aware of 
how the attack took place.  This involves knowledge of the actual act, that is, the 
nature, gravity, etc, and knowledge of the context, that is, the widespread or 
systematic nature of the attack.  According to the Panel, the perpetrator, and/or his/her 
aiders or abettors, having knowingly partaken in the risk of implementing the context 
of that attack, satisfies the mens rea requirements.  The Panel further found that “the 
perpetrator needs only to be aware of the risk of the existence of an attack and the risk 
of the existence of some circumstances of the attack, regardless of his or her 
knowledge about the details.” As for the perpetrator’s knowledge of his/her actions 
forming part of an attack in furtherance or pursuance of a policy, the Panel held that 
the perpetrator needs to be aware of such policy.  The perpetrator was to have 
                                                 
370 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
91, 93. 
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knowledge of the policy to the extent that the perpetrator was “taking the risk that he 
may be performing his conduct in the context of a policy upheld by a State or 
organization.”371  
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana referred to 
ICTY jurisprudence and Article 7 of the Rome Statute in its reasoning.  The Chamber 
held that the perpetrator must have grasped the overall context of his actions in the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity.  In doing so, it must be shown that the 
perpetrator was fully aware of the broader context of the attack in the sense that he 
knew that his actions formed part of a widespread or systematic attack which was in 
fact directed against a civilian population and in furtherance of a policy or plan.  
According to the Chamber this was the same view expressed at the ICTY and also in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute for the ICC.  The Chamber was of the opinion that “part 
of what transforms an individual’s act(s) into a crime against humanity is the 
inclusion of the act within a greater dimension of criminal conduct; therefore an 
accused should be aware of this greater dimension in order to be culpable thereof.”  
Therefore, it was necessary for the Prosecution to show ‘actual’ or ‘constructive’ 
knowledge of the broader context of the attack which, the Chamber noted, is what 
differentiates crimes against humanity from isolated random acts.372 
 
                                                 
371 Los Palos case, Case No. 09/2000, Trial Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, East Timorese 
Transitional Administration, Dili District Court, 11 December 2001 at paragraphs 640-642. 
 
372 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgement, 21 May 1999, 
paragraphs 133-134. 
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The reasoning in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement was upheld in later cases 
heard before the ICTR Chambers;373  however, it was simplified in Prosecutor v. 
Semanza where the Trial Chamber summarized the ICTR position and stated “the 
accused must have acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack and 
knowledge that his act formed part of the attack on the civilian population.”374  In 
addition, the Chamber noted, “the accused need not necessarily share the purpose or 
goals behind the broader attack.”375  
 
The ICTY Chambers have also discussed the mens rea requirements.  Jurisprudence 
from the ICTY indicates the perpetrator must have knowledge of the attack directed 
against a civilian population and knowledge that his or her acts form part of a policy 
of widespread or systematic attacks.376  
 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al stated that the mens rea requirements for crimes against 
humanity were difficult and controversial to determine.  The Trial Chamber did two 
things.  Firstly, it held that the mens rea requirements comprised two components, 
namely, “the intent to commit the underlying offence,” and as well as “knowledge of 
                                                 
373 See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, paragraph 
81, Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Judgement, 27 January 2000, paragraph 
206. 
 
374 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 332.  
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli described this summary as “the clearest statement of the Mental Element of 
Crimes Against Humanity so far”, and upheld the statement, see Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, paragraph 880. 
 
375 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, paragraph 332. 
 
376 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
37, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 621, 
Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 2003, 
paragraph 232, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, 
paragraph 59, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Judgment, 26 
February 2001, paragraph 185, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Judgment, 3 
March 2000, paragraph 247. 
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the broader context in which that offence occurs.”  Secondly, it adopted the ICTR 
position in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement.377   
 
The Trial Chamber in Kupreškić et al also made the observation that “a 
discriminatory animus is not an essential ingredient of the mens rea of crimes against 
humanity.  Nor are the motives (as distinct from the intent) of the accused, as such, of 
special pertinence.” 378   Prior to this Judgment, the issue that all crimes against 
humanity were believed to be committed with discriminatory intent had been 
problematic under customary international law; however, the Tadić Appeal Judgment 
resolved this confusion.  The Appeal Chamber rejected the mistaken belief that all 
crimes against humanity required a discriminatory intent but verified this was with the 
exception of crimes of persecution.379  
 
In summary, the jurisprudence laid down by the ad hoc Tribunals has established 
significant precedents for the ICC.  Of particular significance is the precedent set by 
the Panel of Judges in the East Timor Los Palos case.  This case is significant for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the provision for the crime of persecution, established in East Timor 
Regulation 2000/15, is identical to the provisions for persecution established pursuant 
to the Rome Statute.  Secondly, Los Palos case, discussed above, summarizes the 
jurisprudence laid down by both the ICTR and ICTY.  Briefly, the perpetrator must 
                                                 
377 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraphs 556-557, the reasoning of two components, ‘intent and knowledge’ upheld in Prosecutor v. 
Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 March 2003, paragraph 237. 
 
378 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 557. 
 
379 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, paragraphs 
273-305. 
 
 208 
have knowledge of the context of the attack, i.e. the widespread or systematic nature 
of the attack.    
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6. CONCLUSION  
 
I. THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION UNDER THE 
ROME STATUTE AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
 
The aim of this thesis was to analyze the technical definition of persecution found in 
Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes.  The discussion in this thesis showed that the Rome Conference 
deliberations, which resulted in the formulation of the Rome Statute, were a “political 
compromise or diplomatic expediency.”380  These deliberations resulted in a technical 
definition of persecution that was unclear in some respects.  The Statute definition 
was supplemented by Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes, which provided 6 
Elements required for the crime of persecution.  However, the Elements of Crimes 
were not clear either.381   
 
The Introduction in Chapter 1 of this thesis indicated that Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes paralleled the wording of Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of 
the Rome Statute.  The discussion showed that the provisions on the crime of 
persecution recognized in these two international instruments are substantially the 
same though few differences were noted. 
 
                                                 
380 The Hon. David Hunt, AO “The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ 
and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges” (2004) 2(1) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 56 at 58. 
 
381 Haveman, Roelof, et al (eds), Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2003) Series Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta, vol. 1 at 60-61. 
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II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF TERMS USED TO DEFINE THE CRIME OF 
PERSECUTION 
 
In Chapter 3, the writer analyzed Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes which addresses the kinds of deprivations that amounted to acts of persecution 
under the Rome Statute.  Element 1 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes 
states: “the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more 
persons of fundamental rights.”   
 
To reiterate briefly, the discussion of who could perpetrate crimes of persecution 
showed that any perpetrator could be prosecuted if it was shown that the perpetrator 
was individually responsible and liable for punishment.  In addition, the provisions in 
the Rome Statute require that the perpetrator acted in pursuance or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such attack.  Analysis of the phrase ‘severely 
deprived’, suggested harsh, extreme, serious etc, dispossession of a fundamental right.  
It was noted that the phrase ‘one or more persons’ in Element 1 did not reflect the 
provisions in the Rome Statute and the remaining Elements of the crime of 
persecution which used terminology such as ‘group’ or ‘collectivity’. The phrase 
‘contrary to international law’ depicts the nature of the severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights.  Regarding the issue of what constitutes fundamental rights, 
analysis of the Rome Statute deliberations, and the negotiations at the Preparatory 
Commission as well as judgments under customary international law showed that 
                                                 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
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none of these sources defined the phrase ‘fundamental rights’.  The writer opined that 
fundamental rights were the kinds of rights expressed in the International Bill of 
Rights.    
 
In Chapter 4, the writer discussed Elements 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the 
Elements of Crimes, which concern the manner of deprivations required for acts of 
persecution under the Rome Statute.  
 
Element 2 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the perpetrator 
targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity.”  
Analysis of the concept of targeting suggested that it meant the act of distinguishing a 
person on discriminatory grounds.  The phrase ‘by reason of the identity of the group 
or collectivity’ described the reason why the victim was targeted, i.e. because the 
victim belonged to or could be identified with a particular group or collectivity.  
Regarding the query posed in the Introduction in Chapter 1 of this thesis as to what 
differentiates the terms ‘group’ or ‘collectivity’, the illustration was given in Chapter 
4 that a sum of ethnic groups would not be referred to as a group but rather a 
collectivity.  
 
Element 3 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “such targeting was 
based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”  
The discussion of Element 3 as well as Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute showed 
that these provisions widened the grounds on which persecution could be committed.  
Up until the 1998 Rome Statute, customary international law had established that 
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persecution could be committed on political, racial or religious grounds.  In the 
Introduction in Chapter 1 the writer posed the question: on what other grounds than 
those stipulated in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute can the crime of persecution be 
committed?  This issue was addressed in Chapter 4 under the discussion of the phrase 
‘other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law’.  The observation was made that the International Bill of Rights prohibited 
conduct that was perpetrated on a number of discriminatory grounds which were not 
articulated in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute or Element 3.  For example, grounds 
such as: social origin, birth, colour etc.  It was concluded that, because the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes use the phrase ‘other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law’ in their provisions, this meant 
the ICC could include the grounds stipulated in the International Bill of Rights as they 
were universally recognized as impermissible under international law.     
 
Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of Crimes states: “the conduct was 
committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the 
Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+”  This provision concerned 
the nexus requirement, summarized in detail in Part III, below. 
 
The final part of Chapter 4 examined Element 5 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes which states: “the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”  Analysis of the term 
‘widespread’ indicated that it refers to the large-scale nature of the crime or the 
                                                 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other than that 
inherent in element 6.” 
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substantial number of victims involved.  The term ‘systematic’ refers to the degree of 
methodical planning involved in the perpetration of the crime.  The phrase ‘attack 
directed against a civilian population’ is defined in Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome 
Statute as: “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts… against 
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack.”  Analysis of the terms used in the Article 7(2)(a) 
definition showed that it was not necessary that the act constituting an attack 
comprised a military attack.  Jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals indicates that 
an attack could also include the mistreatment of the civilian population. The phrase 
‘multiple commission of acts’ denoted crimes committed on a massive scale.  This 
feature was said to distinguish crimes against humanity from random isolated acts that 
could be prosecuted by national courts.  Analysis of the phrase ‘directed against any 
civilian population’ revealed that this implies a multiple number of victims that were 
attacked on a large scale.  Finally, Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that it 
must be shown that the attack was carried out in pursuance or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy.  The policy could also be implemented by the deliberate 
failure of a State or organization to take action, thus consciously aimed at encouraging 
such attack.   
 
In Chapter 5, the writer examined the mens rea required for crimes of persecution.  
The writer discussed Article 30 of the Rome Statute which establishes the mental 
element required for crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction.  Analysis of Article 
30 indicated that, to show ‘intent’, it must be proven that the person meant to engage 
in the conduct and meant to cause that consequence or was aware that it would occur 
in the ordinary course of events.  The term ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a 
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circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.  
Analysis of the provisions in the Elements of Crimes which resulted from the Article 
30 requirements showed that existence of intent and knowledge could be inferred 
from the relevant facts and circumstances.  In addition, it was concluded that it is not 
necessary to show that the perpetrator made a value judgment as to the severity of the 
crime.  The Chapter also identified the effect that Article 30 of the Rome Statute and 
the related provisions of the Elements of Crimes had on the crime of persecution.  It 
was noted that crimes of persecution require an additional mental element of a 
discriminatory basis by which the crime was committed. 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ROLE OF THIS CRIME AT THE ICC 
 
In the Introduction in Chapter 1, the writer made the observation that the crime of 
persecution was an ancillary crime at the ICC.  The issue was explored further in 
Chapter 4 when the writer discussed the nexus requirement recognized in Article 
7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute and Element 4 of Article 7(1)(h) of the Elements of 
Crimes.  These provisions state that the crime of persecution must be committed in 
connection with any act found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute or in connection with 
any crime that fell within the ICC’s jurisdiction.   
 
Analysis of these provisions suggested that there were two roles that this ancillary 
crime could play at the ICC.  Firstly, persecution could be an aggravated form of an 
original underlying act.  For example, if a perpetrator tortured a victim because the 
victim belonged to a particular ethnic group this would amount to ethnic persecution.  
The statutory provisions for the crime of persecution would aggravate the act of 
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torture which is prohibited under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  Hence, a further 
connection to another act would not be required.  Secondly, persecution could be an 
autonomous crime that was connected to any act found under Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute or connected to any crime that fall’s within the ICC’s jurisdiction.  For 
example, if a perpetrator destroyed religious institutions and monuments etc. with the 
objective of forcibly removing or transferring a particular religious group then this 
would amount to religious persecution.  In this instance, the religious persecution was 
committed in connection with an act that would be prohibited under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute, that is, the deportation or forcible transfer of population.382   However, 
the crime of persecution “will not be a mere auxiliary offense or aggravating 
factor.”383   
 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORMULATING A CLEAR DEFINITION OF 
THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION IN THE FUTURE 
 
In conclusion, there are a number of reasons why the scope of the crime of 
persecution must be clearly defined in the future.  Firstly, crimes of persecution 
should not be considered as a ‘catch-all’ crime.384  In the case of Prosecutor v. Simić 
et al the Trial Chamber reasoned that, “the principle of legality requires that the 
Prosecution must identify and prove the particular acts amounting to persecution 
                                                 
382 See discussion in Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, “The Current Law on Crimes Against Humanity” 
(2002) 13(1) Criminal Law Forum 1 at 72. 
 
383 Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court” in Roy S. 
Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 101-102. 
 
384 Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2003) paragraphs 5-021, 5-022 at 106-107. 
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rather than charge persecution in general.”385   In addition, the Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al was of the opinion that “in order for persecution to 
amount to a crime against humanity it is not enough to define a core assortment of 
acts and to leave peripheral acts in a state of uncertainty.  There must be clearly 
defined limits on the types of acts which qualify as persecution” (emphasis appears in 
the Judgment).386   
 
Secondly, the crime of persecution must be articulated clearly so as to satisfy the 
cardinal principle of human rights law that a person cannot be tried, convicted and 
punished for conduct that was not criminal at the time the conduct was committed.387   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
385 Prosecutor v. Simić et al, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003, paragraph 
50, which confirmed the Stakić judgment where the Trial Chamber held “in charging persecutions, the 
Prosecutor must plead with precision the particular acts amounting to persecutions.” Prosecutor v. 
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, paragraph 735. 
 
386 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000, 
paragraph 618.  
 
387 Suzannah Linton, “Comments on the Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea”, Searing for the Truth – Comment and Analysis, Special 
English Edition, April 2003, Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam) at 37-38.  Available at: 
www.dccam.org 
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APPENDIX 1 – LEGISLATION 
 
 
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN 
AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE 
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS (LONDON 
AGREEMENT) (1945) 
Article 6 
(c)  Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
 
 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY 
OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY (1945) 
Article II 
1.  Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the 
country where perpetrated. 
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CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FAR EAST (1946) 
Article 5 
(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan. 
 
 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1993) 
Article 5 
Crimes against humanity 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for 
the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or 
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts.  
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STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA (1994) 
Article 3 
Crimes against Humanity 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation; 
(e) Imprisonment; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape; 
(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) Other inhumane acts. 
 
 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998) 
Article 5 
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
 1.  The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in 
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:  
 (a) The crime of genocide;  
 (b) Crimes against humanity;  
 (c) War crimes;  
 (d) The crime of aggression.  
 2.  The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and 
setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with 
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respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
Article 7 
Crimes against humanity 
 1.  For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
 (a) Murder;  
 (b) Extermination;  
 (c) Enslavement;  
 (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
 (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;  
 (f) Torture;  
 (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
 (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court;  
 (i) Enforced disappearance of persons;  
 (j) The crime of apartheid;  
 (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
  
2.  For the purpose of paragraph 1:  
 (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack;  
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 (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia 
the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population;  
 (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course 
of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;  
 (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the 
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are 
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law;  
 (e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; 
except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions;  
 (f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made 
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or 
carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in 
any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;  
 (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;  
 (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to those 
referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of 
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group 
or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;  
 (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of 
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political 
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to 
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of 
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.  
 
3.  For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to 
the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does 
not indicate any meaning different from the above.  
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REGULATION NO. 2000/11 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF COURTS IN 
EAST TIMOR (2000) 
Section 10 
Exclusive Jurisdiction for Serious Crimes 
10.1  The District Court in Dili shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following 
serious criminal offences: 
(a) Genocide 
(b) War crimes 
(c) Crimes against humanity 
(d) Murder 
(e) Sexual offences 
(f) Torture 
 
 
REGULATION NO. 2000/15 ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PANELS 
WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SERIOUS CRIMINAL 
OFFENCES (2000) 
Section 5 
Crimes Against Humanity 
5.1  For the purposes of the present regulation, "crimes against humanity" means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
and directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
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(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in Section 5.3 of the present 
regulation, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the panels; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
 
5.2  For the purposes of Section 5.1 of the present regulation: 
 (f) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity; 
 
 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(2000) 
Article 7 
Crimes against humanity 
Introduction (General Chapeau) 
1.  Since article 7 pertains to international criminal law, its provisions, consistent 
with article 22, must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against 
humanity as defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, warrant and entail individual criminal 
responsibility, and require conduct which is impermissible under generally applicable 
international law, as recognized by the principal legal systems of the world. 
2.  The last two elements for each crime against humanity describe the context in 
which the conduct must take place. These elements clarify the requisite participation 
in and knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 
However, the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the 
perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of 
the plan or policy of the State or organization.  In the case of an emerging widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element 
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indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further 
such an attack. 
3.  Attack directed against a civilian population in these context elements is 
understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. 
The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is understood that policy to commit 
such attack requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such 
an attack against a civilian population.# 
 
Article 7(1)(h) 
Crime against humanity of persecution 
Elements 
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,∗ one or more 
persons of fundamental rights. 
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group 
or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such. 
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law. 
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.+ 
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
                                                 
# “A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State 
or organizational action.  Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a 
deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack.  The existence 
of such policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of a governmental or organizational action.” 
 
∗ “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the Elements of 
Crimes.” 
 
+ “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this Element other than that 
inherent in Element 6.” 
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LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES 
COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 
(2002) 
Chapter II - Competence 
Article 3 
The Extraordinary Chambers shall the power to bring to trial all Suspects who 
committed any of these crimes set forth in the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia, and 
which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979:  
--Homicide (Article 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, and 508) 
--Torture (Article 500) 
--Religious Persecution (Articles 209 and 210) 
The statute of limitations set forth in the 1956 Penal Code shall be extended for an 
additional 20 years for the crimes enumerated above, which are within the jurisdiction 
of the Extraordinary Chambers.  
 
Article 5 
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects who 
committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 
1979.  Crimes against humanity, which have no statute if limitations, are any acts 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as: 
--murder; 
--extermination; 
--enslavement; 
--deportation; 
--imprisonment; 
--torture; 
--rape; 
--persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; 
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--other inhumane acts. 
 
 
STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2002) 
Article 2 
Crimes against humanity 
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the 
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population: 
a. Murder; 
b. Extermination; 
c. Enslavement; 
d. Deportation; 
e. Imprisonment; 
f. Torture; 
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of 
sexual violence; 
h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; 
i. Other inhumane acts. 
 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ROYAL 
GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA CONCERNING THE PROSECUTION 
UNDER CAMBODIAN LAW OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE 
PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (2003) 
Article 9 
Crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers 
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the crime of 
genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
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and such other crimes as defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 August 2001.  
 
 
STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY (2003) 
Article 12 
a) For the purposes of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
 
b) For the purposes of paragraph a): 
6. "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity; 
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF MEMBER STATES THAT SIGNED AND 
RATIFIED THE ROME STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
As of 11 June 2004, 93 Member States have ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court  
 
Member State Signed Ratified 
Afghanistan - 10 February 2003 
Albania 18 July 1998 31 January 2003 
Algeria 28 December 2000 - 
Andorra 18 July 1998 30 April 2001 
Angola 7 October 1998 - 
Antigua & Barbuda 23 October 1998 18 June 2001 
Argentina 8 January 1999 8 February 2001 
Armenia 1 October 1999 - 
Australia 9 December 1998 1 July 2002 
Austria 7 October 1998 28 December 2000 
Bahamas 29 December 2000 - 
Bahrain 11 December 2000 - 
Bangladesh 16 September 1999 - 
Barbados 8 September 2000 10 December 2002 
Belgium 10 September 1998 28 June 2000 
Belize 5 April 2000 5 April 2000 
Benin 24 September 1999 22 January 2002 
Bolivia 17 July 1998 27 June 2002 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17 July 2000 11 April 2002 
Botswana 8 September 2000 8 September 2000 
Brazil 7 February 2000 20 June 2002 
Bulgaria 11 February 1999 11 April 2002 
Burkina Faso 30 November 1998 16 April 2004 
Burundi 13 January 1999 - 
Cambodia 23 October 2000 11 April 2002 
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Cameroon 17 July 1998 - 
Canada 18 December 1998 7 July 2000 
Cape Verde 28 December 2000 - 
Central African Republic 7 December 1999 3 October 2001 
Chad 20 October 1999 - 
Chile 11 September 1998 - 
Colombia 10 December 1998 5 August 2002 
Comoros 22 September 2000 - 
Congo 17 July 1998 - 
Congo (Democratic Republic of) 8 September 2000 11 April 2002 
Costa Rica 7 October 1998 7 June 2001 
Côte d’Ivoire 30 November 1998 - 
Croatia 12 October 1998 21 May 2001 
Cyprus 15 October 1998 7 March 2002 
Czech Republic 13 April 1999 - 
Denmark 25 September 1998 21 June 2001 
Djibouti 7 October 1998 5 November 2002 
Dominica - 12 February 2001 
Dominican Republic 8 September 2000 - 
Ecuador 7 October 1998 5 February 2002 
Egypt 26 December 2000 - 
Eritrea 7 October 1998 - 
Estonia 27 December 1999 30 January 2002 
Fiji 29 November 1999 29 November 1999 
Finland 7 October 1998 29 December 2000 
France 18 July 1998 9 June 2000 
Gabon 22 December 1998 20 September 2000 
Gambia 4 December 1998 28 June 2002 
Georgia 18 July 1998 5 September 2003 
Germany 10 December 1998 11 December 2000 
Ghana 18 July 1998 20 December 1999 
Greece 18 July 1998 15 May 2002 
Guinea 7 September 2000 14 July 2003 
Guinea-Bissau 12 September 2000 - 
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Guyana 28 December 2000 - 
Haiti 26 February 1999 - 
Honduras 7 October 1998 1 July 2002 
Hungary 15 January 1999 30 November 2001 
Iceland 26 August 1998 25 May 2000 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 31 December 2000 - 
Iraq - - 
Ireland 7 October 1998 11 April 2002 
Israel  31 December 2000 - 
Italy 18 July 1998 26 July 1999 
Jamaica 8 September 2000 - 
Jordan 7 October 1998 11 April 2002 
Kenya  11 August 1999 - 
Korea (Republic of) 8 March 2000 13 November 2002 
Kuwait 8 September 2000 - 
Kyrgyzstan 8 December 1998 - 
Latvia 22 April 1999 28 June 2002 
Lesotho 30 November 1998 6 September 2000 
Liberia 17 July 1998 - 
Liechtenstein 18 July 1998 2 October 2001 
Lithuania 10 December 1998 12 May 2003 
Luxembourg 13 October 1998 8 September 2000 
Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of) 
 
7 October 1998 
6 March 2002 
Madagascar 18 July 1998 8 September 2000 
Malawi 2 March 1999 19 September 2002 
Mali 17 July 1998 16 August 2000 
Malta 17 July 1998 29 November 2002 
Marshall Islands 6 September 2000 7 December 2000 
Mauritius 11 November 1998 5 March 2002 
Mexico 7 September 2000 - 
Moldova (Republic of) 8 September 2000 - 
Monaco 18 July 1998 - 
Mongolia 29 December 2000 11 April 2002 
Morocco 8 September 2000 - 
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Mozambique 28 December 2000 - 
Namibia 27 October 1998 25 June 2002 
Nauru 13 December 2000 12 November 2001 
Netherlands 18 July 1998 17 July 2001 
New Zealand 7 October 1998 7 September 2000 
Niger 17 July 1998  11 April 2002 
Nigeria 1 June 2000 27 September 2001 
Norway 28 August 1998 16 February 2000 
Oman 20 December 2000 - 
Panama 18 July 1998 21 March 2002 
Paraguay 7 October 1998 14 May 2001 
Peru 7 December 2000 10 November 2001 
Philippines 28 December 2000 - 
Poland 9 April 1999 12 November 2001 
Portugal 7 October 1998 5 February 2002 
Romania 7 July 1999 11 April 2002 
Russian Federation 13 September 2000 - 
Saint Lucia 27 August 1999 - 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - 3 December 2002 
Samoa 17 July 1998 16 September 2002 
San Marino 18 July 1998 13 May 1999 
Sao Tome and Principe 28 December 2000 - 
Senegal 18 July 1998 2 February 1999 
Seychelles 28 December 2000 - 
Sierra Leone 17 October 1998 15 September 2000 
Slovakia 23 December 1998 11 April 2002 
Slovenia 7 October 1998 31 December 2001 
Solomon Islands 3 December 1998 - 
South Africa 17 July 1998 27 November 2000 
Spain 18 July 1998 24 October 2000 
Sudan 8 September 20000 - 
Sweden 7 October 1998 28 June 2001 
Switzerland 18 July 1998 12 October 2001 
Syrian Arab Republic 29 November 2000 - 
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Tajikistan 30 November 1998 5 May 2000 
Tanzania 29 December 2000 20 August 2002 
Thailand 2 October 2000 - 
Timor-Leste - 6 September 2002 
Trinidad and Tobago 23 March 1999 6 April 1999 
Uganda 17 March 1999 14 June 2002 
Ukraine 20 January 20000 - 
United Arab Emirates 27 November 2000 - 
United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland  
30 November 1998 
4 October 2001 
United States of America  31 December 2000 - 
Uruguay 19 December 2000 28 June 2002 
Uzbekistan 29 December 2000 - 
Venezuela 14 October 1998 7 June 2000 
Yemen  28 December 2000 - 
Yugoslavia (The Federal Republic 
of) 
 
19 December 2000 
6 September 2001 
Zambia 17 July 1998 13 November 2002 
Zimbabwe  17 July 1998 - 
 
 
Sources  
• Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org 
• International Committee of the Red Cross: www.icrc.org 
• International Criminal Court: www.icc-cpi.int 
• United Nations Treaty database: http://untreaty.un.org 
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